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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The keys to success in commodity agricultural production are market expansion to 
obtain scale economies, specialization, and adoption of cost reducing technologies. Producers 
and processors of commodities could only remain viable following the prescribed strategy of 
producing and marketing their goods as inexpensively as possible. The sustained race for cost 
reductions led to an adoption spiral of increasingly investment-intensive high-volume 
production technologies. As an alternative, some market participants not able to cope with 
the costs of technological upgrade started to look for different production and marketing 
models. Other entrepreneurs both at the production and processing stages foresaw the 
potential of marketing differentiated (value added) agricultural products, the most common 
avenue to success identified by industrial firms (Hennessy, Miranowski, and Babcock, 2004). 
These factors, coupled with an increase in consumer demand for specialty products, 
contributed to the tremendous (and sustained) growth of value added agriculture in the past 
decade.1 
Rising standards of living, and increasing health and environmental awareness are 
frequently cited as forces driving the demand for a variety of high quality products, highly 
processed products, and information about on farm activities. New production technologies 
and information systems available make it possible to supply the differentiated product that 
consumers are increasingly demanding. 
Participants in a supply chain of agricultural value added products face two 
significant challenges. First, many of the costly distinctive traits being desired by consumers 
are difficult (if not impossible) to observe even after consumption.2 In order for markets for 
these classes of goods to arise, firms touting the quality of the product need to be trusted. 
Hence, maintaining an excellent reputation is essential for firms to keep their customers good 
will. A complicating factor, addressed in this dissertation, is that in some circumstances 
1 For example, Dimitri and Greene (2002) reported that the retail industry for organic food has grown at a rate 
of 20% per year since 1990. 
2 That is, they fall into what Nelson (1970) and Darby and Kami labeled as experience and credence attributes. 
The former refers to attributes that can be observed after consumption (for example toughness of a steak), 
whereas for the latter consumption does not provide information about the quality of the product (e.g. free range 
eggs, dolphin safe tuna, organic beef). 
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delivered quality can only be imperfectly learned and/or affected stochastically by producers. 
For example, even after using the best genetics available and following best management 
practices to obtain tender beef, it is possible that the resulting beef is not tender. Also, 
elevators cannot be absolutely certain that the grain they handle contain the claimed traits. 
The list of examples is large. Secondly, production is conducted in an environment of yield 
uncertainty, making it impossible for producers and processors to predict how much of the 
input (and of what quality) will be available in any given season. Value added products may 
require the usage of specialized facilities, especially if they perishable, or if they have to 
follow a segregation protocol (e.g. some specialty grains). At least partial information about 
the volumes of the product that will be available for processing is needed, if facilities are 
going to be operated efficiently. The current discussion makes clear that production, 
processing, and marketing of some value added products require tighter coordination 
mechanisms than those afforded by open market transactions.3 
The food supply chain has reacted to the changes in consumer demand, by beginning 
to address the challenges just outlined. Contracting has been introduced to govern 
relationships within a supply chain. This provide a higher degree of coordination between 
different links of the chain, allowing downstream decision makers to have a more accurate 
idea of the amount of produce that will be available from their suppliers at any given point in 
time, which has obvious managerial implications. The choice between contracting and open 
market transactions has been the focus of much research. Much less is known about the 
rationale for co-existence of both markets, particularly in agriculture, which is somewhat 
surprising given the widespread presence of this phenomenon.4 Models where both markets 
co-exist have been presented for the electricity sector (e.g. Newbery, 1998). In agriculture, 
the first paper recognizing this co-existence explicitly is due to Xia and Sexton (2004). The 
prevalence of contracting in some sectors (such as poultry production), and the increase in its 
relative importance in other areas (e.g. specialty grains), may indicate that once contracts are 
introduced, eventually all production in that industry will be conducted under these 
3 Perhaps not surprisingly, many value added supply chains have chosen contracting as the way to govern their 
transactions. But see Chapter 2 and the references therein for more reasons advocated in the literature for 
contract usage. 
4 For examples, see Chapter 2. 
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arrangements. Some worry that if this is true, producers would not have the choice to remain 
independent, since they will not have access to markets, and will be forced to accept 
unfavorable contracts.5 More broadly, if reasonable conditions under which co-existence 
arises in equilibrium can not be found, co-existence could be seen just as a transition stage 
between the open market to contracting. In this sense, the steps to be followed by industries 
where contracting has just begun could be gleaned by observing other sectors more advanced 
in the transition. 
Additionally, some chains expend resources to control and/or learn about the quality 
of the products they deliver to their customers. In this context, a wide variety of privately 
and/or publicly developed and run quality assurance systems, with different degrees of 
stringency and accuracy have been introduced. For example, several dairy companies 
claiming that their products do not contain recombinant bovine somatotropin (rbST, a 
genetically engineered hormone used to enhance milk production), rely on information from 
suppliers about how their milk was produced. There is currently no test able to distinguish 
rbST milk from milk obtained from rbST treated cows (Carriquiry, Babcock, and Carbone, 
2003). Other companies, such as Laura's Lean Beef or Niman Ranch, have much more 
stringent quality controls (including site visits and product testing) in place (Carriquiry, 
Babcock, and Carbone, 2003). The choice and design of the optimal quality assurance system 
(with its associated stringency and accuracy) is contingent, in general, on the technology 
available, on the relevant economic environment, and on the objective pursued by the 
decision maker. In summary, some groups of producers and processors are trying to move 
away from the commodity paradigm and participate in a market for value added products, 
facing and addressing the particular challenges presented by this type of markets and supply 
chains. An analysis of the issues introduced is the focus of this dissertation. 
1.2 Dissertation organization 
In this section I provide a brief outline of the chapters that follow. Chapter 2 
introduces a theoretical model designed to study alternative mechanisms for the procurement 
of an agricultural product. More specifically, the focus is on the possibility of co-existence of 
5 This is especially relevant for agricultural industries, where the buyer side is usually concentrated, whereas the 
supply side (farmers) is atomistic. 
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two procurement channels, namely contract and spot markets. For the model proposed, co­
existence obtains as equilibrium for a wide variety of parameterizations. Hence, the mere 
introduction of contracting in an industry does not imply that spot markets will eventually 
disappear in that sector. Further, fundamental economic factors that affect the relative size of 
each market are analyzed. This provides information to policymakers about how to direct 
their policies if they decide to affect the market balance and favor one market over the other. 
Chapter 3 models the choice of the optimal quality assurance system (QAS) by a 
supply chain participant (an input processor), providing rationales for the wide variety of 
QAS observed in the real world. The QASs can be seen as efforts by processors to obtain 
information and control (stochastically) the quality of the product they deliver. The variables 
under the control of the processor are the degree of "stringency" or assurance in his/her 
quality control system over procurement of agricultural output when there exists uncertainty 
about quality, and the amount of the output to procure, both under a profit maximization 
goal. Downstream customers choose the amount of product to buy from the processors. 
Incentives for implementing QASs are given by reputational mechanisms, in the sense that 
processors will face a positive demand only if a product of substandard quality was not 
discovered by its customers in the past. The effects of different market structures (monopoly 
and duopoly), natures of reputations (firm specific and industry-wide), and quality 
discoverability (from credence to experience attributes) on the choice of the quality assurance 
system are explored analytically and numerically. Then, firms' profits and consumer welfare 
are compared for each scenario. Concluding remarks close the chapter. 
Chapter 4 investigates the fundamental economic factors to consider in the 
development of quality certification programs for red meats. The focus of the chapter is on 
beef tenderness, but the framework applies broadly. A decision framework is proposed to 
determine optimal thresholds for certification based on the results of tenderness 
measurements. That is, a product certification, as opposed to a process certification is 
analyzed. Identification of thresholds for certification of tenderness has been an elusive task. 
A review of the meat and animal science literature points to the lack of clearly defined 
objectives as the source of much confusion. In the framework analyzed, the decision maker 
receives a signal of the tenderness of a particular beef cut and has to decide whether to certify 
5 
it as tender and sell it for a premium, or not to certify it and obtain a commodity price for it. 
The analysis reveals that the optimal threshold depends on the objective pursued, the 
distribution of quality available in the cattle population of interest, the distribution of tastes in 
the consumer target population, the degree of accuracy with which tenderness can be 
measured, and the value that the decision maker assigns to different costumers. The 
framework is then put to work, using data on Warner-Bratzler shear force (the most accurate 
method currently available to measure tenderness) and consumer's perceptions. 
General conclusions and a discussion of possible extensions are provided in the last 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2. CAN SPOT AND CONTRACT MARKETS 
CO-EXIST IN AGRICULTURE? 
2.1 Introduction 
A growing proportion of agricultural production is being raised and sold under 
contract arrangements. The literature is rich in reasons for the increasing use of contracts (see 
for example Barkema, 1993; Drabenstott, 1994; Dimitri and Jeaenicke, 2001; Featherstone 
and Sherrick, 1992; Sykuta and Parcell 2003; Hennessy 1996; Hueth and Ligon 1999; 
Hennessy and Lawrence 1999). The move to production under contracts has some 
concerned about the viability of remaining spot markets and about the degree to which 
farmer welfare is negatively impacted by market power of processors (Smith 2001; 
Hayenga et al. 2002). 
While a lot of research has been devoted to the spot market versus contracts 
question (starting with the work of Coase [1937]), much less is known about the 
motivations that lead to the co-existence of both spot and contract markets. It is somewhat 
surprising that agricultural economists have not explored the rationales for co-existence 
thoroughly since many important sectors exhibit this feature1. The first paper that explicitly 
models co-existence of spot and contract markets in agriculture is by Xia and Sexton 
(2004)2. The point made by these authors is that "top-of-the-market-pricing" (TOMP) 
clauses in cattle procurement result in reduced competition, when buyers can also influence 
the base price. The intuition is that as buyers have committed to buy output at a price tied 
to a spot price to be determined later on, they have incentives to compete less aggressively 
in that market. In their setting, due to externalities or coordination problems among 
themselves, sellers can be induced to sign contracts that are not in their collective best 
interests with little or no financial incentive. 
In this paper, we study how fundamental economic factors (prices, production 
variability, competitive environment, and costs) influence the relative profitability of contract 
and spot production for farmers and processors. Our objective is to gain insight into how 
1 Some examples are hogs, corn, soybeans, wheat, and cattle. 
2 For an example of a model where co-existence may result in equilibrium in a non-agricultural setting, see 
Newbery (1998). This author models the British electricity market focusing on the use of contracts as entry-
deterring devices. 
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these factors help determine the incentives for participation in contract and spot markets. For 
the sake of concreteness, this article focuses on co-existence of spot and contract markets 
in the context of specialty grain production. However, the economic forces at work apply 
broadly (to any industry where the same group of buyers and sellers participate in spot and 
contract markets, and the buying side is concentrated). 
2.2 Specialty grain production and marketing 
Increasing proportions of agricultural products being produced and sold under 
contracts have been reported not only on livestock (Lawrence and Hayenga 2002; Hayenga 
et al. 2000) and fruits and vegetables, but also on some grains and oilseeds. For example, 
the National Agricultural Statistics Services (NASS, 2003) reports that 10.4 percent of all 
U.S. corn production, 8.6 percent of the soybeans, and 4.8 percent of the wheat was sold 
through marketing contracts in 2001. The value of the three crops marketed under contracts 
was about $2.25, $1.25, and $0.25 billions for corn, soybeans, and wheat respectively. 
However, the proportion of specialty grains and oilseeds planted under contracts is much 
larger. Just to mention a few examples, the U.S. Grain Council reports that about 60-70 
percent of waxy com and 60-65 percent of white corn are grown under contracts, with the 
remaining area produced speculatively for the spot market. The interest in planting and 
marketing specialty com and soybean is growing (Good et al. (2000)). These authors 
conducted a survey of grain handling firms in Illinois. In 1998, these firms obtained 85 
percent, 87 percent, 59 percent, and 96 percent of the volumes handled of high oil, white, 
yellow food grade, and waxy com respectively from contracts with farmers. The remaining 
product was procured mostly through spot markets. For soybeans, the surveyed firms 
reported that 97 percent, 80 percent, and 85 percent of the volumes handled of STS 
(Dupont herbicide-tolerant), tofu, and non-GMO soybeans were obtained through contracts 
with farmers. Thus, the firms surveyed procure most of the input (for both types of crops) 
through contracts, using existing spot markets as residual suppliers. 
Marketing contracts are most often used for procurement (NASS 2003; Boland et al. 
1999). The market price plus a premium accounted for 60 percent of the contracts reported 
in a survey of specialty corn producers conducted by Ginder et al. (2000). A premium is 
paid over a reference price (yellow no. 2 corn), conditional on the crop meeting certain 
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quality specifications. Yield drags, higher variable costs of production (specially 
transportation and handling), and additional management time required are among the 
reasons that producers command premiums to plant specialty crops (Fulton, Pritchett, and 
Pederson, 2003).3 
The situation modeled in this paper is similar to that in Xia and Sexton (2004) in the 
sense that we model an oligopsonistic industry that contracts with upstream price taking 
input providers and the market for processed products (downstream) is perfectly 
competitive. The TOPM clause is also assumed to be used in our model. However, we 
depart from this setting by modeling a situation where the pricing arrangement embedded 
in the contract is not affected by the behavior of buyers in the spot market. That is, buyers 
do not have power in the market to influence the reference price to which the contract price 
is pegged,4 although they can influence price in the cash market for the commodity 
procured. Four other distinctive features of our model are as follows; a) we assume a 
harsher type of competition (in prices) in the spot market; b) we include uncertainty as a 
factor inherent in agricultural activity; c) we recognize that at any given point in time or 
growing season, there is only so much of an homogeneous output coming from a fixed pool 
of producers (i.e. supply in the cash market is fixed, influenced by decisions made possibly 
months in advance5); and d) processors are constrained in the amount of the agricultural 
produce they can process at any point in time. There are concessions, of course, that one 
has to make to model a more realistic setting. First, we lose some tractability, in the sense 
that we are not able to obtain analytic solutions for some cases. Second, an ad hoc 
assumption is needed to close the model in one of the possible scenarios (more on this to 
follow). 
The situation we examine is fairly typical in agriculture. Processors offer farmers 
contracts to purchase all production on a specified number of acres at a price pegged to a yet 
to be realized market price. In other words, the pricing arrangement embedded in the contract 
3 Within value enhanced corn, average premiums were highest for white corn and lowest for hard endosperm 
varieties over the 1996-2001 period (Stewart, 2003). 
4 For example, most specialty grain contracts use commodity prices as references. Good, Bender, and Lowell 
(2000) found that virtually all specialty grain handlers (corn and soybeans) in Illinois pay premiums based on 
cash or futures markets for commodities. Thus, it is reasonable to assume they can not manipulate the base 
price. 
5 This is also recognized by Weninger and Reinhom (n.d.), and by Sexton and Zhang (1996). 
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is TOMP, or "market price plus a premium".6 Each processor has a target amount of 
production to procure. Procurement in excess of this target—for example, when per-acre 
yields are very high—can be sold at some salvage price, which is assumed throughout to be 
the commodity price for the product. When contract supply is low, the processor can turn to 
the spot market to make up the difference, but only if farmers have planted for the spot 
market. The price in the spot market clears the ex post (after random yields are realized) 
processor demand with the fixed supply of the product. Thus, stochastic yields lead to 
stochastic spot market prices. We account for such economic factors as the price the 
processor receives for output, salvage values of excess supply for the processor and the 
farmer, the farm-level cost of production, the number of farmers and processors, and the 
amount of yield variability. We find that purely financial reasons can explain the preference 
of contract and/or spot market procurement. 
We begin by providing an overview of the problem to be addressed here and then 
present a formal presentation of a model that captures the profit incentives of processors and 
farmers. Numerical simulations show how the Nash solution reacts to changes in key 
economic parameters. These simulation results allow us to determine the key factors 
affecting the preference of farmers and processors for contract and spot production. 
2.3 Overview of the problem 
Suppose there are M input buyers (processors) in a geographic region who can enter 
into grower contracts that specify that the processor will purchase at a guaranteed premium 
over a yet to be determined market price all the production that comes off of contracted 
acres. There are N growers. Each of the M processors has a capacity constraint Q that limits 
the amount of delivered input that can be used.7 Output technology for the processor is a 
fixed proportions technology q = k(Acy + xs ), where q is output, Ac is acreage contracted by 
each processor, xs is the amount bought on the spot market, and y is the per-acre yield on all 
6 Note that we are not making any claim about the efficiency of this contract (observed) relative to other 
mechanisms. Incentives that shape the form of the contract (e.g., related to quality assurance, etc) are taken as 
given and not modeled formally. 
7 We motivate the target amount of input to procure as given by the capacity constraint. However, that target 
could also be the result of processor's commitments with downstream customers. For example, Good, Bender, 
and Lowell (2000) report that 66 percent of all firms handling white corn in Illinois contract with sellers based 
on acres, and 61 percent contract with buyers based on bushels. These percentages are 80 percent and 48 
percent for waxy corn, and 87 percent, and 47 percent for STS soybeans. 
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spot and contract acres in a given year.8 At no additional cost of generality, the conversion 
factor between raw input and output k is set to one (by choosing units of measurement 
appropriately). A problem arises because per-acre yield on the contract acres is stochastic so 
that the total quantity of produced input from contracted acres will vary from the amount 
needed by the processor to achieve capacity production. Any excess production can be sold 
by the processor for a salvage price. Farmers have the option to plant additional acres without 
a contract. The amount of production depends on the expected spot price they will receive. 
The ex post input price in the spot market equals the commodity price if there is excess 
supply of the input. If, ex post, there is excess demand of the input in the spot market, then the 
spot price of the input (given that there are sufficient buyers) will be bid up to the point where 
profits for the processors equal zero. Under certain excess demand conditions, there is no 
equilibrium price that can be obtained. That is, there is no general solution to the problem of a 
limited number of buyers bidding for a fixed supply of the input. To get around this problem, 
we assume, for now, that the spot price in such excess demand conditions is midway between 
the excess demand and the excess supply prices. 
The processor offers to identical risk-neutral farmers a premium, ô, and a total 
number of contract acres, Ac. If this contract price exceeds or meets the opportunity cost of 
land, then the processor will find an excess demand for the contract acres and will not have a 
problem finding takers for the contracts. We assume throughout that farmers will not plant 
for the spot market if they know they will be obtaining the commodity price for their output9. 
The processor's capacity constraint and the number of contract acres determines the 
probability that production will be less than that needed to run at capacity. This creates the 
possibility that the processor will find it profitable to buy in the spot market. If this 
probability is high enough, this creates an incentive for farmers to produce for the spot 
market. 
The processor can control the profitability of farmers growing for the spot market 
through the choice of Ac. That is, increases in Ac decrease the profitability because there 
8 Sexton (2000) discusses the fixed-proportions assumption in models of agricultural markets. 
9 This is consistent with the survey findings previously reported. 
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will be less total spot demand. There is a spot market supply curve As = g(Ac) with g4 < 0 
that captures farmers' willingness to plant for the spot market. 
Then, each processor i has a demand for contract acreage function that results from 
the profit-maximization problem that depends on the number of spot acres and the number of 
acres contracted by its rivals: A c l  - h ( ^ A c _ l - , A s j .  Vector A c _ .  contains the acreage 
contracted by other processors in the industry. Presumably, hA < 0 ; hj <0 because an 
increase in the demand for contracted acres by the processor's rivals increases the premium 
required to entice farmers to take contracts, and increases in spot market acreage decrease the 
payoff from additional contract acres. All of the above is common knowledge for both 
farmers and processors. 
Farmers and processors face a two-stage optimization problem. In the first stage 
processors decide simultaneously and independently the premium to pay for the input and 
how many contract acres to offer. The farmer's choices are whether to take the contracts 
offered and how many acres to plant for the spot market. Contracts cannot be reoffered. Both 
decision makers face spot price uncertainty caused by supply uncertainty from random 
yields. They would also face uncertainty in the contract price, since the premium is tied to a 
yet to be determined cash price, and premiums usually reflect quality differences. To keep 
things simple, however, we assume that the reference price and quality are fixed at their 
expected value. In the second stage, processors compete to buy the input they need if it turns 
out that the contracted input is not enough to work at capacity. The optimization problem is 
solved using backward induction. The next section formalizes the problem described so far. 
First, we analyze the optimization problem of processors; then, we analyze the problem 
farmers face. 
2.4 The model 
2.4.1 The processor problem 
The second stage of the processor problem occurs after harvest, so yield uncertainty 
has been resolved. Ex post, processors face a perfectly inelastic supply of the homogeneous 
input, given by the total acres planted for the spot market multiplied by its yield. 
12 
After observing yield y, processors decide whether or not to try to buy more input. 
The second-stage (ex post) demand for each processor is xs = (Q- Acy) ,](> which can be 
negative if it turns out that the processors get more input than they need. 
The price in the spot market, and hence the allocation of the rent among farmers and 
processors, will depend on the ex post relative "bargaining" power. Spot price is determined 
by demand and supply in the spot market, both of which are determined by planting and 
contracting decisions made in the first period. In this stage, processors bid simultaneously 
and independently to purchase the amount of input they need (if any) to work at capacity. 
Processors are engaging in a Bertrand type of competition with each other. After seeing the 
bids of each processor, farmers decide whether to sell their production to one of the 
processors (and to which one) or not to sell at all and obtain the salvage value for the 
production. For the allocation of the input, we assume that farmers will sell it first to the 
processor offering the highest price This processor is able to buy all the input he or she 
needs (if less than the aggregate supply); then, farmers offer the input remaining to the 
second-highest bid, and so on. In case of a tie, the input is distributed evenly across 
processors (in the cases where there is excess demand). In short, we are using a "highest offer 
first" allocation rule (see Weninger and Reinhorn, and footnote 18). 
Ex post, processors will find themselves in one of four possible scenarios 
regarding their demand for additional production. The first situation examined is when yields 
are high enough so that processors exceed their capacity constraint with contracted 
production. This occurs when y> — . Any surplus production on contract acres will be sold 
A 
at the going salvage or commodity price. In this case, profits for the processor are 
or 
10 The resulting demand is rectangular. Processors will demand X s  as long as the spot price does not exceed 
their marginal valuation of the input. 
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where p is the price of output (net of processing costs)11, and + 5 is the per-unit price of 
contracted acreage. Here x s  =  ( Q - A c y )  < 0, and the firm is getting some money back for 
the excess input. Note, however, that processors lose money on each bushel contracted in 
excess of their target. They would have contracted less acres, had they known that such a 
realization of y was going to occur. This situation happens with probability 
Pr(^ > —) = Pr(>> > v) = 1 - F ( v ) , where v = —, and F ( - )  is the cumulative distribution 
4 4 
function of yield. 
The second scenario occurs when ex post demand by processors is positive but there 
is still excess supply in aggregate. That is, ]jT ^  (Q - Aciy) < Asy, where As is total acreage 
planted for the spot market by all farmers. Thus A s y  is ex post aggregate, fixed supply in the 
spot market. The range of yields for this situation is given by 
Because there is still aggregate excess supply, an offer by processors of r = rx for 
spot production (where rx is the salvage value for spot production) constitutes a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium12. This is what Sexton and Zhang (1996) observed in the market for 
California iceberg lettuce.13 Processors do not need to bid the price up to get all the input 
they need to work at capacity. 
Again processors can work at capacity, and profits are 
^2  =^8- (^+^)4) ' -n (8 -4^) ,  
11 p = P — C , where P denotes the output price (taken as given by the processor) and C represents the per-
unit processing costs. 
12 One could argue that there is not much strategic interaction in this scenario and that simple supply and 
demand analysis would yield the same outcome, since it is optimal for a processor to bid the reservation price of 
farmers no matter what other processors do. However, we can also say that bidding r{ is a dominant strategy 
for all processors and we can analyze all scenarios using the same framework. This situation would be 
representative of what happened on the 1999 crop year for white corn. A combination of higher-than-normal 
yields, combined with a substantial increase in the number of acres planted by speculators (or "wildcatters") led 
to excess supply conditions (Boland et al., 1999). 








where v is defined as above, and u = -, r. 
(À+lu) 
The third scenario is when there is excess demand ex post but only one processor 
would not have enough production to run at capacity. One would think that in an excess 
demand condition, processors would bid up the spot price to the point in which all their rents 
are dissipated. But if only one processor does not have enough input to run at capacity, then 
there is an incentive for this processor to strategically underbid his or her rivals for the 
residual supply. This is the case in which a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies fails, in 
general, to exist.14 Edgeworth cycles may arise in this case (following a loose dynamic 
argument). For example, the price may rise as the processors try to increase their share in the 
input market, until the profit of doing so is lower than the one resulting from offering the 
reservation price of the farmers (or commodity price) and keeping the residual supply. Once 
the price is at the reservation price of the farmers (or low enough), processors will find it 
profitable to bid s above their rivals and work at capacity. 
symmetric solution in which processors get an even distribution of the fixed supply (i.e., each 
capacity. Profits in this case are 
14 Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Tasnadi (1999), and Levitan and Shubik (1972) addressed this problem for 
capacity-constrained duopolists. Weninger and Reinhom (n.d.), studying a more closely related problem 
(oligopsonists facing a fixed supply), concluded that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this problem exists if 
the number of buyers is sufficiently large and the price space is discrete. 
This case implies Because we are assuming a 




where rs is the resulting input price in the spot market. 
In this case we cannot know with certainty what rs will be. The Nash equilibrium for 
this situation will be in mixed strategies, implying that the payoff function will not be 
continuous15. To close the model, we set it equal to the average of the marginal valuations of 
the processors and the farmers. This case happens with probability 
Pr 
(M- l )S  
= Pr ( s  <  y  <  u )  =  F  ( u )  -  F  ( s )  •  
where u is defined as above and 5 = 
(4+1"™14) 
The fourth and final scenario is when yield is so low (given the areas contracted and 
planted for the spot) that at least one processor would be left out of the market if that 
processor tries to underbid his or her rivals. For example, the second-to-last processor finds 
some supply but it is not enough to work at capacity. In this case, there is no room for 
strategic underbidding by the last processor. If the last processor tries to underbid his or her 
rivals, he or she will be left out of the market. This will happen if '(Q-A c iy ) > A sy , or, 
( M - l ) Q  
equivalently, y < —-. The pure strategy Nash equilibrium here is for processors 
(4 + LV 4,) 
to offer their marginal valuation (/?) for the input. Processors will again split the input 
evenly and will not be able to work at capacity. Profits in this case are 
x 4  =  p A y + p ^ r - { r \ + ô ) A c y - p ^ -  =  { p - { r \ + ô ) ) A c y -
This will occur with probability 
{ M - l ) Q  
Pr y 
%+z:"4  
= Pr (y  < 5)  = F ( s )  
where s is defined as above. 
15 The mixed strategy equilibrium for M= 2 is presented in Appendix A. 
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2.4.1.1 Processor expected profits 
Now we are ready to write the first-stage objective function of a representative 
processor. Bearing the rules that will arise in the second stage in mind, processors 
independently and simultaneously make a decision as to how many contracts to offer and 
price premiums to pay in order to maximize their expected payoff. That is, each processor 
chooses Ad and S to maximize its expected profits, which are defined as 
^ |4,-,, 4 ) = ^ ((p - (n+4) - n ) (8 - 4,y) |% < Pr (:x > % ) 
+E 
z 1 [ p - ( r x + ô ) ) A c i y  +  ( p - ( p  +  r x ) l 2 ) - ^ y \ s < y < u  |Pr(a<j,<w) 
-  (n+4)  4 , :x  k  -  ^  4  
subject to the constraint that the contracts need to be accepted by farmers. This objective 
function can be rewritten as follows: 
^ 4 - r, ^ W + G(1 - FM) + I - (2.1) 
v 
where f ( y ) ,  0 < y  <  y m  is the density function for the random yield and E ( y )  is the expected 
value of the yield. Formally, the problem is 
««£(» , | 4w,4)  
subject to 
( r , + S ) E ( y ) > C \ a , + a c ) .  
The marginal cost for farmers of planting an acre of the specialty crop is C\as + ac ). 
The number of acres planted for the cash market and contract market by a farmer are as and 
ac respectively. The farmer's problem will be presented subsequently. The constraint 
indicates that the expected marginal revenue of a contracted acre can not be lower than the 
marginal cost of planting that extra acre. In other words, the premium and number of acres 
offered to a farmer have to be consistent with his or her supply schedule if the contract is 
going to be accepted16. The constraint has to be binding at any optimum for this problem (if 
16 Here we are interpreting the supply function as giving the minimum price per unit at which firms are willing 
to sell any given quantity. 
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any positive number of contracts is offered). Otherwise, processors can reduce the financial 
incentive offered and still entice acceptance of the contracts by farmers. This observation 
allows us to subsume the constraint into the objective function, and perform the optimization 
only with respect to the number of contracts offered17. 
The first-order condition for a maximum is found by differentiating 
equation (2.1) with respect to Ac using the Leibnitz rule. After imposing symmetry and using 
some algebra, we get 
with equality if Aci > 0, i = . Second order sufficient conditions are presented in 
Appendix B. 
Processors take into account that they can affect the probability of being in each of 
the situations described. They realize, for example, that if they increase the contracted area, it 
is less likely that they will have to buy in the spot market. Of course, the magnitude of the 
marginal effect each processor has decreases as the number of processors increase. Before 
exploring the ramifications of this assumption, we will first examine the problem of farmers. 
2.4.2 Farmer decisions 
Farmers have rational expectations, share common beliefs, and take contract area and 
contract price as given in solving their optimization problem. They decide whether to take a 
processor's offer of acreage and price and whether to plant for the spot market. If they are 
indifferent between taking and rejecting the contracts, they are assumed to accept the 
processors offer18. Assume a large number N of identical farmers. The large number 
assumption is not crucial. The important assumption is that farmers take prices and aggregate 
acreages as given. Thus, they do not act as if they can affect the probability of ex post spot 
market demand. Here, acj is the acreage contracted by farmer j, ay is the area planted for the 
17 This can be written as S  ( A a  )  =  — c  ^  —  r { , with primes indicating first derivatives. 
18 These assumptions regarding the farmer's problem closely follow Newbery (1998). Xia and Sexton (2004), 
stress the importance of considering rational agents on both sides of the market when modeling procurement of 
raw product inputs. 
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spot market by farmer j ,  and C  ( a c j  +  a s j  j is the cost of production. Because it is assumed that 
farmers are identical, the subscript j will be dropped. The expected profit of a farmer thus can 
be written as 
^ (^) = ^  ((% + 4 ^  - Ck + )) -
Again, four different scenarios may arise in the spot market. These situations are the 
same as the ones described in the processor problem and for that reason we will only state 
here what farmers expect, that is, their payoff function and their probability of being in each 
case. In the first scenario, there is no demand in the spot market. Here, farmers do not receive 
any bid for their output and therefore the value of the crop equals the commodity price. The 
profit function for this scenario is 
= (l + + W - C(a, + a, ), 
which, as before, occurs with probability Pr Q = Pr (y  >  v )  =  l -F (v ) .  
C J  
In the second scenario, there is demand for the input in the spot market. However, 
aggregate supply exceeds aggregate demand. Profits and probability of occurrence for this 
scenario are 
and 
Pr < f<  Q 
(À+r^r 
Pr ( u  <  y  < v )  =  F  ( v )  -  F  ( u ) .  
The third scenario corresponds to the one where only (M- 1) processors can work at 
capacity. Farmer profits and probability of occurrence for this scenario are 
= (r, + - C(a, + a, ) 
and 
/ \ 
(M- l )g  ^  ^  Mg 
Pr 
[ a ™ ( 4 + r , 4  
=  Pr ( s  <  y < u) = F(u ) -F(s )  .  
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And the last scenario is as before, where at least one processor would be left out of the 
market i f  t h a t  p r o c e s s o r  t r i e s  t o  u n d e r b i d  h i s  o r  h e r  r i v a l s  s o  t h a t  t h e  s p o t  p r i c e  i s  b i d  u p  t o  ( p ) ,  
the processor's marginal valuation for the input. Profits and probability of occurrence for this 
case are 
and 
Pr =  P r (^<^)  =  F ( s ) .  
Now we can write the expected profit of farmers as 
The first-order condition for a maximum is obtained by differentiating equation (2.3) 
with respect to as : 
^ ^ ^ y/Wdy + P.[ #- C'(a, + a, ) < 0, (2.4) 
with equality if as > 0 . Second order conditions trivially hold for any convex cost function. 
Note that farmers take the aggregate amount planted for the spot as given. Hence, we 
do not use the Leibnitz rule here. Farmers do not realize they can change the probability of 
being in the scenarios described (they take As as given). This is because individual farmer 
output is assumed to be too small to affect the aggregate spot supply. Recall that farmers are 
assumed to have rational expectations. Farmers believe the aggregate acreage for the spot 
will be As, and in equilibrium their expectations are realized. 
2.5 Equilibrium 
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium acreages for both the farmer and 
processor problems. An equilibrium for this model, is conformed by two main components 
corresponding to the processor's and farmer's problem. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium for 
the processor's game is a number of contracted acres A*ci, / = l,...,M such that no processor 
can benefit from unilateral deviations, for a given number of acres planted for the spot 
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market. That is to say that in equilibrium, a processor cannot increase its profit by 
unilaterally choosing to contract a different number of acres. Farmers take the number of 
contract acres and the price offered as given, and, based also on their beliefs regarding the 
aggregate spot acreage, they choose the number of acres to plant for the spot market in order 
to maximize profits. It cannot be overemphasized that farmers' decisions are the result of an 
optimization problem and do not arise from strategic interactions with processors or other 
farmers. However, the discussion will proceed as if farmers were "reacting" optimally to 
processors' offers, and Nash equilibrium will be used in a loose way to refer to the 
equilibrium of the model. 
Three additional conditions have to hold in equilibrium. First, beliefs regarding 
aggregate spot acreage are confirmed: As = Nas. Second, aggregate demand and supply for 
contracts are equalized: Nac = MAc. Finally, farmers' profits are nonnegative. In short, any 
equilibrium has to satisfy equations (2.5) and (2.6), which obtain from imposing the 
equilibrium conditions to equations (2.2) and (2.4), respectively: 
( f -n )  2Mg 
3 AX 




with equality if Ac > 0 ; 
Hp#  +p  j [  -  C '  % ^ < 0 .  
with equality if as > 0, for v = —, u = s = • 
(M- l )g  
(2.6) 
, and equation 
(2.3)^0. 
The equilibrium for a particular environment can be predicted using of the best-
response functions of processors and farmers, which are given Aci = /z(Ax j and a s j  = z ( A c )  
(for z ( A c )  =  g ( A c ) / N )  respectively,19 previously introduced in the problem overview 
section. These functions are defined implicitly by equations (2.5) and (2.6), respectively. The 
equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the best-response functions or, equivalently, 
19 Keep in mind that when reaction functions for farmers are mentioned, those are not "true" reaction functions. 
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by solving equations (2.5) and (2.6) simultaneously for A"c and asj. Unfortunately, we cannot 
obtain closed solutions for this model. However, numeric techniques can be used to 
characterize the predicted Nash equilibrium as well as responses to changes in the 
environment. In what follows, we provide a characterization of the equilibrium for a 
particular calibration of the model (hereupon referred to as the benchmark case). The 
parameter values assumed for the benchmark case are shown in Table 2.1. The parameters 
were chosen in a way such that if the yield were to be fixed at its expected value (which we 
fix at E(y) = 100), there would be no acres planted for the spot market in equilibrium; that is, 
processors would be fully contracted. To see this, suppose that processors offer a number of 
contracts such that they will not obtain enough input to work at capacity. Since there is no 
uncertainty, both farmers and processors know at planting time whether the spot price will be 
p or t\, given a positive expected aggregate spot acreage.20 If the cash market price will be 
p farmers will refuse to take any contract that offers rx + S < p, leaving zero profits for 
processors who in turn will not want to offer those contracts (they would be better off by 
being fully contracted and not participating in a cash market). If the cash price will be rx 
individual farmers will not plant for that market, and expectations will not be confirmed. If, 
on the other hand, processors offer a number of contracts such that they will not need any 
extra input, expected aggregate spot acreage is zero, farmers know that the cash market price 
will be r{, they will take the contracts and confirm expectations by not planting for the spot 
market. 
The problem for each processor reduces to the classical symmetric Cournot game 
with M players. That is max (p-rx-S) AciE (y), subject to (r, +S)E(y} > C'(acj), where 
acj = (V^)(X/m Ay)  '  J = . Using the cost function in what follows, the solution is 
easily checked to be A *  =  N ( p E ( y ) - d  j / b ( M  + 1) . Plugging in the parameters from Table 
2.1, we find that A* = 50, implying that processors can work at capacity with the contracted 
20 Note that there has to be excess demand in order for the spot market price to be between p and rx. This 
situation is ruled out in the absence of uncertainty. 
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acres (or that they are fully contracted). Note that the parameters presented in Table 2.1 are 
also consistent with the observation that producers will not plant for the spot market if they 
will obtain the commodity price with certainty. 
Table 2.1. Parameterization for the benchmark case 
p 4 ym 200 
N 10 a 1.5 
M 5 (3 1.5 
n 1 d 100 
Q  5000 b 10 
To solve the model, we need to assume a probability distribution for the random yield 
and a functional form for the farmers' cost function. The probability distribution for the 
random yield is assumed to be a three-parameter beta distribution, commonly used to model 
yield risk (see Goodwin and Ker, 2002), which has the following density function: 
The parameters of the density function presented in Table 2.1 imply that £'(>') = 100. 
We will assume that the functional form of the cost function is the following: 
C ( a s  + a c )  =  d { a s  + a c )  +  ~ { a s  + a c )  •  
The first term captures the factors of production that can be easily obtained to 
increase the area planted, whereas the quadratic term represents the increasing costs 
associated with less easily adjustable factors. An example of such a factor is the managerial 
capacity of the farmer. Note that an implication of the functional form assumed to describe 
farmers' costs is that increasing the number of acres planted for the spot market increases the 
marginal costs of contract production, shifting contract supply to the left. That is, higher 
premiums will be needed to entice farmers to take a given number of contracts when they 
also plant for the spot market. This specification effectively links the supply for contract and 
spot production. The structure of the model implies that in any co-existence equilibrium, 
expected marginal revenues per contract and spot acres are equalized (this is also true in 
Newbery (1998)). 
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Figure 2.1 shows aggregate best-response functions for farmers and processors. Since 
all processors are identical, the aggregate best-response function is obtained by multiplying 
the individual function by the number of processors. The same rule applies to the best-
response function for farmers. 
50 100 150 
Aggregate acreage under contract 
200 
Figure 2.1. Farmer and processor best-response functions for the benchmark case 
The equilibrium for the model is where both curves intersect. The curve labeled as 
"processors" indicates the equilibrium aggregate number of contracts offered (and hence 
taken) in the game played between processors for every aggregate spot area. The curve 
labeled as "farmers" denotes the aggregate acreage planted for the spot market, consistent 
with any given contract offer by processors. Equilibrium for the model occurs, of course, 
where both curves intersect. At that point, the processors' best-response functions intersect, 
and beliefs about aggregate spot acreage are confirmed. 
Note that the introduction of yield uncertainty results in a quite different equilibrium. 
Each processor reduced the number of contracts offered (from 50 to 27 acres), and room was 
created for production for the open market (39 acres in aggregate), as a complement to the 
contract market. Recognizing the presence of uncertainty as a fact of agricultural production, 
yield a very different outcome than that in a deterministic model. In particular, co-existence 
of contract and spot production results in equilibrium. 
The intuition behind this result is simple. With uncertainty, the possibility of over­
buying the input arises. The more contract acres are offered, the higher the likelihood that a 
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fraction of the input cannot be processed and has to be sold at a loss at the ongoing 
commodity price. As processors offer fewer contracts the probability that they will need 
additional input (and the amount needed) ex-post to work at capacity increases, along with 
the expected spot price. 
Introduction of uncertainty benefits processors and harms farmers in this setting. 
Yield randomness allows processors to reduce the number of contracts offered (and hence the 
premiums needed to get farmers to accept the contracts), while creating an expected spot 
price that induces farmers to plant for the cash market. Profits for farmers decrease from 
$3125 to $1509, whereas processors' profits increase from $2500 to $3826. Introduction of 
uncertainty allows processors to lower the contract premiums from ô* = 2.5 to 5* =1.74, 
where the bar on S* indicates that yield is fixed. 
As mentioned before, there is a growing concern that spot markets are thinning and 
that farmers get more exposed to the market power of processors. The model presented 
allows us to comment on those concerns. Suppose for a moment that processors are 
effectively able to discourage production for the spot market.21 In that case, farmers can be 
enticed to take contracts offering lower premiums. This clearly benefits processors and harms 
farmers (profits now are predicted to be $4048 and $1382 respectively). However, this is not 
an equilibrium, if processors compete ex-post as noted in the model22. Although comforting, 
the previous argument points to the need for authorities to be vigilant concerning the 
behavior of spot buyers.23 
2.6 Equilibrium responses to changes in economic parameters 
In this section, we examine how changes in production uncertainty, the price of the 
processed good, the reference price, the number of processors, and the number of farmers 
affect the optimal choices of farmers and processors. The first variable we examine is 
production uncertainty. The effects of a mean-preserving spread in yields are illustrated by 
21 Either they are able to commit not to buy or collude implicitly not to bid aggressively on the open market. 
22 Though not presented, if the marginal costs of contract and spot production were independent, processors 
strictly prefer co-existence of the two markets. This result is driven by the fact that the spot market acts as a 
complement to the contract market without increasing the costs of contract production. 
23 Note also that processors' profits decrease and farmers' profits increase when spot markets are viable. This 
may provide yet another rationale for processors to integrate backwards into farm production, as observed for 
example, in the hog industry. See, for example Hennessy (1996), Murray (1995), and Perry (1978) for other 
rationales. 
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solving the model for coefficients of variation (CV) of yields ranging from 0.1 to 1. The 
parameters of the yield distribution for the benchmark case represent a CV of 0.5. 
Figure 2.2(a) depicts the Nash equilibria for the model for the different amounts of 
yield uncertainty. As Figure 2.2(a) makes clear, increasing (decreasing) the level of 
production uncertainty confirms the reduction (increase) in the number of acres contracted. 
The same intuition holds. A mean-preserving spread in yield risk increases the expected 
excess supply of input, conditional on yields being high enough to cover all input demand. 
This effect tends to decrease contract acres because processors will want to reduce the 
amount of excess supply they have to sell at a loss. But, a mean-preserving spread in risk also 
increases the yield shortfall conditional on being low enough to generate positive ex post 
demand. However, processors know that if they marginally reduce their offer of contract 
acres, farmers will marginally increase their supply of spot acres. This substitution, which 
reduces the risk of a yield shortfall, is observed for low levels of yield uncertainty. As 
processors keep lowering their contract offers, farmers stop increasing their spot acreage. We 
speculate that this effect is due to a decrease in the premium offered with fewer contracts (see 
Figure 2.2(b)). Farmers' expected marginal revenues from contracting decrease, and this 
slows down the expansion in spot area. Recall that by the structure of the model, farmers' 




0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Coefficient of Variation 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Coefficient of Variation 
<m— Spot acres Contract acres 
Figure 2.2. Effects of yield uncertainty (cv) on (a) the equilibrium acres in contract and spot 
markets and (b) contract premium 
26 
Overall, an increase in yield uncertainty will tend to increase the relative importance 
of spot market activity as processors try to avoid situations of excess supply from contracted 
acres. This suggests that spot markets will be more prevalent in situations where yield risk is 
relatively large. 
Figure 2.3 shows how output profitability (measured by the per-unit margin) affects 
the set of Nash equilibrium. Higher profit margins result in more contracts offered and less 
area planted for the spot market. This result is very intuitive for processors—higher margins 
imply less willingness to operate at less than capacity. However, this result is less obvious for 
farmers. For the farmer, there are two forces acting in opposite directions. On the one hand, 
increases in the output price result in a higher return in the spot market in the case where 
processors have to bid their marginal valuation to get the input. On the other hand, this 
situation of excess demand is less likely to arise because of the reduced expected demand in 
the spot market. Figure 2.3 shows that the latter force dominates farmers' decisions for low 










Output price (p) 
Spot acreage Contract acreage 
Figure 2.3. Effect of output price ( p )  on equilibrium acreage 
When the output price is low enough, p = 2 , the market for contracts disappear. 
Running at less than capacity is less expensive (in terms of foregone profits) for small 
margins. Also, adding premiums over the base price reduces the margin even further. 
Processors also recognize that if they decrease slightly the number of contracts offered, 
farmers will increase their spot acreage, responding to stronger ex-post demand expectations. 
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Analogous results apply for changes in the commodity price. Increasing the reference 
price increases the expected spot price for any given contract acreage, providing incentives 
for farmers to plant more area for that market. Contracting becomes more expensive for 
processors, leading them to reduce the number of contracts offered. 
Figure 2.4 shows the effects of an increase in the number of processors, holding per 
processor demand constant. This situation simulates the effects of an increase in total demand 
for the input, holding the number of farmers constant. An increase in demand increases the 
probability that processors will have to purchase in the spot market, thereby raising the input 
price. Ceteris paribus, this induces processors to offer more contract acres, to avoid a fierce 
40 -, 
2 4 6 8 10 
Number of processors 
Spot acres Contract acres I 
Figure 2.4. Equilibrium responses to changes in the number of processors (M) (per processor 
capacity held constant). Spot acres are per farmer. Contract acres are per processor 
ex-post competition with other buyers. However, the increased likelihood of a strong spot 
demand also induces farmers to increase the area planted for the spot market, which is shown 
to occur in Figure 2.4. Additionally, with increasing marginal costs, it is more difficult for 
individual processors to find takers for any fixed number of contracts as the number of 
processing firms in the market increases. The forces just described act to reduce the number 
of contract acres offered by individual processors, though this is not enough to reduce 
aggregate contract offers. As a whole, the processing industry offers more contracts as it 
becomes larger (for a given pool of farmers) in an attempt to reduce competition in the spot 
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market. Thus, an increase in demand, holding the number of suppliers constant results in 
more contract acres.24 
Similar results are found by holding total market demand constant but increasing the 
number of farmers. The effect of such an increase depends on the form of the farm-level 
marginal cost function. If marginal costs increase with output (as in our case), then an increase 
in the number of (identical) farmers will reduce the premium needed to entice farmers to take a 
fixed contract acreage as each farmer is offered fewer contracts. This creates an incentive for 
processors to expand the area procured under contract, which is what we observe in Figure 2.5. 
Also, for any given number of per-farm spot acres, supply for the cash market increases, 
leading to lower expected price, which creates incentives for individual farmers to reduce 
speculative production. However, this reduction is not as strong as to reduce the aggregate spot 
area. 
5 7 9 11 13 15 
Number of farmers 
Spot acres Contract acres 
Figure 2.5. Equilibrium responses to changes in the number of farmers. Spot acres are per 
farmer. Contract acres are per processor 
24 Alternatively, if we increase the number of processors while holding aggregate capacity constant, the same 
pattern of reduction in contract offers by individual processors is observed, without increasing aggregate 
contracted area. Actually, the total number of contracted acres declines slightly. This scenario simulates the 
effects of a decrease in the market power of processors, as each holds a smaller share of industry capacity 
(hence their individual decisions have smaller marginal impacts). Growers also receive improved price premia 
in this setting, which is consistent with findings of Elbehri and Paarlberg (2003). 
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2.7 Alternative specification for the spot market supply 
When product differentiation is absent (i.e. the input is of homogeneous quality), it is 
sometimes asserted that firm's strategic variables in the cash market (ex-post) are the 
quantities to buy (Sexton, 2000). In those cases, Cournot's equilibrium can be utilized. An 
advantage of that approach over the situation modeled in the previous sections is that 
problems of non-existence of Nash equilibrium in pure strategies arising from capacity 
constraints and/or fixed supplies are sidestepped. However, for firms to be competing in 
quantities an inverse supply function is required, implying that the cash market supply 
function at any point in time is not perfectly inelastic. Firms can attract increasing quantities 
from sellers simply by raising the price. The reasons for this may go in the line of inter­
temporal substitutions, search costs in part of sellers, or the like. Although easy to work with, 
and mathematically tractable, this approach is not realistic for a large number of relevant 
situations in agriculture. In particular, products that are perishable, have to be harvested on a 
given time window, or are the result of decisions made in advance (sometimes months or 
even years) escape this framework. For these situations, one may argue that producers have a 
reservation price over which they will sell all their output (or model explicitly why more of 
the input can be obtained ex-post by raising the price). This is certainly true if a fixed group 
of ex-ante identical suppliers of a homogeneous product is assumed for the first-stage. 
In this section we briefly consider the effects of assuming an upward sloping ex-post 
supply function. We left unchanged the timing, and decisions for the first-stage of the game, 
and model a different scenario for the second-stage. In particular, we assume here that the 
slope of the supply function for the cash market is positive, and is influenced by the number 
of acres planted in the first period. Further, we assume that the ex-post aggregate inverse 
Ss 
supply function in the open market has the following form rs = rx + ——, where Ss is the 
amount of input supplied by farmers. Hence, farmers will supply increasing quantities of the 
raw product as the price rises above their reservation price (or price in the market for 
commodities). Intuitively, as the aggregate spot acreage increases, so does the amount of 
input supplied at any given price. We can see this situation as if the farmers of the modeled 
region were contributing to a pool of the input. If processors raise the price sufficiently high, 
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input crops from other regions would flow into the area of interest (or coming out of storage 
in case of non-perishable goods). Here the amount bought by processors in the cash market, 
is not necessarily constrained by the amount planted by farmers in the first stage. This 
specification may seem a little bit of a stretch, but is not more so than fixing the number of 
potential homogeneous producers, letting them put to run some biological process (growing a 
crop, finishing some pigs or cattle, etc), and when a cash market opens latter on assume that 
the supply is elastic (or not strongly inelastic). 
Suppose first that processors are not capacity constrained. This is a standard Coumot 
game, where buyers compete in quantities. The problem of processor i is to choose the 
amount of input (s; ) to buy in order to maximize profits in the cash market, given the action 
of its rivals. Formally, max(/>-r$)s;. The market clears when S D  = = S s , that is, 
si 
aggregate supply and demand are equalized. A symmetric equilibrium for this model is easily 
show„ ,„ber>^ , /=À*lZi ) .  
M  + 1  M  + 1  
Moving to the first stage, processor i 's  profit is given by 
# |4,-, ' 4 ) = I" (f - % - + (f - K) 
As before, processors choose the number of contract acres to offer and premiums to 
be paid, subject to the constraint that those quantities are consistent with the supply schedule 
of farmers ((r, + ô)E(y) > C\as + ac) ) . The constraint is again subsumed into the objective 
function, leaving processors the choice of the number of acres to contract. The first order 
conditions are 
d E ^ ' - - " A ^ J p - r ,  ~ S ~ ^ A ) E ( y ) < 0 ,  i  =  ,  (2.7) 
&L I &L J 
with equality if A* > 0. 
The first stage problem for farmers is again to choose whether to take the contracts 
and the number of acres to plant for the spot market. Since by construction, the number of 
contracts offered is consistent with the supply of contract acres, we can assume that contracts 
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will be taken and focus on the decision of the number of acres to plant without a contract. As 
before, farmers maximize 
with respect to as. This yields the following first order conditions 
8;/ 
8a. 
= r*E (_y) - d - b (<zs + ac ) < 0 , with equality if as > 0 (2.8) 
Equations (2.7) and (2.8) are solved simultaneously by A*c = ^ ^ ^— = 50 and 
as = ' = 0 ,25 Processors would be fully contracted in expectations, and there will 
b 
be no area planted for the spot market. However, note that this result also holds in the 
presence of uncertainty (i.e. we did not fix yield at its expected value as in the previous case). 
Thus, only in the absence of uncertainty, with the proposed parameterization, both models 
yield the same prediction that spot markets do not have a space in equilibrium. 
In addition, as we will show, when the capacity constraint is introduced both models 
yield different predictions. In particular, we obtain that introduction of a capacity constraint 
in the current model reduces the number of contracts offered (as in the fixed supply case), 
without increasing the number of acres planted for the spot. 
Three ex-post scenarios (analogous to the ones modeled before) are introduced with a 
capacity constraint. Either processors over-procured the input, or they will have a positive 
demand in the cash market. In the later case processors may turn to the spot market and buy 
enough input to work at capacity or in certain supply and demand conditions choose not to 
work at capacity. 
The first scenario is exactly analogous to the previous model, and so is the payoff 
function and probability of occurrence, thus we do not repeat it here. In the second and third 
scenarios, processors will choose to participate in the spot market. Clearly, when processors 
have positive ex-post demand for the specialty grain, they will choose to work at capacity 
25 To have a positive number of spot acres, farmers would need to be willing to plant the specialty crop for the 
spot market, even when they know the price equals the commodity price. This is not likely to be the case, since 
the lack of sufficient incentives or premiums was the highest rated factor influencing the decision not to grow 
value enhanced corn in a survey of producers in the corn-belt (Stewart, 2003). 
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whenever the amount that they would procure without the constraint is larger than the 
a m o u n t  t h e y  w o u l d  l i k e  t o  p r o c u r e  w i t h  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t .  T h a t  i s ,  w h e n  M s *  >  M Q  A a y ,  
M ( M  +  \ ) Q  
or equivalently when, y > —= - = t. In this scenario, the cash price 
M A s ( p - r { )  +  { M  +  \ )  Y j i = x  A a  
•n u " MQ~*Yji-\Aay , r, will be r =r.-\ =-LJ , and processor i s profit 
The last scenario (which occurs when y < t ) ,  is the same that would result if the 
capacity constraint does not bind. In this case rs = r*, and processors buy s* units of the 
input in the cash market. Processor i 's profit in scenario is 
Putting all together, the first state problem for processor i is to maximize 
#(*, K-,,4) = P ^""W) 
+  f  ( ( p  ~ ~  5 )  A " y  +  ( p ~  r * * ) ( 2  ~  A « y ) ) d F ^  
+  l ( ( p - r l - ô ) A c i y  +  ( p - r * ) s t ) J d F ( y )  
with respect to Aci. Taking first derivatives (using Leibnitz rule), and imposing symmetry 
yields after some algebra 
d/L 
(p-1 )  f "  yd F (y)  +  ^  If  (Q- Ady)dF(y) s o 
-< 
with equality if Acj > 0, i = l,...,M . 
Farmers maximize profits by choosing as in exactly the same fashion described 
above. The first order condition for farmer's problem is 
da. 
=  r x  p y d F ( y )  + r * *  £ y d F ( y )  +  r  £y d F ( y ) - d - b ( a s + a c ) <  0 
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Imposing equilibrium conditions ( Nas = As, and Nac = MA*C ), the solution for the 
system of equations is a] = 0 and A* = 33 acres. In this setting, processors will also choose 
not to be fully contracted in an expectations sense. However, contrasting with the fixed 
supply modeling approach, there is no role for the spot market as a complement for a 
contracts market in this scenario. In other words co-existence is not an equilibrium for this 
model. This result makes sense. Competition in quantities is known to be milder than 
competition in prices. When farmers know that processors will not be competing vigorously 
in the cash markets, they have weaker incentives to plant for that destination. 
2.8 Concluding remarks 
In this study we develop a simple theoretical model that, suitably parameterized, 
allows for the co-existence of contracts and spot markets in agriculture. The presentation here 
focused on the production of a specialty crop. However, suitable parameterizations would 
afford the study of a wide variety of agricultural production processes. Numerical 
simulations were conducted to study the impacts of fundamental economic factors on the 
equilibrium outcomes. Our results suggest that for a wide range of distinct parameters, 
participation in both markets constitutes a Nash equilibrium for the model. This result would 
indicate that the fact that a growing proportion of agricultural raw products are transacted by 
means other than cash markets does not necessarily imply that spot markets for these sectors 
will disappear altogether. There is a balance to be attained between the sizes of the markets. 
Because the model assumes that all the market participants are risk-neutral, the equilibrium 
outcomes are the results of purely financial considerations. 
The predictions of the model make clear the substitutability between both systems of 
production (when the market structure remains unchanged). It is worth emphasizing, that co­
existence of both markets only arose in the presence of uncertainty. For both specifications of 
the cash market supply function, specialization in contract markets is obtained absent 
uncertainty. This implies that because of its strong qualitative implications, uncertainty has to 
be explicitly accounted for in any modeling situation in which contracts and spot markets co­
exist and production outcomes are subject to randomness. This is quite important in 
agriculture, for which biological uncertainty and weather variability (among other sources of 
randomness) play a major role. 
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The model demonstrates the antagonistic interests of farmers and processors 
concerning the relative size of the spot and contract markets. With increasing marginal costs 
of contracting (affected by spot acreage), processors would prefer specialization in 
contracting. Farmers prefer the equilibrium predicted by the model (co-existence). The fact 
that processors would like to be able to discourage production for the spot market makes 
clear that safeguards should be established to insure vigorous competition when cash markets 
arise. In the current setting, producers have the option of planting without a contract (a spot 
market is likely to arise). This constrains the behavior of processors since contract offers 
have to provide sufficient financial inducement, relative to expected spot prices, to entice 
farmers to take them. 
The role of spot markets complementing contract production is illustrated. The term 
"complementing" is used here in the sense that spot serves as a residual market in which 
buyers can make up for any difference in input needs, relative to their target procurement 
levels. Farmers can plant (speculatively) additional acres for spot markets based on the 
expected spot price. 
Although the model presented here may not capture many aspects of contracting 
decisions in agriculture, it is a reasonable starting point. We discuss the basic elements, and 
indicate points at which assumptions may yield different qualitative predictions. The model 
could be modified in several directions to tackle different complexities that commonly arise 
in the markets. Examples are the introduction of quality issues or transaction costs related to 
the contracted versus spot market procurement. A different direction in which this research 
could be extended is to explore the efficiency of the contract observed relative to other 
coordination mechanisms, and whether co-existence also attains for other contractual 
arrangements. 
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Appendix A. Mixed strategy equilibrium for scenario 3. M=2 
The argument presented here closely follows that of Levitan and Shubik (1972). A 
mixed-strategy equilibrium for this game is a pair of probability distributions over each 
player's strategy space. These probability distributions must have the property that any 
strategy chosen by a player with positive probability must be optimal against the other 
player's probability distribution. 
The amount that firm i is able to procure as a function of both offered prices in 
general is 
min {max(4.y - (8 - 4^ ), 0), (8 - 4^)} 
4f X. = 
min 
Q However, since this scenario arises when -r= 
(Â , + Af y - (A , + 2A C )  
( Q ~ A c y ) < Âsy < 2 ( Q - A c y ) ,  a nd (Q-Acy) = xswe can focus on the following case 
4f 
if 1 = 0-
1 > f) 
22 
, or 
X • — 
2 
x .  
Since both prices will coincide with zero probability, the expected amount procured 
in the spot can be written as E(xr/) = {\-(j)j{r )^[ Asy -xx J+ xH, and expected profits, 
K ;  ( r )  =  ( P  ~ /')((l -(l>j (r))( A s y  - x s  ) + (r)x s  ). The cumulative distribution function of 
player j is 4>j (r). From this we obtain <j>j as 
M ,
~  ( p - r ) ( A , ~  2 x . )  
with support [r,r] e . If processor i  is willing to randomize, it must be the case that 
7tl is constant on [r,r]. If firm i offers r, it will be overbid with probability one. Since it 
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will be the residual claimant for the input, it will be optimal to bid rx (if firm i knows it will 
be overbid, its payoff function is monotonically decreasing in the offer price, indicating that 
it is optimal to bid the reservation price of sellers). To pin down F we use the fact that 
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CHAPTER 3. MARKET STRUCTURE, REPUTATIONS, AND 
THE CHOICE OF QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEMS 
3.1 Introduction 
New quality assurance systems (QASs) are being put in place to facilitate the flow 
of information about agricultural and food products. Incentives for growers and food 
manufacturers to adopt QASs include (a) increased consumer demand for knowledge about 
where their food came from and how it was produced; (b) opportunities for producer 
groups to capture a greater share of the consumer dollar by differentiating their products; 
(c) greater protection for food manufacturers and retailers against food safety liability; and 
(d) increased chances that agreed upon specifications are met in a framework of imperfect 
information. 
Various QASs have been developed in the United States and elsewhere to facilitate 
the flow of information about products (Bredahl et al. (2001), Reardon and Farina (2001), 
Lawrence (2002), Carriquiry, Babcock, and Carbone (2003)). In the United States, some 
have been developed purely by the private sector, while others have relied on the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to set standards. But what constitutes a proper mix of 
public and private efforts in setting up QASs is an unsettled question. A better 
understanding of private sector incentives for setting up such systems will help clarify what 
role the public sector might have in establishing and enforcing standards. We contribute to 
this understanding by modeling the optimal degree of "stringency" or assurance in a 
processor's quality control system over procurement of agricultural output when there 
exists uncertainty about quality. More specifically, we study the role of reputational 
mechanisms in providing incentives to implement QASs. We compare the resulting 
degrees of stringency across different market structures, and nature of reputations. 
The role of reputations as a deception preventing device has been studied by Klein 
and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983), among others. These authors examine a situation where 
the resulting quality is completely determined by a producer's investments. The only study 
(we are aware of) that considers the case where investments lead to higher expected quality 
(stochastically) is by Rob and Sekiguchi (2001), who consider the producer-consumer 
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interface. In their study, consumers "discipline" firms by switching to rival firms when 
quality is below certain tolerance levels, and only one firm is able to make sales. We depart 
from that study by exploring the effects of different market structures on the choice of 
investments in quality, as well as the nature of reputations. In our framework, potentially 
more than one firm makes positive sales, firms compete in quantities purchased (and sold), 
and the focus is on an arbitrary link of a supply chain. 
We include both process control, where verification of certain production methods are 
to be followed, as well as control over a physical attribute of the input. The models predict 
that the degree of stringency depends on (a) whether the sought-after attribute is discoverable 
b y  c o n s u m e r s ,  ( b )  t h e  p r i c e  p r e m i u m  p a i d  f o r  t h e  a t t r i b u t e ,  ( c )  t h e  m a r k e t  s t r u c t u r e ,  a n d  ( d )  
the nature of reputations. 
The next section provides an overview of the related literature, a detailed discussion 
of the situation studied, and the model presentation and analysis. Numerical simulations are 
performed in Section 3.3 with a corresponding discussion of results. Section 3.4 concludes. 
3.2 The model 
The two decisions modeled are the profit maximizing rate of output and whether a 
buyer of an input should implement a QAS as a way to gain information about product 
quality that can be provided to its potential customers. If the buyer decides to implement a 
QAS, then the profit maximizing level of assurance is determined.1 We study a particular 
case that is becoming pervasive in the food industry (Caswell, Bredahl, and Hooker, 1998; 
Reardon and Farina, 2001; Northen, 2001; Feame, Homibrook, and Dedman, 2001), in which 
an input buyer requires its suppliers to implement a given system of assurance. To do so, the 
buyer has to be an important player in the market (Reardon and Farina, 2001). This would be 
the case of a quasi-voluntary system (Caswell, Bredahl, and Hooker, 1998; Noelke and 
Caswell, 2000). To keep the framework general, we are not specifying the "type" of quality 
assurance strategy that an input processor will follow. For example, assurance potentially can 
come from a system run by the buyer, from reliance on certification by a private or public 
third party, or both. The information obtained through the implementation of the system 
1 Caswell, Bredahl, and Hooker (1998) provide an overview of the functions and effects of quality management 
systems (or metasystems as they call them) on the food industry. See also Henson and Hooker 2001. 
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allows the processing firm to better sort the input it buys, to gain a better idea of the actual 
quality of the inputs, and to be able to convey assurance to its customers about the quality of 
its product. 
The topic of this paper is especially relevant in an environment where it is difficult to 
assert the quality of a particular product (both before and after the input is processed and 
consumed). That is, there is imperfect information about quality.2 Many food attributes can 
be thus classified (see, e.g., Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996; Antle, 1996; and Unnevehr and 
Jensen, 1996). Clearly, if quality is readily observable by both input buyers and consumers 
there is no need for a QAS in the procurement process. 
Quality characteristics of agricultural products have an inherently high degree of 
heterogeneity (Ligon, 2002). This variability stems mainly from the randomness of the 
production environment (e.g., weather and biological uncertainty) and/or the heterogeneity of 
the practices employed by farmers. We aim to capture this variability, and the fact that 
quality can be only imperfectly assessed, by assuming that the processor believes it can be 
represented by a random vector Q. Specifically, let Q denote the vector of the imperfectly 
observable array of quality attributes, and let Q denote the set of possible quality attributes 
of an input. In general, Q could be a set in many dimensions. However, for the sake of 
tractability, we will assume that only one quality attribute is of interest, is imperfectly 
observable, or differs across goods. In this case, the sample space of interest is one-
dimensional (i.e., Q ç %' ). Further, we assume that the unconditional cumulative 
distribution function of Q is FQ (q) = Pq(Q< q) for all q? This distribution of quality would 
prevail in the absence of a QAS or in the open market. 
Noelke and Caswell (2000) propose a model of quality management for credence 
attributes in a supply chain. Based on a literature review, the authors discuss benefits and 
costs of a voluntary, quasi-voluntary, and mandatory quality management system (QMS) for 
a firm within a supply chain. They then provide some comparative static results on how the 
behavior of the firm (given by the choice of a QMS) changes when other firms upstream or 
2 These are the types of quality attributes that Nelson (1970) and Darby and Kami (1973) labeled as 
"experience" and "credence," respectively. The authors introduced the terms search, experience, and credence 
to refer to the moment in which consumers can gain information about product quality. 
3 The quantity of Q is assumed to increase with the quality of the underlying input. 
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downstream modify their QMS under different tort laws. In our model, the firm under 
consideration is the one that has influence on the behavior of firms upstream in the supply 
chain. We also make the probability that a firm is punished dependent on the ability of 
consumers to discern when quality is substandard. Hence, our model accommodates 
credence, experience, and mixtures of the two types of goods. 
We define quality as meeting an agreed-upon standard. Every unit of the product 
meeting or surpassing this minimum standard will be considered of high quality. Caswell, 
Noelke, and Mojduszka (2002, p.58) also define quality in a supply chain as consistently 
delivering a product that meets or exceeds "defined sets of standards for extrinsic indicators 
and cues." The task of the processors is to decide which QAS to implement (if any) to better 
infer the nature of the product being certified. In particular, the QAS will inform the 
processor about the proportion of the input that is likely to deliver a product that meets the 
minimum standard. Note however that the processor will not be able to discern the difference 
in quality of any given unit it actually buys. We assume that the quality of the processed 
output has a direct relationship to its input counterpart, an assumption that is equivalent to 
claiming that the processing technology cannot be used as a substitute for input quality, or 
that it does so only at prohibitively high costs. We assume also that there is a one to one 
correspondence between the amount of input bought and output sold by a processor. Hence, 
the production technology works in a Leontief fashion, and the decision on the output rate 
essentially determines how much of the agricultural input is needed. 
The proposed approach accommodates both the case where the quality attribute or 
trait is the production method itself and the case where the process alters the probability 
distribution of quality (i.e., the costlier process increases the probability of obtaining a high-
quality product). The former has an analog to a discrete attribute (the good was produced 
using a desired process or it was not), whereas quality in the latter case is a continuous 
random variable whose distribution is altered by the process followed. The interpretation of 
the continuous case is straightforward. Let qM be the minimum acceptable quality to be 
considered good quality (or with desirable properties for good performance at the processing 
stage, or to deliver a good eating experience). In this case qM divides the range of the 
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random variable Q  into two subsets defined in 9?1, namely, q L  =  { q  e Q  :  q  <  q M  | and 
qH ={q&Q\q>qMY Hence, F[qM) =PQ(Q&qL) would be the unconditional probability 
that the product is inferior or unacceptable. A product that is deemed inferior receives a 
lower price than that certified as being high quality. This interpretation is akin to attributes 
such as the tenderness of a steak, where qM would be some acceptable degree of tenderness, 
or to food safety, where qM would be interpreted as the count of pathogens4 that makes a 
particular food item unsafe5. 
The discrete case can be analyzed in a similar way. Strictly speaking, here the input 
has or fails to have a particular attribute or was or was not produced following a value-adding 
(cost-increasing) production process. For example, milk used by some companies was 
produced with or without treating milking cows with genetically engineered hormones such 
as rbST (recombinant bovine somatotropin). Also, eggs can be produced using animal 
welfare6 enhancing techniques (e.g., free-range production) or by conventional means. 
Poultry is or is not fed with animal protein. Crops can be grown conventionally or using 
environmentally friendly practices (e.g., minimum tillage). 
However, to unify the analysis, we will differentiate by class of production practice. 
For example, in the case of animal welfare, we will consider a product to be of high quality 
if the production facilities meet a minimum set of amenities or if certain practices, such as 
forced molting of egg-laying hens, are avoided. Another example would be the intensity of 
the soil conservation practices employed. A different interpretation of Q is needed to 
tackle this type of attribute. Let Q be the set of all production practices "bought" by the 
input-processing firm. The natural variability here would come from the heterogeneity of 
4 For this interpretation, we would need to reverse the claim that a larger Q represents a higher quality. 
Pathogen counts above qM represent an unacceptable good. 
5 Antle (2001) provides a literature review of the economics of food safety. Segerson (1999) discusses whether 
reliance on voluntary approaches to food safety will provide adequate levels of safety in a competitive 
framework that allows for consumers and firms to be imperfectly informed about potential damages. Marette, 
Bureau, and Gozlan (2000) explore the provision of product safety and possible public regulation for search, 
experience, and credence attributes when the supply sector competes imperfectly, and hence can use prices as 
signals. However in their model, and in Daughety and Reinganum (1995) sellers know the actual quality of the 
product they offer in each period. 
6 See Blandford et al. 2002 for a classification of science-based definitions and measures of animal welfare. 
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farmers. Implicit here is the idea that the firms will buy from producers and certify the 
product if they believe the input was produced following a process that meets or surpasses 
some minimum standard (more on this to follow). Hence Q would represent the set of all 
input procured from producers who have the capabilities needed to produce, and are 
believed to produce, following the desired processes. The clarification is important because 
having the capabilities does not necessarily mean that the process will be strictly followed 
under conditions of imperfect information7. A problem of moral hazard arises here. 
Because production of the high-quality input is costlier than production for a commodity 
market, and there is a strictly positive probability that deviant behavior will not be 
discovered and penalized, suppliers will find it rational to deviate from perfect compliance8 
9
. Hence, there is a strictly positive fraction of the output that will not be produced under 
the desired cost-increasing conditions. This fraction is again represented by Fg{qM). 
The preceding discussion suggests that there are two different types of uncertainties 
associated with the attribute under consideration. In the discrete case, the uncertainty is 
mainly about the opportunism of the suppliers, whereas the continuous case also entails the 
uncertainty derived from the randomness associated with agricultural processes that generate 
a distribution of qualities for any given set of production practices. Hence, both symmetric 
and asymmetric informational imperfections may be present in this setting (see Antle 2001). 
In terms of quality, the choice of the firm is on the QAS and the associated stringency 
of controls. Suppose there is a set of alternative systems denoted by S = js e 91 : s° < s < s11}, 
where s = s° represents the absence of quality verification (reliance on claims made by 
suppliers), and s = su is a situation in which the quality of the product is perfectly revealed 
(e.g., perfect monitoring, vertical integration, or a good system of incentives). In the absence 
of a QAS, the processor rationally expects to obtain an input of "average" quality from the 
7 Hayes and Lenee (2002) provide the example of Parma Ham. They discuss that only ham produced within a 
certain region can be marketed as Parma Ham. The rationale for the restriction is that the weather in this region 
during the dry-curing process is what gives the ham its unique attributes. Nowadays, however, the dry-curing 
process is mainly carried on in modern, climate-controlled facilities. 
8 There is a large literature showing that when certification is imperfect, some producers of low quality will 
apply and obtain certification. See De and Nabar 1991 and Mason and Sterbenz 1994. 
9 Hennessy (1996) and Chalfant et al. (1999) showed that imperfect testing and grading lead to under­
investment in quality-enhancing techniques by farmers. This is because producers of low quality impose an 
externality on producers of high quality. 
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market for raw materials. When s = su is chosen, note that the actual quality of a given unit 
of input will be perfectly revealed only on the discrete case; in the continuous case, even the 
most stringent system available still leaves the uncertainty derived from the randomness of 
the production environment and attributable to scientific ignorance over biological processes. 
However, in the continuous case, a more stringent system potentially has the double effect of 
increasing the proportion of compilers and the probability of being in the set q" . 
In short, a processor procuring raw materials from certified suppliers (using the QAS 
indexed by s) expects to buy a fraction of good-quality input, denoted by 
X(s) = 1 -F[qM . Also, a fraction l-X(s,) = Fg {^qM of the inferior input is expected 
because of the informational imperfections noted earlier. Here, we consider the QAS as 
aiding in the selection of which input to buy. All inputs bought (and hence certified) will be 
subjected to the production activity and sold to downstream customers as possessing the 
desired trait10. The case where s - 0 (absent an assurance effort) will result in the processor 
buying an input that is expected to have average market quality. To put it concisely, 
X (0) = 1 - F [qM |o) = 1 - F ). Alternatively, if the input were going to be bought 
anyway, the QAS would be functioning as a sorting device that allocates the input either to 
the commodity or to the high-quality market (or production process). In this case, the QAS 
tells the processor how much a unit of the input is worth to him, just as an imperfect test does 
(Hennessy 1996). 
With this in place, we can focus on how to model the effects of a more stringent QAS 
on the overall quality of the product traded by the processor. For this purpose, we will use the 
concept of first-order stochastic dominance. Implementation of different levels of stringency 
switches the relevant distributions for quality as follows. For any s',sJ e S there is an 
associated conditional distribution for quality, namely, Fg^s') and Fe|g|^'j. In this 
context, increasing the level of stringency of the QAS, for example by moving from s' to sJ 
where s' < sJ, leads to a first-order stochastically dominating shift on the distribution of 
quality. Therefore, we have that FQ j > FQ [q\sJ j for all q e Q. In particular, this implies 
10 Firms would be participating in only one market. 
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that X(V) = |.$7) > \ - F [ q M  |s') = . This can be interpreted as reducing the 
probability of incurring type I (rejecting an input that is of good quality11) and type II 
(certifying a product that is of low quality) errors. In short, systems that are more stringent 
increase the precision with which the actual quality of the input is asserted by processors. If 
we are willing to assume that FQ is differentiate with respect to s, the above implies 
that dX(s)/ds > 0 
However, the implementation of a QAS does not come without a cost. The use of 
cost-increasing technologies has to be compensated for by processors. Complications arise, 
however, because the incentives of farmers and processors are not aligned, and the 
production practices used at the farm level are only imperfectly observed. Hence, processors 
may have to give up some information rent if they want to elicit production of high-quality 
inputs (or in the language of agency theory, a high level of effort from the principal's 
suppliers or agents). In other words, there are costs for monitoring and/or providing the 
incentives (e.g., premiums or discounts) to discourage dishonest performance on the part of 
input suppliers. We seek to capture those costs12 through a cost function C(s,j>), which 
satisfies d C  [ y , s ) / d s  > 0, where y  is the per-period output rate. 
The exposition from here on will be made in terms of processors and consumers. 
However, we could replace consumers by downstream firms to study issues within a supply 
chain. Consumers value both types of goods but value the high-quality good more and are 
willing to pay a premium for it. Because consumers can only assert the quality of a given 
product imperfectly, they must rely on the signals sent by the processors, in the form of 
quality certification.13 Hence, we assume that consumers are willing to pay a price premium 
for a good that comes from a quality-assured process. 
" Type I errors may be due to imperfections on the QAS (for example, due to incorrect monitoring.). This 
would increase the costs of procuring the input the processor needs. 
12 Note that we are being vague about what is being represented by this cost function. It could be modeling 
search costs, monitoring costs, or compensation given to farmers to induce high levels of effort. 
13 This does not mean that their message to customers has to coincide with the assurance they get from the 
suppliers. For example, a restaurant that sources beef that is assured to be from a certain breed (e.g., Angus) 
may want to claim that the steaks they serve are tender. Another example would be a branded product. A 
customer of a well-known upscale restaurant expects to get a tender steak, and the restaurant will try to buy only 
beef it can certify to have been fed in a certain way or again from a certain breed. 
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Putting all this together, the processor chooses the output rate, whether to participate 
in the market for quality-certified goods and what level of certainty to obtain from the QAS 
or to direct its product toward the market for commodities. Clearly, the processor will 
implement a QAS as long as the benefits outweigh the costs of doing so. 
Participation in the market for high-quality goods, using the QAS indexed by s 
yields a per-period profit of 7ri,r (y,s;a) = R(y;a)-C(y,s), where the revenue function 
R ( y ; a ) potentially depends on the firm's rate of output y  (this will later represent a vector 
containing the outputs of more than one firm), and the strength of consumer preference for 
high-quality goods a . The superscript in the profit function represents the state of the world, 
where the processor i has a reputation (more on this to follow). 
We could append a term to the profit function, representing the economic loss due to 
certifying a product that is of low quality. Several potential interpretations are possible for 
this loss. It could be the result of obtaining a bad reputation through some form of 
information dissemination or could occur just because the consumer will make future 
purchases from other processors. It also could be the result of legal action under the current 
tort law, applying mainly in the case of a food safety interpretation of the model. However, 
Caswell and Henson (1997) argue that this last effect is likely to be less important than the 
loss of reputation or market share. Therefore, the latter is the interpretation to which we 
adhere in this paper. The punishment for a processor that delivers a good of noticeable 
substandard quality is that it will lose consumer's trust, and hence will be unable to sell its 
output in the market for value-added products in future periods. Note however that the 
processor obtains the price for the certified commodity no matter what the actual quality 
might be, because customers cannot assert a priori whether the claims made by the processor 
are false. In other words, processors will be trusted until proven wrong. Consumers' trust is 
what defines the states of the world in this model. For a given processor, demand is state 
contingent, where the states of the world reflect whether he/she is trusted by consumers or 
not. For this sort of punishment mechanism to have an impact on a firm's decisions, 
modeling more than one period is required (Klein and Leffler (1981)). 
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On the other hand, participation in the market for commodities or non-differentiated 
products yields a quasi-rent of n' = 0 independent of processors' reputation, since the market 
for the commodity is perfectly competitive. 
3.2.1 Optimal choice of quality assurance systems 
We are now in a position to examine how fundamental characteristics of the 
economic environment influence decisions about the implementation of a QAS and the 
relative profitability of the competing markets or options, paying special attention to market 
structure and different forms of punishment. Clearly, QASs will be observed if 
E (]T'r (s, y)) > n' = 0 for some s e S, and y > 0. That is, if there is a combination of output 
rate and QAS that makes the expected return of the value-added market to be positive, then 
the firm has an incentive to enter the value-added market. 
Throughout the analysis, we assume for mathematical convenience that there is a 
continuum of stringency levels from which to choose. The convexity of the set S frees us 
from worrying about problems of non-existence of solutions related to discontinuities. It also 
allows us to use the tools of calculus to analyze the problem. 
We introduce © to parameterize the degree to which consumers can ascertain the 
actual quality of the good. It measures the readiness to which quality is observed after 
consumption. For example, we could interpret me[0,1] as the exogenous probability that a 
consumer discovers the true quality of the product, co -1 implies that quality is perfectly 
observable after consumption, or the sought-after characteristic is an experience attribute. 
Credence attributes are represented by co- 0. 
3.2.1.1 Monopolist processor 
We first examine the case where there is only one processor in the market. Recall that 
we assume processors will be trusted until proven wrong. Therefore, there are only two 
possible states of the world denoted by r = 1,2. The first state denotes the periods where the 
processor has a good reputation, and hence faces a positive demand. In state two, the demand 
for the high quality product is zero. Since there is only one processor, and profits are zero in 
the second state of the world, the superscript of the per-period profit function will be dropped 
here. 
48 
Let T denote the point in time where the processor loses his/her reputation (move 
from the first to the second state). That is, T is the period in which consumers purchase a 
product that does not meet the standards promised, and find out. A processor that moves 
from state 1 to state 2 in period T, has profits given by 
R(s,y) = T,Pt~i7r(y,s;a) = x(y,s;a)Yj/3'~l 7r(y,s;a)^-^- (3.1) 
t=1 t=1 1 P 
As before, 7r(*) represents the per-period profits of a processor that has a good 
reputation. Since they depend only on the state of the world, we can pull per-period profits 
out of the summation. In equation (3.1), (3 is the relevant discount factor, a again denotes 
the size of the market for value added products, y and s represent the levels of output and 
QAS respectively14. We assume ^7y^a - 0, i.e. per-period profits increase as the demand for 
high quality products strengthens. Profits are zero once the seller is forced out of the value 
added market. 
However quality is random and the processor cannot exert perfect control over it. A 
processor can only affect the distribution of quality in the sense described above. Hence, it is 
not known when a processor will lose its reputation. Recognizing that, processor's expected 
profits are 
(  \ -  B T  \  )  x  \ - E ( p T \ m ( s , c o ) \  
£(n(jv)) = £ n ( y , s \ a ) — — ~ \ m ( s , c o )  = n ( y , s \ a )  —  ,  
v  P  J  P  
where m[s,co) denotes the probability that a processor with a QAS .v in place will stay in 
the value added market for a trait with discoverability co. In particular, note that the 
probability of staying in the market or keeping consumer's goodwill for two successive 
periods, m(s,co) = /[(s'j + ^ l-l(j-))(l-to), combines the probability that resulting quality is 
14 The rightmost equality follows by recognizing that the summation term is a partial sum of a geometric series. 
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high, with the probability of type II error weighted by the consumer's level of awareness15. A 
processor will face a zero demand in the second period with probability 1 - m (s, a>). 
To make further progress, we need an expression for e{^(3t Note that T is 
just counting the number of periods until the first notorious (discovered) failure. Since the 
outcome in a given period is independent of the outcome of other periods, T is the number of 
Bernoulli trials required to get the first failure. This is just the description of a geometric 
random variable with "success" probability 1 -m(s,co). The previous observation allows us 
to obtain the required expression as 
E ( j 3 T \ m ( s , û ) ) )  =  ? x ( T  =  t )  =  Y a p t m { s , c o ) ~ X  (l-/w(g,c?))= ^ ^ ' 
t-1 r=i l pmys,o)j 
Plugging this back we see that the processor expected profits are 
Suppose first that the choice of the output rate is independent of the optimal QAS. 
This may be the case where output and safety are nonjoint in inputs (see Chambers (1989), or 
when investments in QAS do not depend on the rate of output. The choice of output in this 
case is the standard monopolist profit maximization problem. To focus on the selection of 
stringency of controls, we assume that processor's only procure and sell one unit of the good 
(or the optimal and independently chosen y*, which is fixed here). The problem then 
reduces to the choice of investments in QAS that maximizes profits as follow 
max E  ( n  (l, s ) )  = max ^ ^ 
A quick look at this problem reveals that the easier it is for a processor to acquire 
information about quality (i.e., the cheaper it is to implement a QAS that yields a given level 
of certainty about quality), the more likely it is that a QAS will be implemented. A rising 
15 Note m(s,CO^ = 2(,S') + (l-/l(.S'))(l-<y) = (l-<y) + <yA(s) is the convex combination between the 
true probability of having a product of high quality, and one. We see again that as CO —> 0 , m (.S', to) —> 1, 
and the processors are expected to stay in state one for a large number of periods, even if they are offering a 
product that does not meet the promised standards. 
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price premium also would increase the likelihood that there exists a profitable QAS. The first 
order condition with respect to s is 
aE(nM)  
d s  ( l  - f i m ( s , c o ) f  
= + (3.2, 
with equality if s *  > 0. Note that =  Ll_l. The second order sufficient 
% % 
condition (S.O.S.C.) given by 
i d 2 m ( s , t o )  
d2£,(ll(l,j')) ^ d 2 x ( \ , s \ a )  .  .  P  
ds1 ' ds1 +'r(1-s;a)(1 
is assumed to hold. 
Equation (3.2) has the usual interpretation. It states that the level of stringency should 
be increased until the marginal benefits of increased stringency equal the marginal costs. 
Marginal benefits of an increase in s equals the change in the proportion of purchases that are 
of high quality multiplied by the probability that low quality output will be discovered16, the 
per-period profit rate and a factor that takes into account the multi-period nature of the 
problem at hand. The marginal benefits of increased assurance rise as the quality of the good 
is more readily observable by the processor's customers, and as the potential punishments for 
false certification become more severe. Switching to the second state of the world is a 
harsher punishment when per-period profits are high, and the future is important to the 
processor. The marginal cost of an increase in 5 is simply the increase in costs that must be 
incurred to implement a more stringent QAS 
In this problem it is straightforward to show that the optimal level of investments in 
quality assurance is unambiguously increasing in the size of the market (or strength of the 
demand for value added products), and the value processor's place in the future. These 
dm(s,a>) ô/l(s) 
16 Note that ——- = CO 
d s  d s  
51 
comparative statics can be respectively represented by 
da 
dn(l ,s;a)  ^ dm(s,co) 
da & 
S.O&C. 
> 0  
and ds 
0^(1,^; a) , . , Lm{s,co) + n{l ,s\a) ^ 
^ & 
> 0 .  
6/9 
We next show that the ability of consumers to perceive quality also increases the 
optimal level of stringency of the QAS. This can be seen by implicit differentiation of 
equation (3.2) (assuming an interior solution, and dropping the arguments of the functions to 
reduce notational clutter) 
% a/ 
ds* d2m dn dm 
+ n/3 /?-  s  0 .  
6# dsdco ds dco 
The term in square brackets is the usual second order conditions of the maximization 
problem, and hence negative. Therefore sgnf^y^ 1 = sgn n  
d2m _ dn dm 
nfi— P 
dsdco ds dco 
. Note 
that d m and are both positive, and hence we cannot determine this sign 
dsdco ds dco 
directly. To show that this difference is positive add equation (3.2) to it (which is the first 
dm 1 
order condition of the problem and hence zero), multiplied by P 
dco ( l-(3m) to obtain 
sgn ds'  
which simplifies to 
: sgn d
2m dn dm dm 1 dn n  dm 
— + nB— 





= sgn n(3 dX >0. 
(l  -  f3m) ds 
Hence, as consumers become more able to discern quality, processors find it optimal 
to increase their expenditures in reputation-preserving devices such as QASs. This reveals 
that as the economic loss from incurring a type II error and/or being discovered increases, 
processors will be more careful about the product he/she certifies. 
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A more interesting and perhaps more realistic situation arises when the choice of the 
level of output is not independent of the investments in quality. Antle (2001) classifies 
quality control technologies for producing quality-differentiated goods as process control, 
inspection, testing and identity preservation. He argues that all these technologies, except 
testing, affect the variable costs of production. However the costs of the testing technologies 
are not independent of the rate of output, since it typically involves sampling a small 
proportion of the product. Weaver and Kim (2002) also model quantity and quality as 
competing goals.17 
In this case, we can write the processor's problem, which is to choose the optimal 
QAS and output level to maximize expected profits as follows 
Z7/T-TZ n(y,s\a) 
max E ll(y,5'))= max ^—-,— 
y>0,$eS V '  y>0,seS f]myS,CO) 
Straightforward applications of the envelope theorem confirm the intuitive result that 
processors are better off when they face a larger demand in state 1 (higher a ), when they are 
more "patient" (higher /? ), and when it is harder for consumers to determine true output 
quality (lower co). In particular, the envelope theorem immediately indicates that 
s£ (n(>• ,$ ) )_  dx i  ^  ac(nw)  _ «(» ,« . )  
da 
— ) )  _  dm (5, a>) 1 < 0. A direct implication of the last derivative is 
that as long as the certification system is imperfect (A.(s') = 1 - F{qM |.s') < 1 j, the profitability 
of participation in the market for quality-assured products is hindered by increased consumer 
awareness. 
The first order conditions for this problem are given by 
0E(n(y,^)) 1 ^ 
dy dy 1 - /3m(s,co) 
17 They model quality as a product diversion process. 
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^(nW) 1 , 
a, - 0, 1-/M,,w) ^ 
< 0 ,  j > 0 ,  
and the corresponding complementary slackness conditions. 
The first order conditions can in principle be solved to obtain the optimal choices for 
output and stringency of controls represented by y*(a>,j3,a) and s*(co,p,a) respectively. 
These conditions are equivalent to 
d£(n) _ dn(y,s;a) 
< 0  y > 0  
(3.3) 








The Hessian for this problem is 
(l-pm(s,co)) 




_2 / \ 
which implies that the second order sufficient conditions will be satisfied when 
D ^ < i  
2) til = 
%2 
--ae- -
(l  -J3m(s,û)))  
f  d2n(y,s;a) 
dyds 
> 0  
3) 
d2m(s,co) 
< 0, (implied by 1) and 2) together), 
hold. 
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Natural questions to ask are what are the optimal responses in terms of output and 
choice of quality assurance system as the parameters change. That is, we are asking what are 
the signs of ^y*/ a?*/ ^y*/ a?y Some of these 
'6# ' /a# ' / ^  ' 
questions can be answered by conducting comparative statics in the proposed model. 
However, the structure of the problem makes the signs of the last two derivatives inherently 
ambiguous'8. The intuition is that as a increases, there is an incentive to increase the rate of 
output, which may in turn partially offset the gain in price. Increasing the output rate has 
potentially the double effect of reducing per unit price, and increasing production costs (in a 
case of decreasing returns to scale technologies). Also, increases in the profitability of the 
market for value added products provide incentives to monitor more closely product quality, 
and delay the transition to the second state. However, this has to be weighted against the 
costs incurred in doing so19. 
We now tackle the question of the optimal choices of output and QAS as quality 
becomes more readily discernible.  Differentiat ing system (3.3) part ial ly with respect to co, 
using the chain rule, we get (after some rearrangement) 
d27r(y,s;a) 
dM**") d^(y, s-a) .  ,  P 
dyds a„2 +^(.y^,a) 
d2m(s,co) 
a^ 







f o2 a m 
(l-pm{s,œ)) a?aw u ^ ^ ^ ^ g 
\s ,co) 
dco y 
Recalling that m(s,co) = A(s) + (l-/L(5,))(l-<y), and applying the same technique 
used in the previous problem, the second element of vector in the right hand side of the 
18 Note that the parameter a enters by itself in both equations of system (3.3). See Silberberg (1990). 
dy * ds * 




system (3.4) can be written again as % (1 - /?) which makes its 
(l -  /3m(s,a>y) ds 
ds * 
negative sign clear. Samuelson's conjugate pairs theorem immediately asserts > 0. As 
dû) 
consumers become more able to discern quality, processors will find it optimal to adopt more 
stringent controls. This result is similar in a sense to one of the findings of Darby and Kami 
(1973). These authors argued that it is very likely (albeit not necessarily true) that as 
consumers become more knowledgeable, the optimal amount of fraud is reduced.20 In our 
paper, firms would have incentives to reduce the number of mistakes they make as 
consumers become increasingly able to discern qualities (or become more informed). 
There exists a key trade-off between the benefits and costs of information acquisition 
on the part of processors. Having a more precise QAS, though costly, decreases the 
probability that firms will lose consumers trust. Furthermore, as the expected losses derived 
from consumer distrust increase, the payoff from processor becoming better informed about 
actual quality increases. 
dy * 
Using Cramer's rule to solve for , we find that its sign is ambiguous without 
00 
imposing further structure, since co enters by itself in the second equation of system (3.3). 
Moreover, system (3.4) tells us that sgn j = sgn j> which is not implied by 
the maximization hypothesis alone. Since it is reasonable to assume that raising the levels of 
d^7t d2C 
controls increases the marginal costs of production, and noting that = , we 
expect the optimal output rate to decrease as co increases. 
The question of how the value that producers place on the future affects the optimal 
choices of QAS and output levels can be explored through a similar exercise. The derivations 
are as follows. 
20 Note that in Darby and Kami's (1973) paper, supplying firms knew the actual quality of the product (repair 
services) they were offering. 
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d2n(y,s\a) d
2 i t(y,s\a) 
8y&s 
8y8^ 
dm (s,  co) 





ds ( l  -  /3m(s,co))\y(l- /3m(s,co)) 






thus we know 
ds f im(s,co))\ .( \- f im(s,co)) 
f im(s,co) 




ds ( l- f im(s,co))\( \-]3m(s,co)) 
M^ + x ( y , s , a )  
ay' 
H 











As the future becomes more important, it is more valuable for processors to invest in 
quality assurance systems that give them a longer expected presence in the market. The sign 
dy * 
of is ambiguous as before (and due to the exact same reasons). However, the discussion 
above suggests it is negative. Increasing the expenses incurred to "learn" about the actual 
quality of the good increases variable costs of production, and hence it is optimal to cut back 
on the output rate. 
To summarize, we have modeled the decision of a monopolistic processor that 
chooses her per period output rate and the stringency of the QAS to implement in a 
potentially infinitely lived market. The duration of the market is unknown to the processor. 
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However, she can influence it (stochastically) through her choices. In this setting, processors 
or firms implementing more stringent QAS are expected to keep their reputation for a larger 
number of time periods. Our main findings thus far are that a) the stringency of the QAS 
will be higher for more easily discoverable traits, more patient firms, and more attractive 
markets (only when the output rate is fixed); b) firms are more likely to implement a QAS 
when the future is important, the quality trait is harder to observe, and of course when the 
demand for the differentiated product is stronger; and c) the effect of both the discoverability 
of the quality trait and the value firms place on the future on the per-period output rate is in 
general ambiguous, however we argued that an inverse relationship between both variables 
and the output rate is more likely. 
The current analysis ignores the potential existence of other firms in the market. 
Strategic interactions among firms are important, especially in markets susceptible to free 
riding and Akerlof s lemons problem21. To study strategic interactions between firms, we 
need to have at least two participants in the market. The next section develops a duopoly 
model to achieve that end. 
3.2.1.2 Strategic interactions between firms 
3.2.1.2.1 Reputation is a public good 
We consider first the situation where the entire industry can lose consumers trust as a 
result of the actions of one participant. In this situation, consumer trust can be viewed as a 
public good, and as we will see, in some situations firms may have incentives to free ride on 
the rival's investments in safety or quality. An industry that has recently experienced such 
loss of reputation is the beef chain, as a consequence of the appearance of "mad-cow" disease 
(bovine spongiform encephalopathy, or BSE) in Europe (Northen, 2001), Canada and the 
United States. 
Henessy, Roosen and Miranowski (2001) model a related issue, and conclude that 
even when firms in the food industry may profit by increased investments in safety 
(assuming a leadership role), they may obtain higher levels of benefits by free riding on the 
efforts of other chain participants. 
21 Note that the current problem is different than the one considered by Akerlof, since processors are only 
imperfectly informed about the actual quality of a given unit of product they offer for sale. 
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Suppose consumers buy a product as long as no irregularity or hazard is detected. In 
this framework, we still have two possible states of the world. In the first state, all processors 
have a good reputation, whereas in the second all sellers are punished by consumers. This is 
likely to occur when it is hard to differentiate the product of different producers, or when 
consumers believe that all participants in the industry follow similar procedures. This case 
can be contrasted to the "notorious firm"22 situation to be described next. 
We model this situation as a potentially infinitely lived game, where the termination 
time is random. The uncertainty comes again from the fact that processors cannot exert 
absolute control on the quality of the good they procure and/or produce. Rob and Sekiguchi 
(2001) model a similar situation. However, in their model firms compete in price in the 
second period, and only one firm is able to make sales until it loses its reputation and the 
other occupies its place. When the second firm loses the market, consumers switch back to 
the first firm and so on. 
As in the previous sections, we assume that the industry will be trusted until proven 
wrong. In the first stage, the two processors once and for all decide independently and in a 
non-cooperative fashion, what QAS to implement. After observing each others choice of 
QAS, processors compete a la Cournot. Therefore, production and QAS technologies are 
known by both firms. Consumers buy the product at the end of the first period and update 
their beliefs about the quality of the industry's output. In the periods to follow, firms keep 
competing in output, and consumers keep updating their beliefs, until a failure occurs and is 
detected by consumers. In that period confidence is lost by the entire industry forever. In 
terms of a stochastic process, the second state of the world is an absorbing one. The 
monopolist problems analyzed in the previous sections can be thought of as following the 
same structure; first choose QAS, and then rate of output. However, since there is only one 
decision maker in the monopoly model, the result is clearly the same as under the 
simultaneous choice modeled. 
As is standard for this sort of dynamic programming problems, we work backwards. 
We first find the equilibrium level of output after technologies have been chosen, and then 
22 Klein and Leffler (1980) refer to the "notorious firm" situation, as one in which every consumer learns about 
a firm that has cheated. 
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solve the first stage, keeping the second period equilibrium rules in mind. The second stage 
problem is a standard Cournot game. Following the same argument used to construct the 
monopolist's objective function of the previous section we find that firm i's expected profits 
are 
K i,l 
^  n  ( f ,  a )  1  -  (a ,  )  (  a_ ,  )  '  
where n l ' x  denotes per-period profits of player i  in state 1, and y -  represents a 
vector of output. Because per-period profits are zero if the firm has lost its reputation, we 
drop the superscript that indexes the state of the world. Since both st and s_t are 
predetermined, the problem is just to choose the level of output that maximizes per-period 
profits in the standard way to find the Nash equilibrium levels y* {si,s_i ), z = 1,2. We can 







which has first order conditions given by 
<0  f ,>0  z =  l ,2  
o 
(3.5) 
and the corresponding complementary slackness conditions. Note that if it is difficult to 
detect quality deviations (i.e. when co—> 0), the model predicts that processors will find it 
optimal not to invest in quality assurance (the solution will tend to the corner 
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(s* = 0,.s2 = O) ).23 The same holds of course if processors do not value future periods, or 
when the probability that your rival is caught is close to one. 
The second order sufficient conditions are 
1 aU a i ,2 
a2A a2,2 d zET\ Ô lE n 
a :  
ds 
and Q = a,, .a. . -  a, .a,, > 0, for i = 1,2. 
i ,i t, i i, i » 
The system of equations (3.5), implicitly define the processor's best response 
functions bt (s_, ), i = 1,2. A vector of investments in safety (s*, ^  ) is a Nash equilibrium for 
this model if and only if s* = ^ for i = 1,2. If an equilibrium for this stage exists, we can 
then compute the output quantities and prices using the equilibrium rules for the Cournot 
game that will be played at the second stage. 
We now investigate the nature of the competition outlined studying a key property, 
the slope, of the best response functions. To that end we substitute the best response function 
of firm i into its first order condition, and differentiate it (at an interior solution) with respect 
to the choice of its rival. After rearranging (and omitting arguments for brevity) we get 
36 (-?_,) (1 - J + — pm_( + 8? , 8s, 
ds i  8s_ j  
8^' 
8^ .. 8& 
23 / \  / ,. dm, (s, ) d/lfj1) To see this, recall that m (s. J = 1 - CO + &M.(s,. ), and lim : = lim CO —; = 0. 
> 0  ds ;  co->0 ds ;  
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The denominator of this expression is negative by the sufficient conditions for a 
maximum. Then, the sign of the slope of the best response function is the same as the sign of 
the numerator (see Dixit, 1986). The first term is negative, since as one firm increases 
investments in safety, it reduces the benefits derived from increases in their rival's 
expenditures in QASs.24 By a similar argument, and the assumption that more stringent 
systems yield better products, the last two terms are positive. Overall the sign is ambiguous 
without further structure. 
However, some features can be read from the form of the previous equation: (a) if the 
probability of success (stay in the good state of the world) for both processors is high, and the 
future is valued, the best response function will slope upwards25 (b) if the cross-partial terms 
are close to zero, for example if the products are not close substitutes, the sign will also be 
positive. But neither condition is necessary to obtain upward sloping reaction functions. 
Downward sloping reaction functions will arise only when the cross effects are strong 
compared to the profitability of the industry. Of course, nothing says that the reaction curves 
will be monotonie. 
Hence, the structure of the problem makes several types of interaction plausible. Free 
riding would be represented by downward sloping best response functions. In the term 
introduced by Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), quality assurance systems are 
"strategic substitutes". If one firm invests heavily in QAS, it will be a weak competitor in the 
second stage. It then may be worthwhile for the other processor to free ride on the periods 
warranted by the other firm's investments, and enjoy a high level of per-period profits for as 
long as the market lasts. Though mathematically plausible, it is hard to rationalize a situation 
where a processor would choose stringent levels of assurance, believing that its rival will put 
a lax system in place. If the processor's rival invests little in quality, he/she will face a tough 
Cournot competitor for the few periods the market is expected to last, which act as a double 
incentive to implement less stringent QASs. 
24 By increasing its first period investments in QASs, a firm is raising its own costs for the second stage 
competition, which benefits its rivals. However, these benefits are lower if the rivals also increase their costs. 
dm i(s,)dm_ l(s_ i)  ,  .  ,  .  
Unless of course when (3 > 0,  i  — 1,2,  faster than f3m l  (jv ) m_i ( s_t ) —> 1. 
a?, 
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A more plausible and intuitively appealing scenario is that of QAS being, in the 
language of Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), "strategic complements". That is, 
reactions functions have an upward slope26. When a processor's rival puts a lax QAS in 
place, he/she will find, as discussed in the previous paragraph, little incentive to invest in 
quality assurance. As the processor's rival increases the stringency of the QAS, he/she will 
have two types of incentives to raise his/her investments. First, the market will last for a 
longer number of periods. Second, he/she will be facing a milder competitor, which increases 
per period margins and makes more stringent systems worthwhile. 
The direction of the response in the levels of assurance when the capacity of 
consumers to perceive quality increases becomes ambiguous. Following Dixit (1986), we 
totally differentiate the system of first order conditions to get 
82E IT d2ETI l  d2E n1 , dco 
a X ]  a l 2  1 dst ds\ds2 dSy dsydco 
ai,\ a2, 2 _  1 8- i d2EU2  dco 
1 
(8 ds2dco 
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ds2dco 
where again Q = (a11a22-a12a21)>0, and a t i< 0, for z' = l,2 are the stability conditions 
(see Dixit, 1986). 
The decisions of both processors are equal, so that it suffices to analyze the responses of 
processor 1. From equation (3.6), the change in the optimal stringency of assurance for firm 1 
is given by 
ds. 1 
dco Q 2,2 
d2EYV 




26 If the parameterization of the problem were such that the game is supermodular, upward slopping best 
response functions would be implied, and Nash equilibrium in pure strategies exist (See Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990). However we do not impose that structure a priori. 
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A first look at this expression suffices to observe that its sign is ambiguous in general. 
However, we can analyze some cases. From the stability conditions, we know that O is 
positive, and a2 2 is negative. Nothing more can be said without imposing further structure. If 
symmetry is assumed (as we do) the cross partial terms are equal and hence we only need to 
sign one of them. 
We study the case where quality assurance systems are strategic complements27. 
From the previous analysis this case arises when al2 > 0. Using the stability conditions we 
immediately see that sgn = sgn 
rd\E\ 
 ^ 8?, 8# dco 
function, and some rather tedious rearranging yields 
e 2ETV _ 3A(j , )  
. Cross-partial differentiation of the objective 
ds^dco f3mx (s [)m2 (s2)) dsx 
which implies sgn = sgn(m2 ( s 2 ) ( l - f i m 2  (^ 2 ) ) - l j .  The  express ion  wi th in  paren thes i s  
is a quadratic equation with negative coefficient -/? g (-1,0). It is straightforward to check 
that the expression is positive if and only if m2 e [m°, lj, where m° is the only root (in the 
unit interval) of the quadratic equation. This shows that if assurance systems are 
complementary, processors will increase their investments in quality only if their rival's 
probability of success is above a certain threshold given by m°. Note also that this condition 
is conducive to the property of strategic complementarity. For small values of m2, processor 
1 will find it optimal to reduce investments in quality as consumers become more 
knowledgeable. 
In summary, we have extended the monopoly model presented above as a way to 
capture and explore plausible strategic behavior among firms in an environment where 
27 For strategic substitutes, the optimal adjustment will depend not only on the sign of the cross partial studied 
below, but also on the relative magnitude of a,, and a{ 2 . To see this, impose symmetry and rewrite 
1  /  \ ^EIT 
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reputations are not firm specific. In that sense a discovered substandard performance by a 
firm will also have negative effects on other firms. The scenario was modeled as a potentially 
infinitely lived game, with two stages. In the first stage firms choose simultaneous and 
independently their QAS (once and for all), and output rates are chosen in the second stage, 
after the QAS of both firms is observed. In this scenario, the nature of the competition is 
ambiguous, in the sense that QASs can potentially be strategic complements or substitutes. 
However, we argued that the former is more plausible. For this case, we showed that firms 
will implement more stringent QASs as the ability of consumers to perceive quality increases 
(or the absence of the trait is more easily discoverable) only if their rival's probability of 
success is sufficiently high (or equivalently if they have a QAS of enough stringency in 
place). 
3.2.1.2.2 Reputation is a private good 
This section formalizes the situation where reputation is a private good. The structure 
of the problem is similar in the sense that firms have to choose the optimal level of 
investments in quality assurance systems, which affect quality stochastically, and then 
compete in quantities for the random number of periods in which they have consumer's 
approval. The key difference with the previous section is that in this scenario when a 
processor fails, the other is benefited because he/she increases his/her market share. We still 
maintain the assumption that firms will be trusted until proven wrong. 
The sequence of the model is as follows. In the current period (e.g. period zero), 
processors, independently and non-cooperatively, choose the stringency of the quality 
assurance they wish to implement. After observing the choice of their competitor, they 
compete a la Cournot, until one processor loses his/her reputation. Unlike the situation where 
reputation is a public good, now the other processor has an "expanded" demand, and behaves 
as a monopolist until his/her product fails and is discovered by consumers. 
To accommodate this sequencing we need to expand the number of states of the 
world from 2 to 4. In state 1, both processors are trusted. State 2 arises if processor 2 loses its 
reputation. In state 3, processor 2 acts as a monopolist. The market disappears when state 4 is 
reached (both processors lose consumer's goodwill). Reputations can then be modeled as 
following a stochastic process, where the probabilities of reaching the different states of the 
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world are affected by the choices made by the market participants. Since only the immediate 
past determines the state of the world in the following period, the stochastic process exhibits 
the Markov property. Therefore, it is natural to use the concept of a Markov process to model 
the dynamics of this market. 
A Markov process is defined by the possible states of the system, the transition 
matrix, and a vector that records the initial state (Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000)). The states 
of the world are described in the previous paragraph, and the assumption that processors will 
be trusted until proven wrong is equivalent to assuming that the system starts at the first state 
with probability one (and hence the remaining three entries of the initial state vector are 
assigned zero probability). The transition matrix M is as follow 
M 
m {m2  m x  ( l -m 2 )  m2  (l -  m, )  ( l - /w, ) ( l -
0 m l  0 1 -m {  
0 0 m2  1 -m2  
0 0 0 1 
m,) 
The probabilities of success and m2  (,s'2) are defined as before. Then, entry 
Mi j denotes the probability that the system will be in state j in the next period, given that 
the current state is i. Note that any state can follow state 1, but neither state 1 nor 3 can be 
reached after state 2. In the jargon of Markov chains, state 4 is absorbing, i.e. once it is 
reached the system stays in it forever, or alternatively, it will go to other states with 
probability zero. Note that as required in a Markov matrix, all the entries are nonnegative and 
X; :X=1 for  4 -
With this in place and noting that processor one makes zero profits in states 3 and 4, 
we can write his/her first stage problem as 
max E [I = max-




28 Note that the case where reputations is a public good, is also a Markov process, but with only two possible 
states (that would correspond to the first and fourth states of the current setting. 
66 
For k = 1,2, n[ , denotes per period profits for processor one when there are k 
market participants, ek is a four by one vector that has zeros everywhere except for a 1 in the 
Mi position, and T is the transpose operator. 
Equation (3.7) specifies that processors maximize the profits in the duopoly and 
monopoly situation, weighted by the likelihood of the different scenarios, which they can 
affect by the stringency of the QAS they choose. The first order condition for this problem 
(omitting arguments for brevity) is given by 
A ^ <0, (3.8) 
ÔS{  ,=o ;=0 US J j=I j=x OS ]  
with equality if > 0. Of course, a symmetric equation exists for the other processor. 
Equation (3.8) has the usual interpretation. Processors will weight marginal benefits 
(given by the second and fourth terms in (3.8)) against marginal costs (given by the first and 
third terms in (3.8)) in their choice of QAS. Now there are new terms in the marginal benefits 
and costs side of the equation. These new terms are associated with the introduction of the 
possibility of being a monopolist if firm 2 loses its reputation first. An equilibrium for this 
model is again a pair of QASs (s,,s2) such that s* = b i  i = 1,2, where b, (•) represents 
the best response function of player i. 
The nature of the competition, some comparative statics, and a comparison to the 
previous industry and reputation structures (monopoly and reputations as a public good) for 
this model is studied in the next section, under the special but frequently encountered case of 
linear demands and constant marginal costs functions. 
3.3 Numerical simulations 
Assume that consumer's valuation of the homogenous final product in each period 
can be represented by a utility function of the form 
u{y\ ,y 2 )  =  a {yJ\  +  y 2 12)  ~^(y f  +  y l  + 2.y1.y2), (3.9) 
where a and b are parameters, and (/15/2) are indicator functions denoting the state of the 
world. The specific form of the indicators will depend on the structure of the market, and the 
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nature of the reputations. Consumers choose quantities to maximize U  ( y x , y 2 ) -  P \ } > \  ~ ~  P i V i  •  
Consumers discount the future at the same rate as producers. 
Processors convert inputs (e.g. farm output) into a good that can be for final 
consumption (this is consistent with the terminology we have been using so far), or used as 
an input by downstream processors or retailers (i.e. within a supply chain). In the latter case, 
equation (3.9) would be interpreted as the profit function of downstream processors or 
retailers. In any case, suppose that processor's transform the input into its product in a 
Leontief fashion with constant marginal costs given by their investments in QASs. Similar 
utility function and technologies (though they normalize marginal costs to zero) are used by 
Hueth and Marcoul (2002). 
The link between stringency of the QAS and the probability of obtaining a product of 
good quality is given by the monotonie and concave function A(s) = —Therefore, we 
assume that if investments in quality are zero, processors will be obtaining a good product 
with probability zero. This sort of link is more likely to occur when quality is given by cost 
increasing practices. When the variability is natural, and processors just need to select what 
input to buy, it may be more reasonable to employ a link that assigns equal probability to 
obtaining a good product and incurring in statistical type II error.29 
3.3.1 Monopolist processor 
The monopoly situation can be obtained by setting /2 = 0. That is, the good produced 
by processor two is not valued.30 /, = 1 if the processor is trusted and zero otherwise. This 
yields an inverse demand function for good 1 given by px (^,) = alx -byx. Plugging this back 
in the monopolist problem we obtain 
max 
s,eS,^,>0 
— (3 — coa>X(s x  ))  j  
' An example would be A = 
é +1 
;hat con 
exclude processor 2 to study the monopolist problem as a special case of the general framework. 
30 Note that this does not mean that sumers can distinguish between the two goods. It is just to be able to 
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3.3.2 Duopoly situation when reputation is a public good 
This case is obtained letting /, and I2 equal one if no failure has been detected and 
zero otherwise. The inverse demand for processor i  is given by p t  (y,,y2)  = al i  -  b{y x  + y2) .  
Then, equilibrium quantities and for the second stage and per period profits are easily 
checked to be y* = ——, and n2  (.s;, s_ j  )  = —=^- i -1,2. Plugging this in 
the first stage problem we get that processor's 1 objective is given by 
{o, — 2s, + s2 ) 
s,eS 9b (l - /? (l - co + coA )) (l - co + coA (s2 ))) 
3.3.3 Duopoly situation when reputation is a private good 
For this case, let /, equal one in states one and two, and zero otherwise. Also, define 
I2 to be one in states one and three, and zero otherwise. As long as the stochastic process 
stays in the initial state (both processor's have good reputation), per period profits are as in 
the duopoly situation presented above. When the system reaches states 2 or 3, the monopolist 
per period profit (also presented above) becomes relevant. Here the problem of processor 1 is 
max-i 
s t eS  
(a-2s,  +sj  +  fci l l jr  
96 *3 46 y„ 
3.3.4 Results and discussion 
In this section, we examine the solutions to the problems posed, and study how 
changes in the economic environment affect the equilibrium levels of stringency of the QAS 
implemented, associated expected profits for firms, and utility for consumers. Specifically, 
we study how the structure of the industry, nature of reputations, and ability of consumers to 
detect quality deviations affect the equilibrium outcomes. 
Figure 3.1 presents the best response functions for both duopoly scenarios. Under 
the functional specifications and reputation being a public good, reaction curves slope 
upwards (this is the most likely scenario identified before). Processors find few incentives to 
invest in QAS, when the market is not going to last long (i.e. when their rivals invest little in 
quality), and they expect to face a tough (low cost) Cournot competitor in the following 
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periods. However, as discussed above, processors find it worthwhile to put more stringent 
systems in place if they anticipate their rivals will do the same thing. For the market to last 
more than a few periods, and compensate the investments in quality assurance, both players 
need to collaborate in this scenario. 
2 4 6 
QAS of firm 1 (s^ 
Firm 1 reputation is a 
public good 
Firm 2 reputation is a 
public good 
• Firm 1 reputation is a 
private good 
• Firm 2 reputation is a 
private good 
Figure 3.1. Best response functions of firms (a -  50, 6 = 1, co = 0.5, /? = 0.9) 
On the other hand, when reputations are private goods, reaction curves have a 
negative slope. That is, when reputations are private goods, as processors anticipate their 
rivals will put a lax system in place, it is worthwhile to invest in a more stringent QAS. The 
driving force is that processors find it beneficial to give up some of the duopoly profits, while 
increasing the likelihood of outlasting the rival and capturing the entire market. But when a 
processor anticipates its rival will invest heavily in quality assurance (and becomes harder to 
outlast), the best he/she can do is to reduce his/her own expenses, and try to capture a higher 
per-period duopoly profit. However, note that a processor profit maximizing level of QAS is 
quite insensitive to its rival's choice under the current parameterization. 
Comparing the stringency of assurance across the different types of reputation, Figure 
3.1 reveals that, as expected, the equilibrium investments in QAS are lower when reputation 
is a public good. This has the classic textbook interpretation. As firms do not capture the full 
returns of their QASs, they will under-invest in quality, and try to free ride on other firm's 
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investments. Branding for example, could be seen as an effort to convert reputations into a 
private good, and hence capture a higher share of the returns to investments in QAS.31 
Economic theory predicts that if branding allows processors to capture the returns to their 
investments, it will result in higher levels of quality assurance. Also, though costlier QAS 
result in lower per period outputs, the expected total production (and hence consumption) is 
higher when reputation is a private good. This is driven by the fact that more stringent 
controls result in a longer duopoly stage, in addition to the monopoly periods afforded by 
being able to identify the firm that has provided a product that does not reach the standards 
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Figure 3.2. Equilibrium responses of expected output to changes in quality observability 
(a = 50,b = l, /? = 0.9) 
When there is only one firm in the market, expected output will be higher than under 
the duopoly and public good nature of reputations (see Figure 3.2). However, expected 
output appears to be slightly higher in the duopoly with private reputations, for most levels of 
We now study the effects of consumers' ability to discern quality on the optimal 
levels of investments. As discussed before, when quality is a credence attribute, firms will 
31 However, as Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen (2002) note, branding also provides a target to consumers in the 
marketplace when a problem occurs (more on this below). 
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find it optimal to not invest in QAS. Firms do not have incentives to avoid punishments that 
have zero probability of occurrence. Figure 3.3 shows that as consumers can detect quality 
deviations more easily, the equilibrium levels of stringency increase, for all market structures 
and natures of reputation considered.32 
Reputation is a public 
good 
Reputation is a private 
good 
Monopoly 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
Quality Observability (w) 
Figure 3.3. Equilibrium responses of the stringency of controls to changes in quality 
observability ( a = 50, b-1, /? = 0.9 ) 
The level of stringency is always greater when reputation is a private good. 
Furthermore, it reveals that the monopolist will provide the highest quality (in expectations). 
Monopolists are the ones that would lose more if a quality deviation occurs and is detected. 
They have the entire market for themselves from the beginning. In the case of a duopoly, 
processors can at best hope to capture the market in the future, and of course future earnings 
are less valuable than current profits. However, it is not possible to state which situation 
yields higher welfare in general. Processors would prefer, as expected, to be the only market 
participants and reputations to be private rather than public goods (see Figure 3.4). It is also 
clear from Figure 3.5 that consumers prefer the private reputations situation to the collective 
reputations and monopoly scenario. However, consumer's choice between monopoly and 
duopoly with public reputations depend on the level of quality observability (a>). In short, 
32 Though not presented, as the demand for high quality products, (parameterized by a ) rises, the stringency of 
the QAS under all scenarios increases. 
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we can only say that the duopoly situation with collective reputations is Pareto dominated by 
the other duopoly scenario considered.33 
Figure 3.4 may explain the efforts of many firms to be able to distinguish and trace 
their products along the supply chain. For example, Niman Ranch has a trace-back system 
that allows its loins to be traced back to each producing farmer. Also, many food retailers sell 
their own-brand labeled products as high quality (Noelke and Caswell (2000)). The draw 
back of this strategy is that firms identify themselves when a problem occurs, and are clear 
targets in the marketplace (Hennessy, Roosen, and Jensen, (2002). If they can differentiate 
their products enough, firms could create a market for themselves (closer to a monopoly 
situation), or create a reputation that is independent from the actions of other market 
participants. That is to say, many of the investments in QAS can be seen as efforts to move 
away from a market where it is hard to identify who produced what, and hence reputations 
are collective, to a scenario where consumers can identify the firms that deliver goods of 
substandard quality. 
7000 
«— Reputation is a private 
good 
*— Monopoly 
Reputation is a public 
good 
Quality Observability (w) 
Figure 3.4. Equilibrium responses of expected profits to changes in quality observability 
(o = 50, 6 = 1, /? = 0.9) 
33 Note if we consider that consumers value more the future than producers, or beta is close to 1 (higher than 
0.98), the expected utility from the monopoly scenario exceeds that of the duopoly with public reputations for 
all CO. In those cases, the monopoly scenario would also Pareto dominate the duopoly with public reputations. 
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The above discussion provides support for some of the policies proposed by 
Hennessy, Roosen and Jensen (2002), to overcome some causes of systemic risk in the food 
industry. The authors advocate for improving traceability, testing, mandate labeling, 
interpreting policies on mergers more leniently for the food industry, etc. Our results suggest 
that market concentration and/or identification of firms producing a given unit of output may 
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Figure 3.5. Equilibrium expected utility for the three scenarios considered for different levels 
of quality observability ( a = 50, b = 1, /? = 0.9 ) 
3.4 Conclusions 
The examination of existing QASs reveals a great disparity in the stringency (and 
associated costs) of the systems employed. We provide a rationale for those differences based 
on the market structure, nature of the reputation mechanisms, and size of the markets or 
strength in demand for value-added products, when the sought after attributes are credence, 
experience, or a mixture of both. We argue that QAS can be seen as efforts made by firms by 
position themselves strategically in the market place. Firms may be trying to move away 
from a market where is hard to identify who produced what to an environment where 
consumers can identify the firm that deliver goods of substandard quality. 
Three models are developed, to accommodate the different scenarios (monopoly, 
duopoly with collective reputations, and duopoly with private reputations) and predictions 
are obtained through comparative statics and numerical simulations. The later are performed 
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under the widely used assumptions of linear demands and constant marginal costs, given by 
the levels of stringency chosen by processors. 
Our results suggest that monopolists would invest more heavily in quality assurance 
than duopolists. In addition, being able to capitalize the full returns (no free riding or 
externalities) of investments in quality provides further incentives to employ more stringent 
QASs. That is under the collective reputations scenario, duopolists will reduce their expected 
quality. Also, as the ability of consumers to detect the actual quality of the good increases, so 
does the stringency of the quality controls34, for all scenarios. Perhaps not surprisingly, our 
numerical simulations show that the size of the market (and hence the potential premiums) 
has a positive impact on the level of investments in quality. 
In terms of welfare, we can only say that the duopoly with private reputations Pareto 
dominate the collective reputation scenario. However, less can be said about how the 
monopoly situation compares to the other scenarios. Processors of course prefer the 
monopoly over any of the duopoly situations. Consumers prefer the duopoly with private 
reputations over the other two scenarios considered. However, under some conditions (when 
the level of quality observability is high, or if consumers value the future highly), consumers 
will prefer the monopoly over the duopoly with public reputations. Hence, our model 
suggests that it is not clear that market concentration hurts consumers, when there is a 
tradeoff between quantity and quality, and the later is imperfectly observable. In the same 
line, if there is no way that the producer of a given unit of output can be identified among 
several firms (it is not possible to develop private reputations), overall welfare may be 
increased by promoting the existence of a monopoly (under the conditions just noted). 
The model could be expanded in several directions. For example, the ability to 
observe quality may be endogeneized, by giving the processor's customers (namely 
consumers or downstream firms) the chance to expend resources and test or inspect the 
processes employed, or introduce groups of consumers that do just that as in Feddersen and 
Gillgan (2001). Alternatively, one could investigate other forms of punishment to producers 
(in addition or in place of seclusion), such as liabilities under the relevant tort law. 
34 This is shown to be true analytically for the monopolist case. For the duopoly with collective reputation, the 
conditions for this to occur are identified. Only numerical predictions were performed for the duopoly with 
private reputations scenario. 
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CHAPTER 4. TOWARDS THE DESIGN OF A 
"GUARANTEED TENDER BEEF" CERTIFICATION 
SYSTEM: TRADE-OFFS IN IMPERFECT CERTIFICATION 
TECHNOLOGIES 
4.1 Introduction 
In most situations a participant in a supply chain has at best imperfect information 
about some quality attributes of a particular input she/he is buying, handling and/or 
processing, and selling to its downstream customers. In many cases, the quality of the final 
product, the destination, and/or appropriate processing of the input is contingent on these 
unobservable quality attributes.1 Assessing the quality of an input is particularly important in 
value-added agriculture, where new producer alliances are creating niche markets by 
differentiating their products by some experience or credence attributes.2 3 The success or 
failure of these ventures is often dependent on whether they are seen as dependable and 
trustworthy by their customers. 
Participants in a supply chain can choose to implement some sort of quality assurance 
systems (QAS) as a way to attempt to learn some relevant aspect about those attributes, and 
provide quality certification to buyers (see Caswell, Bredahl, and Hooker, 1998). Assurance 
can potentially come from a system run by the alliances, from reliance on certification by a 
private or public third party, or both. For some examples from the meats sector see Lawrence 
(2002), or Carriquiry, Babcock, and Carbone (2003). The QASs presented in Chapter 3 vary 
in their precision and effectiveness in identifying products likely to satisfy consumers 
according to certain criteria. We identified several economic factors affecting the precision 
that any decision maker will choose to use in their supply chains. Important factors include 
the market structure, the discoverability of product quality by downstream chain participants, 
' For example, tough meats or non-juicy oranges have very different potential markets, uses, or require different 
preparation than their opposites. 
2 The terms search, experience were introduced by Nelson (1970). The term credence attributes was coined by 
Darby and Kami ( 1973). For search and experience attributes, consumers can gain information about product 
quality before or after consumption respectively. Quality can not be learned by consumers (even after 
consumption) for credence attributes. 
3 A partial list is organic, natural, tender beef, and free range. For a list of existing alliances in the beef sector 
and a rationale for that form of organization see Schroeder and Kovanda (2003). 
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and the nature of reputations. In Chapter 3, however, the quality level considered acceptable 
was fixed and known, but the firm was only able to affect product quality stochastically. 
This chapter focuses on the use of a QAS to learn about the quality of a particular 
input used by a firm in a supply chain, in a framework similar to the one developed in the 
previous paper. However, it differs from the previous work in four ways: 1) we introduce 
variability in the level of quality that will be considered acceptable; 2) we are more explicit 
with regard to the sorting nature of the problem and the distribution of quality of both 
certified and rejected product; 3) we keep track separately of the costs of certification and 
those associated with not being able to observe quality and/or tastes and match customers 
accordingly; and 4) we focus on the choice of thresholds within a given testing or quality 
assessment protocol. This work also differs in scope, in the sense that it intends to be more 
applied by providing an easy to use framework that is flexible enough to accommodate 
different objectives and quality measurements (provided the relevant information is 
available). 
The aim of the QAS considered here is to control a physical attribute of the input, 
which is discoverable by the firm's customers only after purchase and use of the product. 
Thus, an experience attribute will be studied. For concreteness this article focuses on beef 
tenderness. However, the economic forces at work apply broadly to any supply chain that 
contains processed inputs with some imperfectly observable quality attribute and consumer 
heterogeneity. A need for certification from a trusted party comes into play due to the fact 
that tenderness is an experience attribute, and hence buyers can only make inferences about 
the true level of tenderness of a steak. Producers can use certification systems to provide 
information to consumers about beef tenderness (and associated eating experience).4 
Consumers can use these cues to better select the product to buy. 
Meat and animal scientists have dedicated much effort at finding objective 
measurements to infer the palatability and acceptability of beef by consumers to be used on a 
commercial scale to certify quality (or to provide cues to consumers willing to pay premiums 
for better beef). Considerable work has also been devoted to identify thresholds for those 
4 Tenderness has been recognized as the prime determinant of consumer satisfaction by both the industry and 
the meat and animal science community (more on this below). 
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measurements that can be used to sort beef into guaranteed tender and non-certifiable beef. 
The relevant literature is reviewed below. Identification of those thresholds, however, has 
proved elusive.5 The main problem identified by a review of the literature is a lack of clear 
objectives in defining appropriate thresholds. Optimal thresholds are contingent on the 
objective the producer wants to achieve and/or the environment. What is best for a given 
objective (e.g. minimization of errors in classification) may, as we show below miss the 
target grossly under another objective (e.g. profit maximization). The objective of this paper 
is to develop a method that can be used to determine optimal threshold levels in a tenderness 
certification scheme for niche beef marketing, paying special consideration to the goals to 
achieve by the classification procedure, and to the potential costs and benefits of each 
decision. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Importance of perceptions 
Perception of foods in general, and meats in particular, depend both on their intrinsic 
properties and on how they interact with external factors, such as price, information, and 
previous experience (Dransfield, Zamora, and Bayle, 1998). It is generally accepted that 
consumers' expectations about product quality are based on perceptions of one or more 
quality cues (Steenkamp and Van Trijp, 1996). These authors refer to quality cues as any 
"informational stimuli that can be ascertained through the senses prior to consumption, and, 
according to the consumer, have predictive validity for the product's quality performance 
upon consumption" (p. 197). Quality cues can be divided into intrinsic and extrinsic. The 
former refer to attributes that are part of the physical product and cannot be changed without 
altering the product itself (e.g. color and marbling for beef). Extrinsic quality cues (e.g. price, 
brands, etc) are not part of the product, but rather the result of marketing efforts. 
Providing consumers with information has a potentially significant impact on quality 
perception and preferences (Dransfield, Zamora, and Bayle, 1998). For example, samples of 
beef labeled "75% lean" received better quality ratings than identical samples labeled "25% 
fat" (Levin and Gaeth, 1988). Shackelford et al., (2001) indicated that 80% of consumers 
5 The most commonly used measure in experiments are Warner-Bratzler and slice shear force, the force needed 
to shear cooked beef (see for example, Shackelford et al. 1991; Huffman et al. 1996; Miller et al. 2001). 
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believed that steaks carrying a label "Tender Select" (and a statement guaranteeing 
tenderness) were more tender than other fresh beef cuts. Explicit information (in terms of 
guaranteed tenderness) significantly altered consumers' perceptions and revealed preferences 
about steaks in a study conducted by Lusk et al. (2001). In that study, consumers were asked 
to test two samples coming from steaks that differed widely in terms of tenderness (measured 
by slice shear force6). Information about the tenderness differences of the steaks increased 
the percentage of consumers preferring the tender steak from 69.16 to 83.72%, and the 
percentage of consumers willing to pay a premium from 36.12 to 51.16%. In another study, 
Boleman et al. (1997) found that informing people about the tenderness classification 
increased the proportion of steaks purchased by families (after tasting) from the tenderest 
category from 55.3% to 94.6%. The current discussion suggests that this provides credit to 
producers, in the sense that consumers' acceptability (or perceptions) of products after 
consumption is positively affected by expected quality. 
A study conducted by Dransfield, Zamora, and Bayle (1998) indicated that for some 
consumers quality is more important than price in determining purchasing decisions. 
According to the authors, there is a wide range of qualities in the market that do not 
command price differences because the eating experience is not known to the consumer prior 
to purchase. A careful sorting of carcasses and appropriate labeling could in principle be used 
by beef alliances to cash in on consumers' willingness to pay for high quality products, in 
particular for "guaranteed tender beef. 
4.2.2 Guaranteed tender beef 
Guaranteeing a good eating experience is a top priority for the meat industry in 
general, and the beef sector in particular. In this context, segregating carcasses by tenderness 
is increasingly becoming an important topic, especially in the beef sector which has seen a 
decline in demand every year from 1979 to 1998 (Purcell, 1998). The problem of inadequate 
beef tenderness is not new.7 It has appeared within the top quality concerns identified in the 
National Beef Quality Audits of 1991, 1995, and 2000 (conducted by Smith et al., 1991; 
6 In this study the information was provided in terms of the very suggestive names of "guaranteed tender" and 
"probably tough" (after an objective measurement of tenderness). "Guaranteed tender steaks had a slice shear 
force lower than 15 kg, whereas "probably tough" steaks had slice shear force higher than 35 kg. 
7 Morgan (1995), reported losses of $216,976,000 for tenderness related problems. 
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1995; and 2000).8 Moreover, the National Cattlemen's Beef Association (NCSA) created a 
working group of industry professionals to address this challenge (NCBA, 2001). The 
concern of the beef industry is warranted. Beef tenderness has been repeatedly reported as 
the most important quality attribute of meat (Huffman et al., 1996; Miller et al., 2001; CCA, 
2002). The NCBA called tenderness "the one attribute that consumers most associate with 
eating quality" (NCBA, 2001). 
Recent research has shown that consumers are able to distinguish differences in 
tenderness of beef loin steaks that have been classified based on Warner-Bratzler shear 
(WBS) force (e.g. Miller et al., 2001; Boleman et al., 1997; Shackelford et al., 2001; Lusk et 
al., 2001). The same authors report that consumers are willing to pay premiums for these 
tender steaks. For fresh meats, however, flavor and tenderness are experience attributes, and 
consumers have to rely on other cues to make inferences about how the product will perform 
(Acebrôn and Dopico, 2000; Dransfield, Zamora, and Bayle, 1998; Steenkamp and Van 
Trijp, 1996; Bredahl, Grunert, and Fertin, 1998). Studies differ on the assessment of the 
accuracy of those inferences. Steenkamp and Van Trijp found a slightly significant (at a one 
sided p-value of 0.1) relationship between quality expectations and quality experienced. The 
other two studies cited found moderate positive relations between the two. This indicates that 
consumers are often disappointed because their eating experience falls short of their 
expectations.9 
An interesting approach aimed at improving consumer satisfaction was undertaken by 
Meat and Livestock Australia (MLA). MLA has developed a grading system called Meat 
Standards Australia (MSA), with the focus of providing consumers a guaranteed eating 
experience (Polkinghorne et al., 1999). In contrast to assessment of carcass traits at the 
chiller, MSA has taken a total system approach to grading meat, based on the principles of 
Palatability Assurance at Critical Control Points, a concept borrowed from the food safety 
sector (Polkinghorne et al., 1999). The aim is to control the critical points that impact meat 
quality from production, processing and value-adding links of the beef chain. Briefly, MLA 
has conducted large-scale, carefully-planned experiments using consumer tasting panels, 
8 Morgan et al. (1991) also reported that beef tenderness variability was of primary concern to the US industry. 
9 Lockhart (2000) quotes Brad Morgan, assistant professor of Animal Science at Oklahoma State University 
saying "one out of five beef eating experiences will be less than desirable." 
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with a focus on factors identified in the literature as affecting beef palatability. Consumers 
were asked to rate samples of beef for tenderness, juiciness, flavor, and overall satisfaction. 
These ratings were used to construct an index of quality, with the highest weight (40%) 
placed on tenderness. Consumers were also asked to classify the sample as either 
"unsatisfactory" (no grade), "good everyday" (3 star), "better than everyday" (4 star), or 
"premium quality" (5 star). The quality index was then used to calculate optimal boundaries 
for the grades assessed by consumers using linear discriminant analysis. The boundary 
between unsatisfactory and 3 star (representing the pass/fail criteria), was then adjusted up 
for further protection. 
The MSA example indicates that participants in the beef supply chain can transform 
the experience attribute tenderness into a search attribute (see footnote 2) by testing, sorting, 
and carefully labeling.10 This creates an opportunity for producer alliances who wish to 
develop a niche marketing venture. It seems that there are premiums that can be fetched by 
"guaranteed tender" beef.11 Some producer groups and food corporations have already tapped 
into this market. One of the enterprises, Beefmaster Cattlemen LP (located in Texas), has 
been allowed by the USD A to label its products as "all natural tender aged beef', and they 
command significant premiums for their products. The procedure used by this venture to 
assure tenderness is selection of USD A Select carcasses, with yield grades lower than 3, 
having a certain weight and ribeye area, and being devoid of visible defects. Selection of 
carcasses is accomplished with the BeefCam technology (more on this technology below). 
Eligible carcasses are electrically stimulated and aged at least 14 day before they are shipped 
to retail warehouses. 
However, the technology used to identify and certify guaranteed tender must be 
accurate enough to result in beef products that are recognized by consumers as superior in 
tenderness (Ward et al., 2004). Most often, beef products are sorted for tenderness by type of 
10 The issues in transforming credence and experience attributes into search attributes in food products are 
discussed by Caswell and Mojduszka (1996). 
11 For the industry as a whole classifying cuts by tenderness is a more delicate issue. If classification becomes 
the norm, there will be a reduction in value for all the non-qualifying (probably tough) cuts, and the overall 
balance is not clear. This is a concern for the beef industry (Schroeder et al. 1997; Ward et al. 2004), but the 
efforts devoted by the NCBA to develop better (tenderness) sorting technologies seem to indicate the industry 
perceives benefits of doing so. 
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cut and USDA quality grades (NCBA, 2002).12 Although USD A quality grades are correlated 
with consumer's ratings of beef palatability, using this classification criterion will fail to 
convey precise information to consumers with regard to the tenderness of the product (Savell 
et al., 1987). USDA quality grades have been recognized (Wulf et al., 1997) as not 
appropriately differentiating longissimus tenderness of USDA Select or Low Choice fed-beef 
carcasses13. Further, Shackelford et al. (2001) argued that consumers can detect differences 
in tenderness within Select strip loins after 14 days of postmortem aging. This is significant, 
since Choice and Select account for over 90% (Boleman et al., 1998) of the graded carcasses. 
More broadly, Wheeler Cundiff, and Koch (1994) found that marbling explained at most just 
5% of the variation in beef palatability. Comparing the USDA grading system, with MSA, 
and the Japanese Meat Grading Association System, Strong (2001) concluded that the wide 
variation of eating quality within each USDA quality grade is not surprising, since the system 
does not consider many factors proven to affect quality. 
It is well established that to increase the probability of obtaining satisfactory 
tenderness, the best genetics should be used, and appropriate management practices should 
be followed during growth, slaughter, and processing of carcasses (Koohmaraie et al., 1996). 
However, the same authors cautioned, that the relation between breed and tenderness is not 
strong, since variation of tenderness within breeds is larger than variation across breeds.14 
Hence, as Schroeder et al. (1997, p. 10) conclude "...producer alliances with the goal of 
targeting beef to specific markets demanding particular quality attributes will likely find 
success elusive if they rely predominantly on current beef quality grades, cattle breeds, and 
genetics to ensure tenderness and consistency of their products. Producers may also need to 
employ some type of tenderness testing." This claim is significant, since only one of the 40 
12 These grades are based on the relationship between marbling of the 12th rib cross section of the longissimus 
and cooked beef palatability (USDA, 1997). 
13 Miller et al. (2001) were able to produce (strip loin) steaks within the Select grade that were rated from 
extremely tough to extremely tender by a panel of consumers, by varying the aging period of the different 
steaks. The animals were all steers of the Simbrah breed, fed in the same feedlot, subject to similar implant and 
feeding strategies. Before being slaughtered at a commercial processing facility, all animals were fed 180 to 210 
days. Steaks were cooked by trained research teams to the same degree of doneness, at the same time, and on 
the same day, to avoid other sources of variability. 
14 Hilton et al. (2004) found no differences in WBS force and sensory panel tenderness ratings among six 
different phenotypes (all including less than % Brahman). The authors then concluded that any cattle 
phenotypes with % or less phenotypic expression of Brahman can be used in a guaranteed tender program. 
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certified beef programs registered with the USDA rely on such measurements.15 Broadly 
speaking, all these programs require is some distinctive genotypic and/or phenotypic 
characteristics combined with eligible USDA quality and yield grades (with variable 
stringency), and absence of visible defects such as hemorrhages or dark cuts.16 All these 
requirements are conducive to more tender meat, but there are still significant amounts of 
unexplained variation in consumers' perceptions. Scientists have concluded that "the beef 
industry must identify more precise methods [than USDA quality grades] of distinguishing 
palatable from unpalatable beef' (Wulf and Page, 2000, p.2595), and in the same line "a 
direct measure of meat tenderness is needed to supplement quality grade" (Wheeler, Cundiff, 
and Koch, 1994, p.3150). 
4.2.3 Prediction of tenderness 
For commercial utilization, real-time measurements are needed to classify carcasses 
according to tenderness. Despite a tremendous amount of effort by animal and meat 
scientists, accurate prediction of consumer perceptions of beef tenderness has proved elusive. 
Further, Lorenzen et al. (2003) concluded that predicting consumers' ratings of beef based on 
laboratory procedures (trained panels, Warner-Bratzler shear force) is inherently difficult, 
because cooking method, degree of doneness, seasoning and individual heterogeneity in 
preferences all affect the way consumers perceive the quality of the product. Shackelford, 
Wheeler, and Koohmaraie (1997, p.2421) argued that the ideal method to measure or predict 
meat tenderness would be through "an accurate, rapid, automated, tamper-proof, noninvasive 
machine." Several technologies have been investigated for the purpose of replacing the time 
consuming and destructive measurement of Warner-Bratzler shear force, a widely used 
device for measuring the tenderness of cooked meat. Some examples include near-infrared 
reflectance spectra (Park et al., 2001); image texture analysis (Li, Tan, and Shatadal, 2001); 
neural network modeling (Hill et al., 2000); measurements of muscle color, pH and electrical 
impedance (Wulf and Page, 2000); and BeefCam (Vote et al., 2003). Wheeler et al. (2002) 
showed that slice shear force was more accurate (than the later two) at identifying beef cuts 
15 The only program that attempts to measure tenderness is Nolan Ryan Tender-Aged BeefTM. However, 
research conducted by Gheno et al. (2001) concluded that the resulting tenderness in this program as measured 
by WBSF or trained panel evaluations is no better than USDA Choice. 
16 The most salient of these alliances, Certified Angus Beef accounted for 5.7% of all the fed cattle slaughtered 
in 2001 (Schroeder and Kovanda, 2003). 
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that can be guaranteed tender. Further, the authors concluded that commercial BeefCam 
provided added assurance of acceptable tenderness over USDA quality grade, but 
refinements seem necessary to enhance the ability of BeefCam to identify carcasses that will 
yield acceptably tender meat. In another work, Wyle et al. (2003) reached a very similar 
conclusion that BeefCam might ultimately be useful in identifying carcasses for inclusion in 
branded beef programs, but further development and testing of the technology is warranted. 
In view of the difficulty in predicting consumers' ratings accurately, researchers often 
try to segregate carcasses into classes (e.g. either tender or tough) according to some criteria. 
The most commonly used procedure is to classify carcasses according to the Warner-Bratzler 
or slice shear force, measured in the longissimus.17 Since sufficiently accurate and less 
invasive (costly) methods are not available (yet), effort is being placed on determining 
thresholds for Warner-Bratzler or slice shear force values to be used in the classification 
process. In particular, this is one of the objectives of the Instrumentation Working Group of 
the National Beef Instrument Assessment Plan II (NCBA, 2002). The first thresholds for 
WBS force were proposed by Shackelford et al. (1991), who proposed thresholds values of 
4.6 kg and 3.9 kg as approximate cutoffs to obtain 50% (corresponding to the mean) and 68% 
(mean minus standard deviation)18 chances of a steak being rated slightly tender or better 
respectively, recognizing that the confidence of having more stringent standards may be 
offset by higher production costs because of lower acceptance rates).Though not mentioned 
in the study, the trade-offs between type I and type II statistical errors are nicely illustrated. 
For example, 6.6% and 16.9% of the predicted tough were actually tender (rated at or higher 
than slightly tender by a trained panel), for the 50% and 68% confidence limits respectively. 
On the other hand when comparing the 50% and 68% confidence limits, the percentage of 
predicted tender that were actually tough (rated lower than slightly tender) decreased from 
6.7% to 1.6%. Another example can be found in Wheeler, Shackelford, and Koohmariae 
(1997). These authors adapted the data from Huffman et al. (1996) to show that steaks rated 
as acceptable had WBS forces as high as 5.7 kg, whereas values as low as 3 kg were rated 
17 Of course, this only predicts the tenderness of this muscle. The correlation between shear force of the 
longissimus and other muscles is generally low (Shackelford, Wheeler, and Koohmaraie, 1995). 
18 To conduct the analysis the authors assumed shear force in the population of cattle to be normally distributed. 
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unacceptable, indicating a significant overlap. Both types of error will arise for the proposed 
threshold of 4.1 kg, which led to 98 percent consumer overall satisfaction with the steaks. 
The problem just discussed is not to be seen as exclusive to the prediction of 
tenderness. Thompson et al. (1999) argued that the MSA system worked well in the sense 
that it reduced the probability that a consumer will receive an unsatisfactory steak (11% for 
striploins). However, there were a significant proportion of carcasses (71%) that failed to 
meet the 3 star specifications but were deemed acceptable by consumers. The developers of 
MSA recognize this as a problem with the methods or pathways used to determine 
acceptability, but argue that a "minimal risk approach was necessary in the interests of 
guaranteeing consumer satisfaction" (Thompson et al., 1999, p.2). 
The number of tenderness classes needed to maximize carcass value and consumer 
satisfaction is an unsettled question (Wheeler, Shackelford, and Koohmaraie, 1997; 
Shackelford, Wheeler, and Koohmaraie, 1999). It is also unclear where the lines separating 
the tenderness classes should be drawn. In this paper we focus on where to draw the line for 
two classes. Future research needs to address the optimal number of tenderness classes 
needed. In previous research, the best system to classify carcasses is the one that matches 
most closely the perceptions of either trained panels or consumers. Arbitrary values of WBS 
(e.g. 5 kg in Shackelford, Wheeler, and Koohmaraie, 1999) force at 14 days of aging were 
used as benchmarks. However, none of the studies provide an economic assessment of the 
implications of different benchmarks. For example, setting the standards higher may confirm 
the prediction more frequently, but it will also lead to a large number of false rejections (or 
statistical type I error). Setting the standards lower, will likely lead to fewer false rejection, 
but a higher proportion of the certified tender beef will be perceived as not complying by 
consumers (type II statistical error). The correct standard from an economic standpoint must 
balance these two types of errors with the potential premiums and cost of segregation by 
tenderness in an economically meaningful fashion. 
Testing and/or classifying a product (even with nondestructive methods) entail costs. 
Producers will be willing to implement a certification system if they perceive there are price 
premiums that can be fetched through better sorting. Hence, before any effort is incurred in 
designing a sorting and certification system, one question should be answered: are there 
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premiums that can be fetched by guaranteed tender steaks? More importantly, are those 
premiums higher than the costs of implementing the certification system? 
4.2.4 Benefits and costs of a tenderness-certified program 
Costs are involved in any tenderness certification system. These costs can be broadly 
classified into tenderness assessment (or testing) and sorting costs. The cost of classification 
using an automated system using slice shear force to measure tenderness (once developed) 
has been "crudely estimated" at $4.35 per carcass (Wheeler, Shackelford, and Koohmaraie, 
1999). The same author estimated the costs of manual classification at $8.50 per carcass. 
Included in those cost estimates are labor (at $25/hr), equipment, and the sample that needs 
to be destroyed for testing (a 1-inch ribeye steak valued at $4). However, as Lusk et al. 
(1999) observed, actual costs will likely be larger since the previous estimate ignores 
additional sorting costs and the cost of capital financing. As we will see below, we would add 
the costs associated with errors in the certification process. Other available technologies, 
such as BeefCam may result in lower costs. 
Consumer willingness to pay premiums for tender beef has been documented by 
recent studies. Lusk et al. (2001) reported average premiums of $1.84 per pound for 
guaranteed tender steaks and 20% of consumers were willing to pay a premium of $2.67 per 
pound or more. In another study conducted by Shackelford et al. (2001), half of the 
consumers indicated that they would definitely or probably be willing to pay 500 more per 
pound for the guaranteed tender Select steak.19 Boleman et al. (1997) reported that most of 
the families who purchased steaks in an experiment (94.6%) chose revealed tender, over both 
intermediate and tough steaks (segregated by shear force), even though a $1.10/kg difference 
was placed between each category. In a somewhat surprising response, half of the consumers 
(surveyed by Shackelford et al. (2001) in Denver, Colorado) indicated they do not let price 
govern their food-purchasing decisions.20 
19 This study does not give us a good sense of consumer's willingness to pay for tender steak, since it only 
asked "How willing would you be to pay 500 per pound...more to purchase that steak?" Hence the only 
information we can extract is that half of the consumers are willing to pay at least 500 per pound of premium 
for the guaranteed tender Select steak. 
20 The sample used was not representative of the general population, since 58.1% of the respondent households 
reported incomes above $60,000. However, this could be a good sample for research of acceptance of value 
added products. 
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Benefits or premiums accrue only on carcasses that are certified as tender, whereas 
costs are incurred for all the carcasses tested. In an error free world, where cuts can be 
perfectly classified (based on the result of the measurements) into acceptable and 
unacceptable, the profitability of a certification system depends only on the price premiums 
for high quality, costs of testing and sorting, and the fraction of the tested population that can 
be certified (assuming that packers cannot strategically misrepresent the results of the 
tests21). Ward et al. (2004) argue that the proportion of qualifying carcasses plays a key role 
in determining whether a system to guarantee tenderness is feasible. Letting A be the 
fraction of tested carcasses that can be sold in the high quality market, p be the price 
premium for that quality, and C the incurred costs per tested carcass, a system will be 
implemented whenever, Ap-C> 0. Rearranging the inequality as p>C/A makes clear that 
a classification system will be feasible only if the price premiums exceed the costs per 
certified carcass. The inequality could also be rearranged as A>Cjp, the larger the costs of 
certification relative to the premiums, the higher is the fraction of high quality carcasses 
needed for the system to be profitable (more on this below).22 In the real world, the issue is 
not that simple. Packers face uncertainty about both the real quality of the carcasses (even 
after grading and/or performing tests), and about differences among consumers. A steak that 
is perceived as tender by a consumer in a given circumstance may not be rated in the same 
way by another buyer or situation. Additionally, the proportion of carcasses that are certified 
is under the alliances' control whose objectives may conflict with minimization of the 
number of classification errors. In what follows we present a model that allows us to address 
these issues formally. 
21 This could be the case for example when packers reveal the result of the measurements, and consumers would 
buy only those cuts they know will meet their expectations. In reality consumers will not be able to perfectly 
"self-select", due to a lack of perfect links between quality measurements and actual perceptions. We discuss 
this more thoroughly when we present the model. 
22 Suppose that only the rib and loins area can be certified (usually the area tested; more on this below). 
According to Miller et al., (2001) those cuts would represent 137 lbs of scalable steaks per carcass. For the 
manual system costs reported by Wheeler, Shackelford, and Koohmaraie, (1999) and the conservative 
premiums (lower bound) reported by Shackelford et al., (2001) a proportion y > ($8.5/\2>llbs) /$0.5 = .12 
is enough to warrant the implementation of a certified tender system, in an error free world. 
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4.3 The model 
Suppose an alliance is considering launching a line of guaranteed tender steaks to the 
market. Tenderness of any given steak is unknown to the alliance. However, it can attempt to 
measure it (at some cost) before guaranteeing it as tender. Suppose that measurements of 
quality can be condensed in an index w. In this setting, the quality index and tenderness are 
used interchangeably. As discussed above, the method of shear force has been proven to be 
the most accurate that can be used at a commercial level to infer tenderness, hence we base 
our discussion on terms of that testing technology assuming it summarizes all the information 
available. Since tougher steaks require higher forces to shear them, lower values of the index 
will be representing more tender meat. However, the analysis is presented here in a way that 
can be easily adapted when new (nondestructive) technologies such as BeefCam, for 
example, are more precisely calibrated, or to a process certification system such as the MSA. 
Since testing and certification entails costs, high value cuts (e.g. loins) are natural candidates 
for the analysis.23 When they are ready to market, producers in the alliance ship their cattle to 
the packing plant, where they are tested with the selected technology. At this stage the 
decision maker has to decide whether to certify the product or not. If certification occurs, the 
steaks from that loin are labeled as "guaranteed tender". Beef that fails to meet the 
certification standards are sold as commodity under the usual USDA quality grades. The 
commodity market is assumed to be competitive, implying zero premiums for non-qualifying 
animals. 
Consumers are willing to pay a premium of p per unit over the commodity price of 
beef for certified tender steak, and each consumer has his or her own (potentially different) 
idea of what is the sensory perception delivered by a tender steak. However, if after buying 
and cooking the steak a consumer disagrees with the statement of the seller, that is the steaks 
falls short from the sensory perception expected, he/she can punish the alliance. The 
punishment an individual customer can impose to the alliance equals ô per unit certified. 
23 Meat scientists warn us against using the results of a cut to predict tenderness of a different cut. Round cuts 
for example are less likely to be worthy of certification due their high within carcass variability (Shackelford, 
Wheeler, and Koohmaraie, 1997). The same authors argue that measuring a minor muscle (as a way to avoid the 
need to destruct high value product) would provide little information regarding longissimus tenderness due to 
their poor correlation. Meat Livestock Australia conducted experiments at the cut level, and MSA assigns 
"stars" to different cuts. 
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Plausible interpretations of this punishment are given below for the different scenarios 
modeled. We also assume that bad news does not spread throughout the market (as in Klein 
and Leffler; 1981, and Shapiro, 1983). Only consumers whose expectations were not met 
punish the alliance certifying the guaranteed tender beef. 
If the true quality (tenderness) measured by w can be assessed by testing the 
product, and the acceptable perceptions for tenderness of consumers are equal and known by 
the alliance, then with repeated purchases, as we assume here (or when firms can be punished 
with enough severity for non-compliance), there is an equilibrium where high quality is 
provided to the market at a price above marginal costs of production (see for example Klein 
and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983; Grossman, 1981).24 One could argue, that if the alliance is 
able to assess w with certainty, then in theory, it can just reveal the results of the test, set a 
premium for each steak p(w), and allow buyers to self-select. This would imply that the 
alliance has information about consumer willingness to pay for each available quality, and 
that consumers can determine the value of the index w that satisfies them. The two 
assumptions are highly problematic from a practical standpoint. As noted before, researchers 
are only starting to uncover consumers' willingness to pay for tenderness. Moreover, the 
studies only indicate willingness to pay for guaranteed tender beef, and not for different 
levels of tenderness (an exception is Miller et al., 2001). Additionally, consumers have some 
confusion with regards to the information provided by USDA beef quality grades (Cox, 
McMullen, and Garrod, 1990), even when these grades have been in place (with changes) for 
more than 70 years.25 Hence, it is at best questionable to assume that consumers are able to 
infer the acceptability of the steaks, at least at the beginning, based on the value of the index. 
A less stark assumption would be to assign steaks into a number of classes based on the 
result of the index, and price equally all the steaks in the same class. This is exactly the 
approach taken in MSA.26 The optimal number of classes is, as argued above, an open 
24 Relaxing this, Antle (2001) argued that when preferences are tightly concentrated around a central value of a 
distribution, and producing a variety of products is costly, firms will concentrate in qualities around that central 
value. Rob and Sekiguchi (2001) provide a model where producers can only affect the distribution of quality, 
but the acceptable quality level is known. 
25 For a brief history of quality grades see Schroeder et al (1997). 
26 Also, classification by ranges of w makes sense when there is error in measurement. 
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question. Here we focus on the threshold for only two classes. Steaks are either certified as 
tender or they are not. 
In any given steak, however, the true w  is not known. After testing, the packer only 
observes a noisy signal w0|w, where w0 is the result from the test.27 Additionally, a given w 
can be rated as either satisfactory or not satisfactory for different consumers and/or 
circumstances. Myriad factors can affect the sensory experience that is rated as acceptable 
both within and across consumers (e.g. the degree of doneness and cooking method, 
geographic location, etc28). This implies that there may be two forms of heterogeneity in 
perceptions that will be considered acceptable. First, acceptable perceptions may be 
consumer specific in the sense that what would be rated as satisfactory by a buyer may not 
make the grade for another consumer. In this interpretation we have consumer heterogeneity. 
Another form of heterogeneity arises if the ex-ante identical perceptions that would be 
considered acceptable change each time the consumer purchases a steak.29 The two forms of 
heterogeneity have different implications in terms of modeling and outcomes. We model the 
two forms of heterogeneity explicitly, paying close attention to their effects on the optimal 
choices of the alliance. The next section analyzes the situation where the alliance can learn 
the true value of the index. 
4.3.1 True tenderness can be learned 
The general structure of the model is presented in this section assuming that w  can be 
learned with certainty through some testing technology, and it's distribution in the population 
of cattle available is known to be f(w). The following subsections consider the implications 
of the two types of heterogeneity introduced. If consumers who are willing to pay a premium 
are homogeneous with respect to the quality that meets their expectations, and that value is 
known, the problem of the alliance is very simple. They can just certify steaks known to be 
satisfactory, and compare the revenues (given by the premiums and proportion of pounds 
27 When Warner Bratzer or slice shear force is used, this is usually the average of the shear force needed to cut 5 
or 6 cores taken parallel to the fiber muscles of a steak. 
28 See McKenna et al. (2004). Also, a given consumer can find a steak acceptable under some conditions but not 
under other (see footnote 33). 
29 This is "as if' each consumer receives a random shock from a common distribution before each purchase. 
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certified) against certification costs, to see whether a niche marketing venture is warranted.30 
We delay a formal proof of this claim until the relevant notation has been introduced. In 
general, however, consumers in the target population differ for example in the quality (or 
sensorial perception) that meets their expectations. This heterogeneity is captured by , 
which represents consumer's j  tastes, tenderness acceptability levels, or "type". Consumer i  
will be less demanding in terms of tenderness than consumer j whenever v. < yj. The 
alliance does not know the type of any particular consumer, hence it cannot match her with 
steaks that will be acceptable. It only knows that types can be represented by the random 
variable y which has distribution g(>') ,31 From the alliance's standpoint, any consumer that 
buys a particular certified steak is seen as a random draw from that probability distribution. A 
certified steak that measures w will meet the expectations of a random consumer 
approaching the meat counter if w < y . If on the other hand the consumer who buys the steak 
has expectations y>w, he/she will be disappointed and will not repeat the purchase. For any 
particular certified steak with tenderness measured by w, the probability that it satisfies a 
random customer that approaches the meat counter is given by PrK (y > w) -1 - G(w), where 
is the cumulative distribution function of the consumer tenderness acceptability level. 
Defining 6[w) = l-G(w), we have that \-Q(w) = G(w) is the probability that a consumer 
is disappointed. 
The problem of the alliance is to choose a threshold for certification w  .This can be 
seen as a classification problem. The alliance is using the results of the measurement to 
separate steaks from two populations; tender or tough steaks, as rated by consumers. Letting 
higher values of w be associated with lower probability of acceptability by consumers (e.g. 
more force is needed to cut a tougher steak), every steak with w < w will be certified as 
tender. This leads to a distribution of tenderness of certified steaks given by f (w|w < wj. As 
in any decision under imperfect information, "errors" will be made. Some consumers will be 
30 This is true if the loss from cheating is higher than the premium obtained in a single period (more on this 
below). 
31 A similar description of heterogeneity , but in a food safety setting where households make decision under the 
belief that health risks follow a given distribution, is presented in Antle (2001). 
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dissatisfied with the purchased steak. Strictly speaking, the problem may be one of mismatch, 
and there may have been no disappointments had the alliance been able to observe the "type" 
or expectations of each consumer buying the product (and ordered the steaks accordingly). 
Recall that the alliance knows the distribution of consumer expectations, but not the 
expectations of a particular consumer that shows up at the store. The alliance can control the 
proportion of dissatisfied consumers through the choice of the threshold w. Hence, 
dissatisfaction may also occur because the alliance has chosen to certify non-tender steaks. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates. The vertical line in Figure 4.1 represents a hypothetical threshold, and 
region E represents the product that will be certified as tender. Whereas consumers whose 
tastes belong to region B will be assured 100% satisfaction, it is likely that some consumers 
from region A will be disappointed. Figure 4.1 also makes clear that some of the non-
certified steaks (region D) would have been found acceptable by some consumers with tastes 
f a l l i n g  i n  r e g i o n  B .  
3 4 9 10 0 1 2 5 6 7 8 
W 
Figure 4.1. Implications of an arbitrary threshold for hypothetical distributions of y  and w 
92 
Certified steaks that fail to meet the expectations of a consumer, lead to a punishment 
of S if purchased by that consumer. This punishment could represent the net present value 
(NPV) of the consumer's future purchases or it could represent restitutions or replacements 
to the consumer such as would occur with a money back guarantee. It could also represent 
the cost of replacing a disappointed consumer.32 Strictly speaking, under the net present value 
interpretation of consumer value to the alliance, the punishment each customer can impose 
would be contingent on the quality distribution of certified steaks, which depends on the 
threshold chosen. We delay the full treatment of how the size of the punishment interacts 
w i t h  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  q u a l i t y  u n t i l  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n .  S o m e  o f  t h e  r e j e c t e d  s t e a k s  i n  r e g i o n  B  
of Figure 4.1 could have been certified, and fetched the premium p with some customers, 
which of course, is an opportunity cost. However, potential punishments are also avoided by 
not certifying them. We will ignore the potential rewards or costs associated with that region 
and only include realized costs and revenues in the profit function. Denial of certification 
entails only testing costs, whereas correct certification (in the sense that the consumer is 
satisfied with the purchased steak) brings a net benefit p-C . When the alliance observes a 
given w < w (and hence certifies the steak), it obtains expected profits per pound given by 
E { k \ w}  =  E Y  ( p - C \ y  >  w)Prr (_y >  w )  +  E Y  [ p - C - S \ y  <  w)Prr (y < w). 
EY is the mathematical expectations operator with respect to the variable Y. Using 
the notation introduced above, the previous expression can be rewritten as 
E { n \ w }  = (/> - C)0(w) + (l-0 ( w j } { ^ p  -  C  -  E y  (<5|_y < w)j . (4.1) 
This is the average of the profits obtained from sales of certified steak measuring w  
to an ex-post satisfied or dissatisfied consumer respectively, weighted by the probability of 
each event. Recall that quality is an experience attribute, and consumers will pay for the 
product before discovering the actual quality. Averaging over the acceptance region, 
expected profits are 
E ( t t \ w < w)  =  E W { J ) - ( \ - 6{ W F ) E Y  ( S \ y  <  w)-C|w< w j .  
32 Caswell and Henson (1997) argued that the losses associated with customer dissatisfaction (e.g. market share, 
bad reputation) are costlier for firms than those resulting from legal action under the current tort law. 
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The expression p - E W  ((l - Q (W) )E y ( S |y  <  w)|w < w) can be seen as a long run 
equilibrium premium. In long run equilibrium consumers will have near perfect information 
about product quality for some experience attribute (Segerson, 1999). 
For a steak yielding w > w, certification is denied and expected profits (losses) per 
unit over the denial of certification region are E^7t\w>wj = -C, the costs of conducting the 
test. This equation assumes that the commodity market price just covers the alliance's 
production and processing costs (i.e. zero profits from commodity production). 
Now we have all the elements needed to write the per unit profit function of an 
alliance that chooses to implement a guaranteed tenderness certification system with 
threshold w as 
=  E {K \W< w)Prr [ w <  w )  +  E ( n ; \W> W )Prw (w> w) 
=  E w { ^ p - { \ - 6 { w ) ^ E Y [ Ô \ y  <  w ) | w <  w j ~ P r w  ( w < w ) - C  
Equation (4.2) shows that, in general, the optimal threshold will depend on the 
objective of the alliance, the price premium and punishments, the distribution of types in the 
target population of consumers, and the distribution of tenderness of the population of cattle 
owned and/or marketed by the alliance. The costs of testing and certification play no role in 
determining the optimal threshold, but determine whether the alliance is profitable. Equation 
(4.2) together with Figure 4.1, also make clear the tradeoffs involved. More stringent 
certification levels lead to higher profits from each certified steak due to a reduction in 
expected punishments. This can be seen by noting the reduction in area A in Figure 4.1 or the 
increase in the E W  (»|w< w) term in equation (4.2). But the proportion of steaks certified 
given by Prr ( vv < vv) or area E  is reduced, and the number of steaks that were not certified 
but would have satisfied some customers is increased. The later can be seen as an increase of 
areas B and D in Figure 4.1. 
4.3.1.1 Value of a customer is not "taste specific" with fixed S  
Suppose first that consumers are homogeneous in tastes, but the way in which they 
perceive tenderness when they eat a steak interacts with other factors such as the dining 
environment, side dishes, or the entrée served. This leads to heterogeneity in acceptability 
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levels (or acceptable perceptions) among consumers.33 Distinct y  's are the result of different 
shocks that affect the level of tenderness that different consumers will rate acceptable in any 
time period. Shocks are independent within and across time periods. The alliance knows that 
random shocks result in the acceptability levels for tenderness of consumers to follow the 
distribution g(.y). In this situation, each customer is valued the same in expectations by the 
alliance, since someone very demanding in the current periods may be easy to please the next 
period (more on this below). When the cost of losing any consumer is the same regardless of 
his/her type equation (4.1) simplifies to 
e {k \w} = 6,(w)(/7-C) + (l-0(w))(/?-5-C) = p - ( \ - 0 { w ) ^ 5  - C .  
As argued above, the optimal threshold depends on the objective of the alliance, on 
whether it acknowledges or not the presence of the opportunity costs associated with 
different choices, and of course on the relative sizes of premiums and punishments. Suppose 
first that the alliance is striving to maximize aggregate profits of its members. In this case, 
the optimal threshold for certification is defined as the level that maximizes expected profit 
e(7z\w} from testing and certification, which is given by 
E(n\w^ = E[p-(l-0(w)}S\w<M^~Prw(w<w)-C 
and can be rewritten in integral form as 
E ( n \ w } =  J "  [ p - ( \ - Q ( w ) ^ ô y i F ( w ) - C  
or 
= (4.3) 
In this expression F(«) is the cumulative distribution function of vv, and the integral 
represents the costs associated with not being able to match the results of the test with 
consumers expectations. Those mismatches could be used to quantify the amount the alliance 
33 The fact that people's perceptions interact with many different factors is widely recognized among meat and 
animal scientists. For example, Miller et al. (2001) conducted their consumer evaluations at the same time and 
on the same day to reduce variation. Huffman et al (1996) served wine to their subjects in a restaurant setting, 
but instructed them not to drink until they had completed rating the steaks so that it would not affect the results. 
Other researches provide crackers between samples to avoid confounding, or use red lights to minimize the 
impacts of visual perceptions on tenderness evaluations. 
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would be willing to invest in a more accurate technology, or in targeting the customers more 
effectively. Notice that whereas costs are paid for all the pounds tested, premiums are only 
obtained over certified pounds. This has relevance, since as recognized by Shackelford et al. 
(2001) and Ward et al. (2004) among others, a certification program would be feasible only if 
testing costs can be spread over a relatively large proportion of animals that can be 
certified34. It may be important to combine certification programs with some form of 
presorting to only test animals that are likely to meet the criteria for classification (especially 
when premiums are not large compared to testing costs). Many producer groups and alliances 
already have programs in place that use cattle with characteristics known to be conducive to 
tender meat. For example presorting could be done to exclude breeds likely to present 
tenderness problems.35 Certified Angus Beef is one case; the program relies basically on 
certain breeds (assessed phenotypically mainly by color and hump height), USD A quality 
grades, and absence of visible defects (USDA). This would concentrate testing costs on 
carcasses that have a high chance of meeting the certification criteria. 
We have now all the elements needed to address the problem of the choice of the 
optimal threshold. In the previous section we claimed that if consumer's acceptability 
perceptions were fixed and known (y), the optimal threshold entails choosing a value such 
that no customer will be disappointed (i.e. w = y ). The next result states this formally for 
both profit maximization and minimization of expected punishment objectives.36 
Result 1 : If y = y is fixed, and S > p , then setting the threshold at w = y is optimal 
both under a profit maximization and expected punishment minimization objectives. Only 
steaks known to be satisfactory will be certified.37 
34 The example provided is that if only 1/5 of the tested carcasses can be certified, and testing costs are $4 per 
animal each certified carcass has to obtain a $20 premium for the system to break even. On the other hand, if 
4/5 of the carcasses can be certified the premium needed is reduced to $5 per carcass. 
35 Tatum et al. (1999), proposed placing a constraint of 3/8 Bos indicus inheritance, as a way to reduce the 
incidence of tenderness problems. Proven genetics is also mentioned by the authors as a way to improve 
tenderness. 
36 Since acceptable tenderness is known, rhe problem of minimizing errors in classification is trivial. 
37 A similar result was found by Shapiro (1983) and Klein and Leffler (1981). However, these authors modeled 
a situation where product quality was homogeneous. Producers just needed to choose its level. 
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Proof. From the definition of 0(w) we have that 0 ( w )  = 1 for all w < y  and hence 
0 (w) = 0 for all w > y . When w < y the per unit profit function can be written as 
E(k \w)= £" p-(\-d{wf)8dF(w)-C = pF(w)-C which is clearly maximized by setting 
w  = y  . Expected punishments are zero for all w < y .  However, there will be opportunity 
costs for any w<y since steaks known to be acceptable will not be certified. For our 
purposes, w = y minimizes expected punishments (as any other w<y). When w>y the 
profit function is given by e(tc\w} = -0(w)jSdF(w) +  p - ( \ - 6 ( w)}ôdF{ w )  which 
simplifies to + . The second term in the previous 
equation represents the expected punishments. Since 5 > p, profits are maximized when 
costs of misclassification are minimized at w = y . • 
When there is heterogeneity in acceptable perceptions, the optimal threshold is 
contingent, as expected, on the distribution of perceptions and the objective pursued. In this 
case, the necessary condition for maximizing profits is 
^fcti = fl/-(w)-5(l-6(w))/(w) = 0. (4.4) 
O W  
The benefits obtained by marginally increasing the threshold are due to an increase in 
the proportion of certified product, clearly shown by the expansion of area E of Figure 4.1, 
which is captured by the first term in equation (4.4). Additionally the opportunity costs 
become smaller as represented by a reduction in area D of Figure 4.1. Marginally increasing 
the thresholds also entails costs, namely those associated with higher expected punishments 
by consumers. The increase in these costs can be noted by the expansion of area A in Figure 
4.1, and quantified by the second term of equation (4.4). 
Equation (4.4) indicates that the profit maximizing threshold is implicitly defined by 
d ( w )  =  — —— ,38 Hence, if any effort is to be put in sorting, the costs associated with losing 
v 
'  8  
the business of a customer would be at least as big as the premium in a given purchase. When 
38 Sufficient conditions are given by 0\W ) < 0, which is satisfied by the definition of a cdf. 
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larger punishments are imposed, the alliance finds it optimal to be more stringent in the 
certification threshold, and hence increase the likelihood that certified steaks meet 
consumers' expectations. Since the probability of acceptance by consumers is assumed to be 
a decreasing function of w, this translates into lower levels of w . The formula also implies 
that it will be optimal for the alliance to admit some dissatisfaction unless the punishment 
goes to infinity. Since = 1-G(w*), we obtain G[w^ = ~ which represents the 
probability that a consumer is disappointed when eating a steak of tenderness w. Note that 
in this setting the threshold depends solely on the premium, the punishment, and the 
distribution of shocks. In particular, the optimal threshold does not depend on the distribution 
of quality of the cattle population employed. The latter distribution only has a role in 
determining whether the venture is profitable. 
It is worth noting that the profit maximizing threshold will in general not coincide 
with the one that minimizes classification costs or mismatches as obtained in the absence of 
uncertainty in acceptable perceptions. Equation (4.3) shows that expected cash punishments 
are increasing with the threshold, which implies that to minimize this quantity only steak that 
will be found acceptable by every consumer should be certified, which would only be profit 
maximizing for very large punishments relative to the premium. More generally, there are 
two types of misclassification costs associated with the two decisions certify and do not 
certify. For the certified steaks, we already argued that the costs of misclassification arise due 
to consumer dissatisfaction. For the non-certified product, the expected (opportunity) cost 
arises because the steaks could have been sold for a premium to some consumers (recall 
region D in Figure 4.1).39 The expected costs of misclassification (ECM) for threshold w are 
ECM - Ew {ô{\-6(w)y\w<w^x(w<w) +Ew[pQ(w)\w> vv)Pr(w> w ) .  (4.5) 
It is straightforward to show that the threshold (w*c) that minimizes equation (4.5) is 
implicitly defined by the rule d ( w c )  =  —-—, thereby will be generally different than the 
v  
'  ô  +  p  
threshold obtained through profit maximization. Defining thresholds as to minimize the 
39 Note however, that by not certifying a steak the alliance is also obtaining the "potential benefit" of not being 
punished, which would oppose the opportunity costs just mentioned. 
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number of mismatches (as in Platter et al., 2003a), is not likely to lead to maximum profits 
for the alliance either. Error in matching minimization in this context is equivalent to assume 
that both mistakes are equally costly, and d{w*E^ = JZ obtains. 
The probabilities of acceptance for the first two thresholds can be ranked for arbitrary 
combinations of S and p such that 0<p<8 as follows <0{w*c^< 1. This would 
translate into w > wc, implying that a more stringent system will result if the objective is to 
minimize the expected costs of misclassifications. The place in the ranking for threshold that 
minimizes the number of mismatches can not be determined in general. We can only say that 
d[wE^< , and hence that w*E > w*c . However, for sufficiently high punishments 
(relative to the premium) for noncompliance ( S / p > 2 ) ,  the three thresholds can be ranked as 
w E  > w >  w c  ,  o t h e r w i s e  w  >  w E  >  w c  h o l d s .  P r o f i t  m a x i m i z i n g  d e c i s i o n  m a k e r s  w i l l  
adopt more stringent thresholds than the ones that minimize classification errors, whenever 
the costs of a mismatch in a certified steak are severe compared to the premium. In these 
situations, alliances will prefer to take extra precautions, or are willing to incur in some 
opportunity costs, in order to reduce the amount of certified products that do not meet 
customer expectations. For fixed premiums, when punishments for consumer dissatisfaction 
decrease, profit maximizing alliances will be more willing to certify carcasses of doubtful 
tenderness. This result already arose in the previous Chapter. There we showed that for all 
the market structures and nature of reputations considered, when consumers were more able 
to discern quality (and hence the expected punishment for any low quality item certified is 
higher), processors chose more stringent quality assurance systems. 
Interestingly, when heterogeneity in acceptable perceptions is introduced, neither of 
the possible objectives considered lead to satisfaction of all consumers (under finite 
punishments). In fact, as we state and prove in the next result if the consumer that receives 
the median shock is going to be always satisfied with his/her purchase, 5 / p > 2 is needed 
under the profit maximization objective. 
Result 2\ Let /(•) > 0 for all w in the support. The consumer receiving the median 
shock will be satisfied with his/her experience with probability one (if the median shock can 
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be satisfied with the base cattle population) for ô  / p  >  2 under profit maximization, (i.e. for 
sufficiently large punishments relative to the premium) and ô / p > 1 for cost of 
misclassification minimization, for any distribution of shocks. 
Proof: Let yM be the median shock. The median shock will be satisfied with his/her 
experience with probability ¥ x w  ( w  < y  M \ w  < w } . Since Pr^, (w < y  M  \ w  < w) = 1 for all 
w<  y M  and Prw, ( w < y M  |vv < w) < 1 for all w > y M ,  to guarantee that the median shock 
will be satisfied with the purchased product w < y M  is needed. This threshold implies 
G  (w) <  G  ( y M  ) = 1 - G ( y M  ) = 1 / 2. Hence, at the profit maximizing threshold we need 
<  G ( w )  <1/2 or  '  equivalent ly  5 / p  > 2 . At the cost minimizing threshold we 
need G  (w*c ) < 1 / 2 or equivalently — < y which implies S  /  p  >  1.  •  
The current discussion would imply that the threshold used by Shackelford, Wheeler, 
and Koohmaraie (1999) to classify a steak into the tender class using a (3 days) slice shear 
force of 23 kg would be too stringent from all the perspectives analyzed here. In their study, 
the threshold resulted in 100% of the steaks classified as tender being rated slightly tender or 
higher by a panel (which was considered a success in classification). However, 91% of the 
carcasses classified as intermediate (48% of the carcasses in the experiment), and 28% of the 
carcasses classified as tough (5% of the carcasses in the experiment) were rated slightly 
tender or higher by the panel, and hence were suitable for certification. Note that we do not 
explicitly recognize that more stringent thresholds have the "potential benefit" discussed in 
footnote 41. Maybe this component was highly weighted by Shackelford, Wheeler, and 
Koohmaraie 1999. In any case, the criterion used by proponents of thresholds is rarely 
articulated explicitly.40 
40 The developers of MSA are an exception. They justify the large number of rejections of acceptable steaks on 
the grounds that it is necessary to guarantee consumer satisfaction (Thompson et al., 1999). Shackelford, 
Wheeler, and Koohmaraie (1999) are not explicit about the criterion used to choose their shear force threshold 
for the tender class, but it seems to be in a way such that there are not disappointed consumers. Other authors 
proposed threshold to assure a given percentage of consumer satisfaction, but they do not explain why that 
percentage is the correct target (e.g. Shackelford et al., 1991; Huffman et al., 1996; Miller et al., 2001). 
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For estimation of the probability of consumer satisfaction, or of acceptance, consumer 
j 's perceptions upon tasting the steak are assumed to be summarized by the dichotomous 
variable Aj, where; 
Therefore, for certified tender steaks, values of A .  =  0 ,  reflect disappointment by 
buyer j . Conditional on w , A  can be viewed from the modeler's perspective to follow a 
Bernoulli distribution 8 [ w )  .4I We know that the probability of acceptance will vary 
systematically with quality w and one would expect the probability of acceptance for any 
given Bernoulli trial to vary systematically with it. For estimation purposes, the systematic 
component is assumed linear in the parameters ( a and /? ), and we use the logit as the link 
function connecting w and E^A\w} = #(w) which yields the logistic regression model 
logit (0, ) = a + J3wi 42 For the logit model, the thresholds can be obtained in closed form. For 
4.3.1.2 Value of a customer is consumer specific 
Consumer heterogeneity from differences in tastes not shocks complicates the 
analysis because the value assigned to any particular consumer and hence the punishment 
that that consumer can impose depends on how easy or difficult he or she is to please. In this 
section, we interpret the punishment a consumer can impose on the alliance as the loss of the 
expected net present value of that customer's future purchases. More demanding consumers 
will be less valued (for any fixed premium) because they are easier to lose. In other words, it 
is more likely that a consumer who has high standards will be disappointed in any given 
purchase. The alliance expects him/her not to repeat the purchase with high probability. 
Hence, expected punishments are consumer specific. Suppose that in any given period, the 
41 Recall that denotes the probability that a random consumer that shows up at the meat counter to buy 
steak with measured tenderness W is satisfied by the product. 
42 The logistic model has been used to model the relationship between shear force, and consumer's acceptability 
of steaks (Platter et al., 2003a). 
1 (  ô  
example, under the profit maximization criteria w = — In — - a 
I P J J 
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alliance knows that a consumer will be disappointed T  periods down the road. Hence, the 
punishment this consumer can impose on the alliance if he/she is disappointed in that period 
is given by S  =  p y ' ~ x  ~ P  =  —^—-—-, where y  e(0,1) represents the appropriate 
discount factor. The equation represents the punishments the consumer can impose after 
paying for the current period steak. When there will be no repeated purchases, i.e. when 
7 = 1, the alliance cannot be punished for noncompliance in any given period. In these 
situations, it has been shown that markets for experience attributes will fail to develop (Klein 
and Leffler, 1981; Grossman, 1981; Antle, 2001; Marette, Bureau, and Gozlan, 2000). Note 
that consumers from whom the alliance expects more purchases over time have the capability 
t o  i m p o s e  s t i f f e r  p e n a l t i e s  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  H o w e v e r ,  t h e  t i m e  p e r i o d  i n  w h i c h  c u s t o m e r  y  
will be disappointed is random, and depends on the interaction between his/her preferences 
(unknown to the alliance) and the quality distribution of steaks certified. Hence the alliance 
p A \ - E T ( r ^ ) )  
can only evaluate the punishment in an expectations sense ET8 = — . As 
before, a consumer with taste y  will be satisfied whenever, by purchasing a certified steak, 
he/she finds that w<y. In any given period this scenario occurs with probability 
m (y, *) = ( w < ;y) = (y), for any consumer with .y < w where (.) 
r ( w j 
represents the cumulative distribution of tenderness in the certified population. By the 
d m  ( y , w )  
definition of a cdf, > 0, which just reflects the fact that less demanding consumers 
d y  
will be satisfied with higher probabilities for any distribution of qualities. The same 
consumer is disappointed in any given period with probability 1-zm(>>,w) . With this in 
place, T can be given the interpretation of a geometric random variable, with "success" 
probability l-m(_y,w), which is counting the number of periods until customer y is 
43 For customers with y > w, m{}\ w) = 1. Even the less tender of the certified steaks will satisfy these 
consumers, implying that mismatches do not occur for this segment of the customer base. 
102 
disappointed. Then Er8 = V-^) and ^T^ > 0. The previous derivative implies that 
it is costlier to mismatch a less demanding customer. Note also that the value placed upon 
each customer, given by his/her punishment capability is endogenous. As w increases (and 
the distribution of certified quality spreads towards less tender beef), the probability that any 
customer with y < w is satisfied in any given period decreases, and so does the expected net 
d m ( y , w )  
present value of that consumer. More formally —— = — r- < 0, since by the 
d w  ( l -  y m ( y , w ) ^  
definition of «(,», = 
Note that this does not imply that the alliance can reduce total punishments and 
increase profits just by increasing the threshold. There is a balancing effect. As the alliance 
increases the threshold, a higher proportion of consumers are likely to be disappointed. 
Therefore, the net effect of increasing the threshold on expected total punishments is in 
general ambiguous. If the expected total punishment is decreasing over the relevant range of 
w we would have a corner solution, with the alliance certifying all the steaks. The trade-off 
just discussed is captured in the necessary conditions for the alliances' problem. We will 
return to it after we present the problem formally. 
Stepping back for a moment, in parallel to our exposition in the previous section, 
suppose that every consumer has the same known perception of what is an acceptable steak. 
In this situation, all consumers will be satisfied only if the common expectations are not "too 
high" relative to the population of cattle available to the alliance. The next result states and 
proves this claim formally: 
Result 3: For any given and known level of expectations y = y and distribution of 
quality in the base cattle population F (•) such that f ( y )  > 0, all customers will be satisfied 
with probability one only if F(j7) > 1/2, that is, if the median quality will be found 
acceptable by all consumers. Otherwise, no effort will be incurred in sorting (recall that 
h i g h e r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i n  t e r m s  o f  q u a l i t y  t r a n s l a t e  i n t o  l o w e r  y  ) .  
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Proof: For fixed y = y , all customers will be satisfied with probability one if w < y . 
We first show that w<y does not maximize profits. For any arbitrary w< y, 
E(N\W}  = j* { ^ p ~ { \ - d ^W)^E T 5^F  [W)DW , which simplifies to E(TT\W)  =  p F ( w )  by the 
definition of #(•). By the properties of a cdf and the assumption that / (p) > 0, the previous 
function does not attain a maximum in the region w<y. Therefore, only w> y are 
candidate solutions for the profit maximization problem, and only w - y result in the 
satisfaction of all customers with probability one. For any particular w>y, profits are 
E ( n \ w }  = ^  { ^ p - ( l -0 (w))i?rc>)/( w ) d w  +  J p - { \ - d { w ^ E T ô f [ w ^ d w ,  which can be 
rewritten as E {K \W^ = /?F(y) + (/?-Zsr£)(F(w)-F(j>)) by use of the definition of #(•). 
Therefore, w = y will result only when (/?-ET8) < 0 for all w>y. Since (p-ET5) is 
monotonically increasing in w, it is sufficient to identify the conditions needed for w —» <x>. 
fyf (y) 
lim ( p  -  E T S ) =  lim < 0 occurs when y  F  (7)  > 1/2,  which implies  
F(w)-yF(y)  
F(y)  > 1/2 .  Otherwise,  there  exis t  some w '  such that (p - E r S ) > 0 and no effort will be 
incurred in sorting, since the profit function is monotonically increasing for all w  >  w ' .  •  
Ex ante profits given by equation (4.2) can be written as 
E ( n \ w )  =  E W  { ^ p - ( \ - 6 ( w ) } E Y ( ^ E T 8 ) \ y  <  w ) | w <  w ) P r „ ,  { w <  w ) - C .  
which can be written in integral form as £M*)= tip- LT^r^dG MVM-c 
or 
' l - y m ( y ,  w )  
E ( t v \ w }  =  p  F(w) - £  J *  — ^ j — \ ^ d G { y y ) d F ( w )  - C .  (4.6) 
The double integral in equation (4.6) represents the expected losses due to matching 
or classification errors. Again, the losses arise because disappointed customers will not repeat 
purchases. The necessary condition for a maximum for this problem is given by 
104 
\ 
< 0  (4.7) 
y 
with equality only if w > 0 . Equation (4.7) captures formally the trade-off between the size 
of the punishment and the proportion of disappointed consumers. The third term in equation 
(4.7) denotes the change in the expected size of the punishment. This term combined with the 
preceding negative sign are conducive to higher thresholds. The second term of equation 
(4.7) represents the punishments coming from an increased proportion of disappointed 
consumers. Note that this is the only term in the equation (combined with the preceding sign) 
providing incent ives  to  the al l iance to  not  cer t i fy  a l l  the  s teaks.  Using the def ini t ion of  m(«)  
and G ( » )  the first order condition can be written as 
The optimal threshold depends on the distribution of consumer's tastes, and in 
contrast with the fixed punishment case (presented in the previous section), on the 
interpretation. The alliance should increase the threshold until the costs outweigh the benefits 
of doing so. Benefits of increasing the threshold accrue due to larger proportions of 
certifiable product, and reductions in the punishment each disappointed customer can inflict. 
On the costs side, punishments due to mismatches are more likely to occur. For the alliance 
to find it worthwhile to put some effort in sorting, the term in parenthesis in equation (4.8) 
has to be positive for some w. This will only be satisfied if the decline in net present value of 
customers is strictly smaller than the punishments due to the increased proportion of 
z \ 
^<0. (4.8) 
distribution of measured tenderness in the cattle population.44 This equation has the usual 
44 Since the premium enters multiplicatively on the punishment function, it washes away from the first order 
condition. However, whether the alliance is successful (profitable) or not will be ultimately determined by the 
premium. 
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mismatches. Figure 4.4 presents the expected punishment function obtained from the data 
analysis in section 4.4. 
The sufficient condition for this problem is given by 
m? i-r ^ ^ 
<o. 
A potential extension to the work presented here would be to study the effects of the 
distribution of tastes in the population on the optimal threshold, and alliance profitability. In 
contrast to the situation where all consumers have identical tastes, the effects of different 
expectations distributions on the optimal threshold can not be explored analytically. 
However, the effects of consumer heterogeneity on the threshold (and alliance profitability) 
can be assessed, in principle, numerically, using for example mean preserving spreads on the 
distribution of tastes, or solving the problem for alternative plausible distributions. McKenna 
et al. (2003) reported variations in consumers' ratings of beef that can be attributed to 
cooking methods, degree of doneness, and interactions with other factors such as city. 
Research has shown it is common for cities to have grade differences (see McKenna et al., 
2003 and cites therein). This implies that appropriate thresholds may differ for different 
regions. The alliance could attempt to improve the overall levels of acceptability, by 
targeting certain market segments (or geographical locations) known to rate beef tenderness 
better. A pragmatic implication is that different thresholds could be tailored to different 
populations leading to higher proportions of certified product (and profitability). In short, the 
alliance would be engaging in more sorting than just an absolute threshold.45 
45 This would also have practical implications if the alliance can exert efforts to reduce consumer heterogeneity 
in perceptions, for example by educating customers on cooking methods that will result in consistent (or 
improved) tenderness. For example, if the alliance can convince a customer to cook the steaks to a lesser 
degree, the perception for that consumer will be better (and likely to meet the expectations of marginal 
consumers). CCA (2002) found that 88% of customers not satisfied with their steaks blamed it on the product, 
whereas only 6% and 5% cooked correctly their boneless cross ribs and inside round respectively. When 
instructions on correct cooking methods were provided, those figures rose to 52% and 29% respectively. 
However, this would be another line of research requiring an alternative interpretation of W, as a noisy signal 
of the true quality. Consumers cannot learn the true tenderness of a steak (even after consumption), only a 
signal of it affected by for example by the abilities of the cook. 
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4.3.2 True tenderness cannot be learned 
There is no testing technology currently available allowing us to determine true 
tenderness index w. This index has to be inferred from other measurements. Shackelford, 
Wheeler, and Koohmaraie (1999) point out that the repeatability of slice shear force 
measurements is 0.89, indicating that there is still uncertainty of the true "tenderness" of a 
steak even after the test has been performed. In this situation, the alliance has to rely on the 
noisy signal w0 |w to make decisions. The threshold has to be identified in terms of w0. 
Associated with any value of w0 there is a posterior probability distribution for the true 
tenderness g(w|w0). Formally, g(w|w0)cc f ( w ) h ( w { } \ w), where /z(w0|w) is the sampling 
distribution of the tests results, and /(w) represents the prior information the alliance has 
about the cattle available. Tenderness of any given steak is now a random variable, and the 
results of the test give us some information about it. The acceptance region is the interval of 
feasible w0 such that w0<w0. In general, for any w(: in the acceptance region, the expected 
profits are given by E ^ { j ? - ( \ - 6 { w f ) E Y ( ô \ y  <  w)-C|w0), and averaged over all the 
acceptance region are E^^E^ (p -(l - 6>(w))(<?|y < w) -C|w0 < w0). We only present 
h e r e  t h e  c a s e  w h e r e  a l l  c o n s u m e r s  a r e  v a l u e d  i d e n t i c a l l y  a n d  ô  i s  f i x e d  [ e y  [ ô \ y  <  w )  =  6 ^ .  
Over the rejection region expected profits are EWa>{/aE^ (-C|w0 > w0 ) = -C. Hence, ex-ante 
expected profits for an alliance that has chosen the threshold w0 are given by 
£( ; r |w 0 )= £  £(/?-( l -6>(w))£)g(w|w 0 ) /z(w 0 )^w<iw 0 -C,  (4.9)  
where h ( w 0 )  is the marginal distribution of the results of the test, 
Equation (4.9) can be rearranged to yield 
E ( n \ w 0 )  =  p H ( w 0 ) - C - S  j^((l-6>(w)))g(w|w0)/z(wj<iw</w0, (4.10) 
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where, //(•) is the cumulative distribution of the test results. The term involving the double 
integral in equation (4.10) represents the costs of not being able to sort the product perfectly 
to match consumers' expectations. Equation (4.10) can be rewritten to obtain 
E { x \ w 0 )  =  ( p - S ) H { w 0 ) - C  +  ô ^ E 9 ( w \ w 0 ) h ( w 0 ) d w 0 .  
The first order condition for an interior solution for this problem is given by 
which yields £#(w|w0) = ———. The expected probability of acceptance at the threshold is 
S  
the same as when the true w  was observable. The problem is to find the value of vv0 such 
that the previous equation holds. Now the optimal threshold is not independent of the 
distribution of tenderness in the population of cattle available to the alliance. In particular, 
the distribution of tenderness on the cattle population affects the threshold through the 
posterior distribution. When w is observable, the distribution of tenderness only affects the 
feasibility of the system, that is, whether or not the system will be implemented. When w is 
not observable, the distribution of quality of the population plays a role in both, the optimal 
threshold of the signal, and whether the system is feasible. 
Note that the equation determining the threshold can be rewritten in a way that makes 
clearer the factors involved as 
£/9(w|w0)= J<9(w)t/G(w|w0)= J(l-G(w)yQ(w|w0) = -~-, 
which is equivalent to J<j(w)dQ{w\w^ = ^ . G(«) is again the cumulative distribution 
function of perceptions that will be considered acceptable. If we assume that different w0 's 
lead to first order stochastically dominated shifts of the distribution of w, the left hand side 
of the equality is increasing in w0, implying that if a solution exists, it is unique. 
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4.4 Data and estimation results 
The organization of the discussion and the approach used in this section follows 
closely that in Babcock, Carriquiry and Stern (1996). To illustrate the approach proposed, 
data was obtained and estimation of the relevant distribution functions was conducted. The 
data obtained are measurements of Warner-Bratzler shear force in two experiments 
(described below) conducted at Iowa State University. Some summary information of the 
data used here is presented in the first two rows of Table 1. The means and standard 
deviations of shear force obtained in both experiments seem to be smaller than those reported 
in other studies (Table 1), hence care is warranted when interpreting our results. As argued 
before, a "guaranteed tender" certification system is most likely to be successful when 
combined with some type of pre-sorting of cattle (e.g. as a complement to some of the 
existing ventures that sort by breed, number of days on high energy diets, etc), because this 
allows the concentration of efforts (and testing costs) on animals that have higher chances of 
being certified. The cattle population used in this study could be seen as being the result of 
selection from the general cattle population, by some criteria conducive to obtain tender 
beef.46 Our intention here is to illustrate the usage of the framework proposed, which can be 
easily adjusted to the cattle population available to the alliance and relevant economic 
environment. 
The functions needed to solve the preceding model are 
a) the sampling distribution of shear force measurement represented 
by /z(w0|w) 
b) the prior density function of shear force in the population of cattle of 
interest / (w) 
c) the distribution of perceptions that will be considered acceptable for 
t h e  t a r g e t  p o p u l a t i o n  g { y )  
46 Hilton et al (2004) also obtained low averages of shear force. In that study, selection was conducted by 
trained evaluators. Animals were chosen from over 2000 feedlot steers and heifers. Additional sorting was 
conducted after slaughter, retaining only A-maturity carcasses with marbling scores between Slight and Modest. 
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Table 4.1. Summary statistic from seven selected studies from the animal and meat science 
literature 
Study n Aging (days) Mean (kg) SD (kg) Grades3 
Gonzalez (2003) 10 1 &7 2.34 0.80 C 
Iowa Beef Tenderness Project 376 N/A 2.53 0.45 p,c,s 
Wheeler et al. (2002) 306 14 4.0 0.90 c,s 
400 14 3.82 0.86 c,s 
Hilton et al. (2004) 303 14 2.41-2.57" N/Ad c,s 
Shackelford et al. (1997) 400 14 5.3 1.6 N/A 
594 14 4.1 1.1 N/A 
Platter et al. (2003b) 550 14 & 21 3.54-4.46c N/A P,C,S 
Vote et al. (2003) 399 14 4.0 0.9 c,s 
195 14 4.5 1.1 c,s 
304 14 4.3 0.9 N/A 
184 14 4.7 1.0 S 
aUSDA quality grade: P=prime, Ochoice, S=select. Six different phenotypes were 
considered. cFor different hormonal implanting strategies. dOnly standard errors for the 
means are reported in the study, and the sample size after post-harvest sorting was not 
reported (see footnote 1). 
Data for estimation of a) and b) are available, whereas the parameters of the function 
g(>!) are obtained from the animal science literature. Specifically, Platter et al. (2003a) used 
the logistic regression model presented before to predict probability of acceptance of steaks 
by consumers, as a function of shear force. Here we interpret y as a given consumer's 
perception. Steak with shear force w > y ' will be considered unacceptable by all consumers 
with acceptability perceptions y < y'. In this context, G(w) represents the probability that a 
steak with shear force w will be deemed unacceptable. In Platter et al. (2003a), the predicted 
4.7331-1.0701"* 
probability of acceptance was given by d(w) = -—47331-10701»»- » hence, the predicted 
probability of rejection would be G(w) = \-B (w) = -—4733^,-1 070i*w • take the parameters 
of the distribution as given ignoring uncertainty in the estimates. 
4.4.1 Prior density and sampling distribution 
The prior distribution captures the alliance's prior information about the actual 
tenderness as captured by shear force of the cattle available to them, that is, their beliefs 
about shear forces, before obtaining any new information through testing. A three parameter 
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gamma distribution, an informative prior, will be used in this illustration. This distribution 
was chosen based on an analysis of shear force measurements. Data for this purpose was 
collected from an experiment designed to assess the effects of different power ultrasound 
treatments on properties of the longissimus muscle (Gonzalez, 2003). The longissimus of 10 
animals were used in this study. Each muscle (20 in total), was cut into 10 steaks, and each 
steak was divided into four samples. Three treatments were applied, and the remaining 
sample was left as a control. In total 800 samples were obtained (and 1600 cores were 
sheared). The data represents Warner-Bratzler test results rather than actual tenderness, but 
we ignore measurement errors in constructing the prior distribution. The idea here is to try to 
get a sense of the distribution of tenderness that will obtain from the cattle available. The 
treated samples from the previous data set may not be appropriate for this purpose, since the 
objective of the treatment was to alter the distribution or of tenderness of the meat. Instead, 
only the samples from the control group (in their natural state) were used. 
Several tests for normality (using the procedure CAPABILITIES of SAS, on WBS 
force measurements of the 200 untreated samples in Gonzalez (2003)) were conducted on the 
data set described below, and the null hypothesis that the data comes from a normal 
distribution is rejected. 47 Graphical analysis of the distribution of the tests results from the 
untreated samples indicated that a positively skewed distribution might be appropriate. 
Shackelford et al. (1991, p. 293) conducted the same tests for normality concluding "WBS 
values were normally distributed". However, discrepancies between their results and those 
expected if WBS were to follow a theoretically normal distribution are explained by the lack 
of "perfectly normal" data. In their discussion they note that the data was positively skewed 
since "the majority of the carcasses had WBS values less than the mean while the upper 
tail...extended beyond 10 kg (4.9 standard deviations above the mean)". Hence, we chose a 
three parameter gamma distribution to represent the prior belief of the alliance about the 
tenderness w in the cattle population available. The density of the proposed distribution is 
47 The tests conducted were: Shapiro-Wilk, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Cramer-von Mises, and Anderson-Darling. 
All returned p-values lower than 0.01. Applying the same analysis to the other data set available confirmed 
these results. 
,T(r) 
I l l  
The parameters 7 7 ,  K , and r were estimated (through maximum likelihood) to be 
77 = 0.4338, ic = 1.1821 and f = 2.8142, implying that the expected value and standard 
deviation of w are 2.40 and 0.73 kg respectively, which are equal to the same sample 
statistics obtained for the control group (the first row of Table 1 reports the same statistics for 
all the treatments). 
To explore the shape and estimate the parameters of the sampling distribution 
h(w0\w) a different data set was used. Data for this purpose was obtained from the Iowa 
Beef Tenderness Project, a three year project (2000-2002) that sought (among other 
objectives) to identify sires that produce superior offspring in terms of tenderness. The 
longissimus dorsi of 376 steers were used in this study. The animals used in this project were 
mostly from the Angus breed, and finished on high energy diets on a central testing site. This 
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Figure 4.2. Mean versus standard deviation (over six replicates) for shear force measurement 
of 376 samples 
may explain the low average shear forces measured and the homogeneity (low standard 
deviation) in tenderness of the group. A plot of the mean (of six cores) and standard 
deviation of shear force for each sample is presented in Figure 4.2. 
Standard deviations appear to be increasing with the mean shear force, and 
conditional on the mean, the data do not appear skewed. A normal distribution with mean w 
and variance (y/wf is hypothesized for the sampling distribution of the individual cores. The 
sampling distribution for the result of the test is just the average of independent (if the testing 
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is done correctly) measurements obtained from n cores from a steak, and hence follows a 
normal distribution with mean w and variance (i//vv)2 In . y/2 needs to be estimated from the 




where k is the number of samples available, rt is the number of cores sheared in the i'h 
sample and Xf and S2 are the mean and variance of the measurements obtained from the i'h 
sample. For the data set available, rt = 376*6 = 2256, and the parameter was estimated 
to be y/2 = 0.0402. Hence, ignoring the uncertainty in this estimate, the sampling distribution 
of test results is normal with mean w and variance 0.0402 w2 / n. Research has shown that to 
achieve high repeatability, six cores (n = 6 ) are recommended (Wheeler et al., 1997). 
The posterior distribution of w  (again ignoring uncertainty in the estimate of y / 2 )  can 
be written as 
4 n  exp 1-0.5((w0 - w ) y / n / y / \ v j  - 1 ) ~ X  ( w - K y > ( w - K ) r  '  
? ( w K ) =  i h j j w w  •  
where the normalizing constant, represented by the derived marginal distribution of w0 is 
given by 
Vn exp|-0.5|(w0 - w ) J n  / y / w \  - r f x  (w-?c)|(w-/^)r '  
h ( w 0 ) =  f  '  j =  —  '  d w .  
^ y f 2 i ï y / w r } T r ( T )  
Figures 4.3a and 4.3b present the derived marginal distribution for Wamer-Bratzler 
shear force measurements, and the posterior distribution conditional on different test results. 
Figure 4.3b highlights the fact that significant uncertainty with regards to tenderness 
persists, even after completion of the best test currently available to measure it. Also, the 
distributions are not centered on the result of the test, especially for values that differ from 
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the a priori expected result. This reflects the effect of the informative prior distribution used. 
This combined with the observation that tougher steaks are associated with larger sampling 
variability (as reflected by the sampling distribution proposed), lead to posteriors with higher 
variances for larger tests results. 
(a) 
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Figure 4.3. (a) Derived marginal distribution for test results; (b) Posterior distributions for 
three different test results 
4.4.2 Determining the profit maximizing thresholds 
To find the optimal thresholds, information is needed about the distribution of 
consumer tastes or types in the target population. Since data to gain that information is not 
available, we rely here on the results obtained by Platter et al. (2003a) who fitted a logistic 
regression to determine the probability of acceptance as determined by WBSF. We first 
obtain the threshold for the case where tenderness can be observed by the alliance through 
testing. The scenario when testing is imperfect is solved next. 
4.4.2.1 True tenderness can be learned through testing 
We assume in this section that the prior distribution obtained is an accurate reflection 
of the quality of the cattle available to the alliance. For the scenario where the value of a 
consumer is not taste specific and 5 is fixed, we showed in section 4.3.1.1 that for the logit 





S - p 
-a 
Under the expected net present value interpretation of the punishment, if the alliance's 
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py 
planning horizon is long enough, 5 = J-J— obtains, and the profit maximizing threshold can 
1 -y 
be rewritten as w* = — 
P 
In 
2 y - \  
1 - 7  
- a . In the logistic regression setting, /? has the 
v \ ^ / V 
interpretation of the change in the log-odds of success (that the steak is found acceptable) 
that corresponds to a one unit increase in the independent variable w. Therefore, it is 
expected to be negative (tougher steaks have lower probabilities of success). For the 
distribution of tastes implied by Platter et al. (2003a), /? = -1.0701, and a = 4.7331. As the 
punishment that can be imposed upon the alliance parameterized by the discount factor 
increases, the optimal threshold decreases, provided that the alliance puts sufficient weight 
on future earnings.48 For a discount factor of 0.9, the optimal threshold is w = 2.48 kg, and 
for the distribution of tenderness of the cattle available, 61.9% of the loins tested will be 
certified. 
When the value of a consumer is taste specific, the threshold needs to be obtained 
numerically, either by maximizing equation (4.6) (or equivalently the parenthesized portion 
of the equation), or solving equation (4.7). We follow the first approach. In this case, the 
optimal threshold depends on both the distribution of tastes, and the distribution of quality. 
Figure 4.4 explores the shape of the expected profits equation for different thresholds, by 
plotting the parenthesized term of equation (4.6). We explore this portion of the equation 
rather than expected profits because the shapes are the same and it allows us to avoid 
assuming a premium and testing costs. Expected profits are obtained just by rescaling that 
term by the appropriate premium and subtracting testing costs. 
The two marked curves in Figure 4.4 represent the individual terms in the 
parenthesized portion of equation (4.6). The curve labeled "CDF" is the cumulative 
distribution function of the population of cattle available. The "E. Punishment" represents the 
expected total punishments by disappointed costumers respectively. Figure 4.4 depicts a 
situation where expected total punishments are increasing in the threshold, affording an 
\-i d w  ( 1  - y )  




interior solution. The dashed line in Figure 4.4 represents the term in parenthesis in equation 
(4.6). Clearly, profits will be highest when this term attains a maximum. That happens at 
w = 3.98 kg. The distribution function of tenderness indicates that at the profit maximizing 
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Figure 4.4. Cumulative distribution function of tenderness, expected punishments from 
dissatisfied customers, and difference between the fraction certified under alternative 
thresholds and expected punishments, y = 0.9 
At the profit maximizing threshold, the term in parenthesis is 0.85, hence the venture 
is profitable only if CI p< 0.85, or if the costs of testing do not surpass 85% of the 
premium. Notice the trade-off between the expected punishments by dissatisfied customers 
and opportunity costs. For very low thresholds, all consumers will be satisfied, but only a 
small fraction of the product is certified. 
The optimal threshold obtained when tastes are consumer specific is noticeable higher 
than the one arising for non-consumer specific tastes and a long planning horizon. The 
difference between the two is due to the way in which the alliance perceives the punishments. 
In a sense, by increasing the threshold, the alliance is diminishing the punishment capabilities 
of each consumer. However, Figure 4.4 indicates that expected punishments increase as the 
threshold is increased. Figure 4.4 also shows that the benefits associated with certifying a 
higher proportion of steaks are only offset by the punishments at higher values of the 
threshold. 
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A high proportion of steaks certified were expected for this environment. First, the 
distribution of quality used is such that there are a large proportion of animals with low shear 
forces (see Table 4.1). The population of cattle used could be seen as coming from a 
successful presorting. Additionally, the first order conditions of the problem indicate that as 
the threshold is relaxed, the alliance knows it is putting a lower quality product in the market 
(in an expectations sense) and lessening the punishment potential of consumers (this was 
already argued above). Lastly subjects used by Platter et al. (2003a), whose taste distribution 
we borrow, may have been "too lenient" in their answers, since they were only asked if the 
steak was acceptable, and not if it would have been acceptable in a tenderness certified 
program. For example, increasing marginally (in absolute value) the parameter /?, which 
would be representing a more demanding population of consumers led to more a stringent 
threshold (simulations not shown). 
4.4.2.2 True tenderness cannot be learned through testing 
We turn now to the situation where the alliance can only observe the noisy signal of 
tenderness provided by WBS force measurement. In parallel to the presentation of the 
conceptual model, only the scenario where tastes are not consumers specific and 5 is fixed 
will be considered. Figure 4.5 illustrates the determination of the optimal threshold for the 
test. From the analysis in section 4.3.2, the optimal threshold is implicitly defined by 
EOiw w*f\ = ———. Returning to the interpretation of the punishment as the expected NPV 
^ ' ô 
of a consumer for a time horizon that is long enough, i.e. ô  =  p y  / { y - 1), (or letting 5  be 
proportional to p) we obtain Ed{w w^ = {2y-\)ly, the threshold depends only on the 
discount factor (or proportionality constant). The downward sloping curve in Figure 4.5 
represents the expected probability of acceptance for alternative test results ^E0^w\wQ^j. 
The profit maximizing threshold is determined by finding the test result at which the 
expected probability of acceptance curve intersects the relevant horizontal line, representing 
S — p 
alternative values of —, which for the current interpretation of the punishments translate 
8 
into alternative discount factors. 
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For the same discount factor used in the previous section, that is y = 0.9, the required 
expected probability of acceptance is (2y - l ) / y  =  0 .89 .  The test result associated with an 
expected probability of acceptance of 0.89 and therefore profit maximizing is Wq - 2.47 kg 
(see Figure 4.5). To provide a measure of the uncertainty involved in the probability if 
acceptance, we report that for the proposed threshold the posterior interval is given by (0.84, 
0.92). Also, from the derived marginal distribution of test results (Figure 4.3a), 61.3% of 
tested steaks will be certified for this discount factor. 
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Figure 4.5. Determination of the profit maximizing threshold for two different premium-
punishment combinations 
Note that this threshold is significantly lower than the one obtained for the case of 
customer specific tastes. This is due in part to the discussed fact that in the later environment 
punishments were endogenous (and affected by the alliance). 
The threshold proposed by Shackelford et al. (1991) to obtain 68% of steaks rated 
slightly tender or better was 3.9 kg. Figure 4.5 shows that the proposed threshold, correspond 
to an expected probability of acceptance of 66%, which would be profit maximizing under a 
discount rate of 0.75. The percentage of steaks certified under this threshold (again obtained 
from the marginal distribution of test results, Figure 4.3a) would be 96.1%. For the prior and 
sampling distributions obtained, a test result of 3.9 kg, result in an expected posterior shear 
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force of 3.79 kg, and an expected probability of acceptance comparable (slightly lower) to 
that obtained by Shackelford et al. (1991). The acceptability level proposed by these authors 
(68%) is included in the 95% posterior interval (0.51, 0.77) for the probability of acceptance 
at w0 = 3.9,49 When quality can be measured perfectly an expected probability of acceptance 
of 0.66 can be obtained by w = 3.8 kg, which is as just argued the expected posterior shear 
force of a test result of 3.9 kg. The informative prior distribution is indicating that such a 
high test result may be overestimating the true tenderness and corrects accordingly. In the 
same line, if the required shear force to attain the optimum probability of acceptance falls 
below the prior mean, the alliance needs to allow for some "margin of error" when an 
imperfect test is used.50 
Direct comparisons are hard to make, because of the way in which questions were 
posed to consumers. In Shackelford et al. (1991), acceptability was not recorded directly 
(tenderness ratings higher than "slightly tender" were considered acceptable), whereas it was 
recorded in the work of Platter et al. (2003a). Huffman et al. (1996) concluded from their 
study that steaks with less than 4.1 kg of WBS force will ensure satisfaction of 98% of 
customers. Miller et al. (2001) obtained 100% tenderness acceptability with steaks of 
measured WBS force lower than 3, and 93% tenderness acceptability for values of WBS 
force between 3 and 4.6 kg. The tenderness acceptability levels reported in the later two 
studies seem to be higher than those obtained in the present work and by Shackelford et al. 
(1991). The discrepancy with our work may be partially explained by the fact that the 
distribution of tastes borrowed from Platter et al. (2003a) referred to overall and not just 
tenderness acceptability. 
4.5 Conclusions 
One of the main problems identified by U.S. beef industry participants is the lack of a 
uniform and consistently tender product. This problem is important because there is 
widespread agreement that tenderness is the single most important factor affecting consumer 
satisfaction with beef. The lack of adequate product tenderness has been blamed, at least 
49 The posterior interval associated with a test result of 3.9 kg is wider than the one for 2.44 kg. This takes into 
account the larger uncertainty associated with higher test results. 
50 For example, if the discount factor is y = 0.95 the optimal threshold when quality can be assessed without 
error is 1.67 kg, whereas the same threshold is 1.60 if there are testing errors. 
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partially, for the decline in beef market share to other sources of protein. The beef industry 
has been slow in implementing systems to sort beef better into tenderness classes. This has 
been fueled by the feeling of packers and feedyards that no one would want to purchase 
steaks in the least tender classes (Schroeder et al. 1997). Agricultural economists, along with 
meat and animal scientists, documented that consumers are willing to pay premiums 
exceeding the costs of testing and sorting for meat that is guaranteed tender (Boleman et al., 
1997; Lusk et al., 2001; Miller et al., 2001; Shackelford et al., 2001). Hence, there is an 
opportunity for certain groups of producers to create a niche market and add value to their 
cattle by categorizing meat according to tenderness. This marketing strategy is beginning to 
be used in the U.S.51 
Some of the difficulties of implementing a tenderness certification system for red 
meats (with particular emphasis on beef), and the main economic factors to consider are 
identified in this paper. Specifically, we have shown that the optimal threshold depends in 
general on the distribution of quality of the livestock available, the precision available to 
measure it, the objective pursued, the distribution of consumer tastes, and how the venture 
perceives the likelihood that a consumer will be disappointed with any given quality 
provided. We develop a flexible framework that can be used to determine optimal 
certification thresholds for a wide variety of economic environments, including perfect and 
imperfect testing technologies, different objectives, and different consumer valuations. The 
commonality to all scenarios considered is that sorting consumers out perfectly is not 
possible. That is, only partial sorting is allowed. 
The paper sheds some light on why determining thresholds for certification of 
tenderness in red meats has been so elusive. A key factor is that the objective function needs 
to be clearly identified in order to obtain a meaningful optimal threshold. Thresholds 
designed under a profit maximizing, cost minimizing, or error minimizing (with different 
weight for different types of errors) objectives will generally differ. 
If the objective is to maximize profits, the optimal threshold when true quality cannot 
be learned will be different than that in the perfect testing scenario. This reflects that when 
51 However, it has been in use for a few years in Australia, using a process based classification system (see the 
literature review). 
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there are testing errors, the alliance needs to take some "margin of error" in the certification 
scheme, which in turn results in a different proportion of certified steaks.52 For all the 
scenarios analyzed, the least stringent thresholds were obtained when customer valuation was 
taste specific and for a perfect testing technology. This follows from the fact that the value of 
each customer for the alliance depends on the distribution of product quality in the market 
and on how hard is he/she to please. Customers that are very demanding are more likely to be 
disappointed sooner, hence, less repeated purchases or business is expected from them. This 
in turn undermines their punishment capabilities. In this model, by increasing the threshold, 
the alliance knows that is providing a product to the market that is of lower expected quality. 
The alliance will expect fewer repeated purchases from all consumers. By loosening the 
threshold, the alliance decreases the punishment each customer can impose (the market is 
less valuable when you do not expect it to last). The balancing factor is that a looser 
threshold will also yield a higher proportion of consumers that are disappointed. 
The analysis presented considers only classification of tenderness into two categories. 
The optimal number of tenderness classes is an open question, not addressed in this 
dissertation. Fruitful exploration of that question will require more information regarding 
consumer's expectations and willingness to pay for different tenderness levels. 
52 This is consistent with the Australian experience, where the boundary for the pass/fail criteria was adjusted in 
order to ensure a high level of confidence (Polkinghorne et al., 1999). 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation analyzed some key economic issues in supply chain management for 
value added products that arise when qualitative or quantitative uncertainties are present. 
Both types of uncertainties entail different problems and plausible solutions. A commonality 
is that they both demand more information gathering and/or tighter coordination among chain 
members than that required for commodity production and afforded by open markets. When 
investments in processing capacity are needed, or the sole existence of the market is 
contingent on the presence of a sought after quality attribute that is difficult (if not 
impossible) to verify even after consumption, some chain participants need to take actions to 
obtain more information or alter the quantity or quality of the product that will be available. 
The actions analyzed in this dissertation are: a) contracting (in Chapter 2) as a way to 
manage the amount of an input a processor will obtain from a group of farmers; b) requiring 
input suppliers to adopt a particular QAS system to affect (stochastically) the quality of the 
output a firm is going to be able to deliver (Chapter 3); and c) the decisions by a group of 
producers with regards to the design of a certification system, focusing on finding thresholds 
for certification on an index of quality measurements (Chapter 4). 
Chapter 2 studied the merit and feasibility of co-existence of spot and contract 
markets for a value added (specialty grain) product. For that purpose, a stylized theoretical 
model was constructed. The situation was modeled as a two stage game, where oligopsonistic 
processors contracted upstream with price taking farmers. In our model, co-existence was 
obtained as Nash equilibrium under a wide range of distinct parameters. This would indicate 
that the introduction of contracting into an agricultural industry does not necessarily mean 
that open markets for those products will disappear. There may be a balance to be obtained 
for the relative size of the two markets. The fundamental economic factors influencing the 
prevalence of each market were identified. It was shown that in order to obtain co-existence, 
both yield uncertainty and a vigorous competition (Bertrand style) whenever a spot market 
arises are needed. From a policy perspective, if the goal is to maintain viable spot markets 
where independent producers can sell their output, it may be necessary to monitor the 
behavior of the buying side whenever an open market arises. The simulations also revealed 
that processors would prefer the disappearance of spot markets if marginal costs of 
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contracting are affected by spot acreage, whereas farmers profits are higher under co­
existence. All our results apply to the particular form of the contract observed. An interesting 
line of research would be to verify whether the same results obtain under alternative 
contractual arrangements, and explore the shape of the optimal contract. 
Chapter 3 analyzed the optimal choice of a QAS a processing firm should require 
from its suppliers, or in other words, the choice of a quasi-voluntary system of assurance. 
This case is becoming pervasive in the food industry. The model presented has great 
generality. It allows us to analyze process control systems, that is verification that certain 
production methods were observed and followed (e.g. free range), as well as control over 
physical attributes of the input (e.g. lean beef). Also, any type of quality attribute, from 
credence to experience can be accommodated within the proposed framework. Our findings 
indicate that when the sought after quality attribute is harder to discover, the firm finds it 
optimal to reduce the stringency of QAS. This effect is magnified when firms cannot obtain 
the full return on their investments in quality; when reputations are not firm-specific firms 
will try to free ride on other firms' investments. Our analysis indicates that increasing the 
number of firms (from a monopoly to a duopoly) is welfare improving only if firms that 
deliver substandard goods can be identified. Firms prefer the firm specific to the industry 
wide reputation. In short, we provide a rationale for both the wide variety of QAS observed 
in the real world, and the branding efforts of many firms to differentiate themselves in the 
marketplace. The chapter also has policy implications. Chief among them is that welfare can 
be enhanced by improving traceability, facilitating branding efforts, and/or mandating 
labeling. 
The last issue addressed (Chapter 4) points to some of the fundamental economic 
factors and challenges that should be considered when designing a quality assurance system. 
This chapter intends to be pragmatic. It proposes a flexible framework that can be used 
empirically by a group of producers to sort their product into quality classes, based on the 
result of some (potentially many and imperfect) measures of quality. In particular, the models 
presented are designed to obtain thresholds for certification. The analysis in conducted in 
terms of beef tenderness, but the framework is clearly more general. 
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The search for thresholds for beef tenderness certification, based on Warner-Bratzler 
shear force measurements (pursued mainly by meat and animal scientists) has been ongoing 
for a long time now. Our models provide insights on why finding those thresholds has been 
such an elusive task. Optimal thresholds depend in a complex way on the particular 
objectives of the designer, the quality of the cattle population available, the distribution of 
consumer tastes (in particular of tenderness acceptability), the accuracy of the testing 
technology, and the way in which the designer believes tenderness acceptability is 
determined (customer versus non-customer specific). The last item in turn determines the 
value the designer will attach to different customers. An illustration of how to put our 
framework to work is provided for different combinations of the mentioned factors. 
The optimal number of quality classes is an open question. We limit the analysis to 
two classes. Although the theoretical models presented can be expanded to address this issue, 
meaningful answers for that question will require carefully designed experiments to elicit 
consumers' expectations and willingness to pay for different tenderness classes, as well as to 
assess their ability to detect subtler differences in tenderness that will result as the number of 
classes increase. 
Chapters 3 and 4 highlight the importance of the economic environment in 
determining the incentives that shape the quality provision efforts of firms. When customers 
have the means or the ability to punish firms that deliver substandard products, firms will put 
more stringent systems in place or choose higher thresholds, even if that implies higher 
procurement costs, or having a lower proportion of the product to sell for a premium. The 
analysis points to environments that will result in higher expected quality delivered to the 
market and markets where low quality firms can be singled out easily. Those are the types of 
markets where reputational mechanisms for quality provision will work best. When firm 
reputational mechanisms do not work, government intervention may be required to prevent 
customer deception, either by providing certification services, requiring quality claims to be 
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